Broadening national security and protecting crowded places -

Performing the United Kingdom’s War on Terror,

2007-2010 by JACKSON, EMILY,LINDSAY
Durham E-Theses
Broadening national security and protecting crowded




JACKSON, EMILY,LINDSAY (2012) Broadening national security and protecting crowded places -
Performing the United Kingdoms War on Terror, 2007-2010. Doctoral thesis, Durham University.
Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3498/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
Broadening national security and protecting 
crowded places - 




Emily Lindsay Jackson 


















This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Geography. 








Because texts do not reflect the entirety of their authors or their worlds, they enter 
a field of reading as partial provocations, not only requiring a set of prior texts in 
order to gain legibility, but – at best – initiating a set of appropriations and criticisms 
















	   3	  
Abstract 
 
Emily Lindsay Jackson 
Broadening national security and protecting crowded places - 
Performing the United Kingdom’s War on Terror, 2007-2010 
 
This thesis critically interrogates the spatial politics of two ‘fronts’ of the UK’s 
on-going war on terror between 2007-2010: first, broadening national security, the 
extension of national security into non-traditional social and economic domains; and 
second, security in ‘crowded places’, counter-terror regimes in the UK’s public 
spaces. It responds to the neglect within security studies of the spatial politics of this 
conflict by considering the spatial performativities enabling these two 
contemporaneous iterations of national security. The first part applies critical 
geopolitics and biopolitics frameworks to a case study of the new National Security 
Strategy of the United Kingdom. It argues that UK national security reiterates the 
‘interconnecting’ performativities of neoliberal norms as a ‘broadening’ 
understanding of national security which licenses a ‘broadening’ register of coercive 
policy responses. The second part carries out an exploratory case study of one such 
coercive policy response: security at the ‘crowded place’ of the BALTIC Centre for 
Contemporary Art in Gateshead. It identifies crowded places security as reliant on 
practices of emptying out and ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive 'zero tolerance' risk 
imaginaries, and extensive surveillance – both electronic and ‘natural’. In other 
words, counter-terrorism is becoming increasingly important in shaping daily life in 
the UK through a diverse range of spatial control practices. 
The thesis uses an innovative methodological and conceptual strategy combining 
Foucauldian discourse analysis of security policies, participant observation of situated 
security practices, with theoretical frameworks from political geography, 
international relations and visual culture. It also develops Judith Butler’s theory of 
performativity as a conceptual tool to critique the materialisation of contemporary 
spaces of security and counter-terrorism, from the meta-imaginative geographies of 
national security to the micro-spaces of counter-terrorism in UK public space. In 
sum, this thesis points towards new avenues for understanding the on-going 
encroachment of the war on terror into everyday spaces in the UK 
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Glossary 
 
BALTIC The BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead, England. 
 
BoB Michel Foucault (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1978-79. Translated by Graham Burchell. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
CONTEST The UK government’s second public counter-terrorism strategy published by 
the Home Office in March 2009. Its full title is Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare. The 
United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism. 
 
CPAVA A document on security advice for visitor attractions produced by NaCTSO 
and published in 2007. Its full title is Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for 
Visitor Attractions. 
 
CPPS The policy document Crowded Places: The Planning System and Counter-Terrorism 
published by the Home Office in March 2010, as part of the review of crowded 
places security. 
 
CTSA Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers are responsible for implementing 
counter-terrorism protective security at a local level. They report to NaCTSO 
(see below) but are seconded to local police forces. 
 
GIS The Government Indemnity Scheme underwrites the risk of exhibiting valuable 
artworks in public buildings, and is run by the Museums, Libraries and Archives 
Council on behalf of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.   
 
HoS Michel Foucault (1998) The Will to Knowledge. The History of Sexuality: 1. 
Translated by Robert Hurley. London: Penguin. 
 
NaCTSO The National Counter Terrorism Security Office is an organisation within the 
police force funded by the Home Office. It is responsible for supporting the 
Protect and Prepare strands of CONTEST: specifically, the protection of crowded 
places and hazardous sites and substances, as well as the critical national 
infrastructure alongside the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure. 
 
NSS The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom published by the Cabinet 
Office in March 2008, with an update in June 2009. 
 
PCP The policy document Protecting Crowded Places. Design and Technical Issues 
published by the Home Office in March 2010, as part of the review of crowded 
places security. 
 
SMBD Michel Foucault (2004) Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975-76. Translated by David Macey. London: Penguin. 
 
STP Michel Foucault (2007) Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1977-78. Translated by Graham Burchell. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
WTP The policy document Working Together to Protect Crowded Places published by the 
Home Office in March 2010, as part of the review of crowded places security.  
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Chapter 1 Performing the United Kingdom’s 
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1.1 The problem of the war on terror - From the September 11 
attacks to crowded places security 
 
This thesis critically interrogates the spatial politics of two ‘fronts’ of the UK’s 
on-going war on terror between 2007-2010: first, broadening national security, the 
extension of national security into non-traditional social and economic domains; and 
second, security in ‘crowded places’, counter-terror regimes in the UK’s public 
spaces. It responds to the neglect within security studies of the spatial politics of this 
conflict by considering the spatial performativities enabling these two 
contemporaneous iterations of national security. The first part of the thesis applies 
critical geopolitics and biopolitics frameworks to a case study of the new National 
Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.  It argues that UK national security reiterates 
the ‘interconnecting’ performativities of neoliberal norms as a ‘broadening’ 
understanding of national security which licenses a ‘broadening’ register of coercive 
policy responses. The second part of the thesis carries out an exploratory case study 
of one such coercive policy response: security at the ‘crowded place’ of the BALTIC 
Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead. It identifies crowded places security as 
reliant on practices of emptying out and ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive 'zero 
tolerance' risk imaginaries, and extensive surveillance – both electronic and ‘natural’. 
In other words, counter-terrorism is becoming increasingly important in shaping 
daily life in the UK through a diverse range of spatial control practices. 
However, despite the title of this section it is not quite correct to say that the 
problematisation of the war on terror that this thesis pursues began with the 
airplane bombings in New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. For a 
start, and as I elaborate over the following pages, the two ‘fronts’ of the war on 
terror I interrogate, broadening national security and crowded places security, 
materialise regulatory norms that are reiterated in many other violences – petty and 
sublime, invisible and infamous - at many other times and in many other places. 
Furthermore, it is absolutely the case that growing up in the violently contested 
province of Northern Ireland in the 1980s - where highly disruptive counter-terror 
measures were literally a way of life - underwrites a personal interest in wars against 
terrorism which substantially predates September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, as an 
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academic project I can quite clearly discern a line from this thesis back to those 
attacks. 
For in the aftermath of that day, the study of terrorism veritably exploded 
across the British and North American academies, not to mention becoming a topic 
of intense interest within media and popular discourses (Burke, 2003). Of course, 
terrorism and political violence more broadly had already been an important object 
of academic study, in relation both to localised ‘ethnic’ conflicts such as those in 
Northern Ireland and the Basque country (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996), and to the 
more ‘far off’ phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, demonstrated so 
vividly for international audiences by the kidnapping and murder of eleven Israeli 
athletes and a German police officer at the Olympic games in Munich in 1972, and by 
the siege of the Iranian embassy in London in 1980. Scholars wishing to understand 
the events of September 11, 2001 could therefore draw on (and in their turn add to) 
a wide range of literatures on the historical, cultural, religious, and political backdrop 
to Al Qa’ida terrorism (Esposito, 2002; Scruton, 2003); as well as a wealth of 
quantitative analysis on the so-called structural causes of terrorism, which included 
variables of socio-economic depravation, political repression, and lack of educational 
attainment (Enders and Sandler, 2004; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Li, 2005; Pape, 
2005, 2003; Testas, 2004). 
But at the same time, a new or at least distinct movement was also taking shape. 
Almost immediately after the attacks, some scholars, particularly within 
poststructural international relations, were hanging back from the general stampede 
and advocating a slower, more thoughtful response to events (Campbell, 2002; 
Edkins, 2002; Jabri, 2005; Zehfuss, 2003). This was undoubtedly an act of resistance 
to the intensely military nature of the government response led by the United States 
and the United Kingdom. On 7 October 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom was 
launched against the sovereign state of Afghanistan, and the succeeding months were 
also marked by the inexorable building of a case for war against Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq. 
But this new critical movement was also indicative of a wider and deep-seated 
disrespect for government warmongering, and a concern that a full-scale ‘war on 
terror’, fought through overseas military interventions and ‘homeland security’, was 
not only overblown and ineffective but also downright dangerous. Arguments were 
	   13	  
put forward that security measures such as biometric technologies in airports 
(Amoore, 2006), widespread data monitoring (Amoore and de Goede, 2005), and 
restrictions on civil liberties including stop and search powers, posed more of a 
challenge to the everyday life of citizens in the ‘free world’ than the putative 
terrorists. Equally, there was concern for the lives of those outside the west, who 
found themselves ‘othered’ and rendered implacable enemies in the war on terror 
(Graham, 2005; Gregory and Pred, 2007). As a result, more and more scholars in 
international relations and related disciplines began to turn their attention from the 
causes of terrorism to what was identified as the other side of the coin: the logics 
and rationales of the hegemonic discourses that enabled western societies to be 
securitised and to securitise in such crude and repressive ways. 
This thesis is located within this new critical security movement, and in 
particular the hugely influential work of Michel Foucault, whose late-1970s lecture 
seria at the Collège de France in Paris – 1976’s Society Must Be Defended, 1978’s 
Security, Territory, Population, and 1979’s The Birth of Biopolitics – have become almost 
synonymous with critique of the war on terror within international relations and 
associated disciplines. Foucault’s provocative arguments about the uniquely modern 
relationship between power and life – ‘biopolitics’ - though not always consistent, 
have nonetheless proved powerfully resonant in relation to a war on terror that has 
sought, and continues to seek, to securitise and control societies, populations, and 
individuals. His claims in these lectures that ‘politics is the continuation of war by 
other means’ (2004: 15); that ‘a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached 
when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies’ (1998: 143) so 
that these societies become, in effect, an archetypal ‘society of security’ (2007: 10), 
seemed almost supernaturally prescient in the months and years after the September 
11 attacks. This thesis makes use of all three of these claims in problematising the 
UK’s on-going war on terror through the performativity of broadening national 
security and crowded places security. 
Finally, by locating itself within Foucault’s critique, this research is clearly 
distinguishable from the prominent work of ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’ (CTS) 
scholars, who, in the last ten years and driven by some of the same concerns, have 
made great strides in establishing a bona fide sub-discipline concerned with the 
normative analysis of political and state violence (Jackson, 2005; Jackson, Breen 
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Smyth and Gunning, 2009). Specifically, this research differs from CTS in two ways. 
First, it does not rely on recourse to an ‘outside’ – a normative position – beyond 
the babble of the social and from which the power plays of the war on terror can be 
opposed. Instead, it adheres to the view that what can be known about the war on 
terror, terrorism, and state violence acquires its status as ‘knowledge’ only through 
the regulatory parameters of discourse. Second, the research moves beyond the 
assumption widely implicit in CTS that discourse is constituted entirely by people 
and what they say and do. Whilst the social world can only be accessed through 
language, this is not the same as claiming that social phenomena are made possible 
only as linguistic representation. To the contrary, this research moves beyond one of 
the key limitations of both the poststructural and CTS scholarship on contemporary 
security discourses by making the spatial politics of the war on terror its primary 
concern. Such a concern focuses on space as a central consideration in the politics of 
security to the extent that it is generative of, rather than passive to, security 
practices. This necessarily involves the proliferation of agency - moving far beyond 
that of active human agents to that performed through buildings, documents, images, 
installation artworks, indemnity contracts, and even trees. 
In this chapter I introduce the thesis in six stages. In the rest of this section I 
continue to discuss and clarify the academic context in which I commenced and 
carried out this research project, followed by the policy and political backdrops to 
its two case studies of broadening national security and crowded places security. By 
‘political backdrops’ I mean not only the place of these two ‘fronts’ of the war on 
terror within their institutional settings, but also the importance of critiquing their 
emergence within security discourses. Second, I ‘frame’ the research conceptually 
through Judith Butler’s theory of performativity. Third, I set out the aims of the 
research and my guiding research questions. Fourth and fifth, I discuss the research 
design and methodology in turn, which I reformulate in terms of research ‘strategies’ 
and ‘tactics’. Sixth and finally, I explain how I organised the thesis and why it departs 
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1.1.1 Contesting the ‘already-made geographies’ of the war on terror 
 
Although spatial heuristics remain marginalised in much of the critical work on 
the war on terror – exempting of course the work of a number of political 
geographers – they have been gaining ground in the social sciences for some time, 
ably represented by Edward Soja’s assertion in 1989 that the world is not an 
‘already-made geography’ (p. 14). ‘We must be insistently aware’, he wrote, ‘of how 
space can be made to hide consequences from us, how relations of power and 
discipline are inscribed into the apparent innocent spatiality of social life’ (Soja, 1989: 
6). Space has also played a pivotal, if understated, role in Foucault’s work: the 
‘epistemological space’ of discourse in The Order of Things (1989: xi); the utopias and 
heterotopias ‘Of Other Spaces’ (1986); and of course the forceful critique of space, 
knowledge and power unleashed by Discipline and Punish (1991). Still, Elden and 
Crampton (2007: 13) claim that ‘Foucault’s position in relation to geography remains 
unclear… it is fruitful to establish a critical encounter with his work’. 
This thesis takes up the baton here, proposing that the nexus between space, 
knowledge, and security in the conduct of the war on terror is an ideal ‘site’ for such 
an encounter. In looking for a case study through which to explore this relationship 
which has been largely ignored in security studies, I turned to the UK government’s 
policy on crowded places security. A 2010 Home Office publication makes clear that 
preventing violent extremism is ‘not enough’ to meet the ‘significant threat from 
international terrorism’, and that attention must also be given to ‘protective security’ 
in so-called ‘crowded places’: 
 
Crowded places remain an attractive target for international terrorists who 
have demonstrated that they are likely to target places which are easily 
accessible, regularly available and which offer the prospect for an impact 
beyond the loss of life alone (for example serious disruption or a particular 
economic/ political impact) (Home Office, 2010a: 4). 
 
Although what counts as a crowded place is, according to a sister document, ‘a 
matter of judgment’, they are nonetheless categorised as bars, pubs, and clubs, 
restaurants and hotels, shopping centres, sports and concert venues, cinemas and 
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theatres, visitor attractions, the health sector, the education sector,1 and places of 
worship (Home Office, 2010b: 9). My research therefore questions the ‘already-
made geographies’ by which the UK’s high street businesses and public services have 
become a front in the war on terror. What are crowded places? Or more precisely, 
what are the spatial knowledges from which crowded places are materialised, and 
how does this materialisation happen? What makes crowded places insecure? In 
other words, what knowledges make it possible to fight a war on terror in the UK high 
street?  
Scholars in political geography and critical geopolitics, and even in cultural 
studies, have been unravelling the geographical knowledges or ‘imaginaries’ 
underpinning war and violence for many years (and some, like Edward Said, citing 
Foucault too). But whilst my research makes much use of this work in drawing out 
what Derek Gregory and Allan Pred (2007) might term the ‘violent geographies’ of 
crowded places security, and the contemporary broadening of national security 
which it cites (see section 1.5.1), it also makes use of literatures from visual culture, 
critical architecture, political economy and risk to conceptualise the spatial politics of 
these fronts of the war on terror. This thesis is therefore explicitly interdisciplinary 
and in this way closely reflects my own experience of hybridisation as a past student 
of politics and international relations (in which I completed my undergraduate and 
Masters degrees) and a current proto2-academic in political geography (in which I 
undertook this thesis).  
 
 
1.1.2 The context of crowded places security 
 
The timing of this thesis is significant. Having just marked the tenth anniversary 
of the September 11 attacks and after a decade of the war on terror, it is no doubt 
getting more difficult to appreciate just how disturbing the presence of national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This only applies to places of further and higher education and not schools. According to the Home 
Office, schools, unlike colleges and universities, are ‘generally controlled environments’, and ‘would 
address potential counter-terrorism issues within their broader security and emergency planning 
work rather than as a discrete issue’ (2010d: 9). But this doesn’t seem to make sense – although 
schools are more internally regulated than colleges and universities, they are just as ‘crowded’ and 
‘accessible’, and therefore – by the logics of crowded places policy – just as vulnerable to terrorist 
attack. 
2 In chemical terminology, ‘proto’ denotes the first of a series of compounds, or a compound 
containing the minimum amount of an element, which I thought was a rather fitting description. 
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security in restaurants, pubs, hotels, and even hospitals, is, and should remain. This 
research was partly born of a concern that the links between the global geopolitics 
of the war on terror and counter-terrorism policies within the UK are disintegrating 
with the passage of time. If such links are lost, I fear it will become all too easy for 
security regimes like crowded places, apparently made necessary by extraordinary 
times and events, to become ordinary, and the violences and exclusions they make 
possible will become similarly banalised. Indeed, ‘real world’ events are facilitating 
such a displacement. 
Whilst at the time of writing the media is full of discussion and analysis ‘ten 
years after the attacks’, there is little if any attention given to on-going counter-
terrorism programmes like crowded places. Indeed, the term ‘war on terror’ has 
been publicly dropped by both the UK and US governments. On 15 January 2009, 
midway through this PhD, the Labour Foreign Secretary David Miliband claimed in 
The Guardian newspaper that the use of the term had been ‘misleading and 
mistaken’.3 ‘The ‘war on terror’’, he wrote, ‘implied that the correct response was 
primarily military. But... the coalition there [in Iraq] could not kill its way out of the 
problems of insurgency and civil strife’.4 Around the same time, a number of news 
and media outlets reported that the new US President Barack Obama sent an email 
to senior Pentagon staff explaining that ‘[his] administration prefers to avoid using 
the term Long War or Global War on Terror (Gwot)’.5 
But as Angharad Closs Stephens quite rightly put it: ‘the very idea that we might 
be at the end of a war which we were once told must be without end, raises some 
questions… what exactly would have to end for us to agree that we have indeed 
reached the end of the War on Terror?’ (2011: 254). Would it be, for example, the 
death of Osama bin Laden, the putative leader of the Al Qa’ida terrorist organisation 
that claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks? Would it be full military, 
political, and financial withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq? Would it be the end of 
national security practices in everyday spaces - a government statement informing 
the public that crowded places security is being abandoned?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Miliband, D. (2009) ‘‘War on terror’ was wrong’, The Guardian, 15 January [Online]. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/15/david-miliband-war-terror (Accessed 5 March 
2011). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Cited in Burkeman, O. (2009) ‘Obama administration says goodbye to ‘war on terror’’, The Guardian, 
25 March [Online]. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/25/obama-war-terror-
overseas-contingency-operations (Accessed 16 April 2012).	  
	   18	  
The death of Bin Laden, however, does not seem to have brought about an end 
to the war on terror. In July 2011, two months after he was killed in Pakistan by US 
special forces, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government published their first 
CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy – the third in five years. Withdrawals from 
Afghanistan and Iraq are always in progress – although the meaning of ‘withdrawal’ is 
itself highly problematic. Finally, rather than being wound down, crowded places 
security is, in my view, going from strength to strength. 
To grasp and appreciate the spatial politics of crowded places security, then, and 
from there to its resilient role within the war on terror that is not over, requires 
approaching it from two directions. First, crowded places is one of the flagship 
policies of the UK government’s official CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy. The 
first version of CONTEST was put together by the Labour government in 2003 in 
response to the September 11 attacks - it was not, however, made public. A second 
version, titled ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, 
was quietly published in summer 2006.6 A third version was published amid great 
fanfare in March 2009 (Home Office, 2009). Titled ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, 
Prepare. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ 
(hereafter CONTEST), this is the version I will be interrogating in this thesis.  
CONTEST is organised around four delivery ‘workstreams’ based on the four 
‘Ps’ of the title, Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. Each workstream contains a 
set of objectives which ‘reflect the assumptions we have made about the future 
threat and the principles to which we hold’, and a series of ‘supporting programmes’ 
(CONTEST, 2009: 11). Crowded places security is part of the Protect workstream, 
which aims to enhance the ‘protective security’ of the UK’s assets. These assets 
include crowded places of course, as well as critical national infrastructure, the 
transport system, borders, ‘interests overseas’, the so-called ‘insider threat’ 
(discussed in chapter 5), and the ‘misuse of hazardous substances’, such as fertilizer 
(CONTEST: 104). Briefly, the other three are: Pursue, which aims to ‘stop terrorist 
attacks’ through intelligence, ‘non-prosecution actions’ such as revocation of UK 
citizenship, and ‘capacity building’ in ‘international partners’; Prevent, which aims ‘to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This document is no longer available online although I have a copy. It has also been discussed, for 
example, by Assistant Commissioner Robert Quick (former head of Special Operations for the 
Metropolitan Police) in a 2009 Home Affairs Select Committee report. He references the first 
CONTEST in 2003 and then goes on to say that ‘certainly its refresh in 2006 led to the availability of 
more funding to grow police counter-terrorism resources’ (House of Commons, 2009: 34). 
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stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism’ through 
community-based intervention programmes; and finally Prepare, which aims to 
increase the long-term capacity of the UK to recover from a terrorist attack, 
through the development of emergency planning and crisis management  
(CONTEST, 2009: 60-1, 80, 118). 
The CONTEST strategy has been reviewed and updated three times, including 
the latest version in June 2011.7 Furthermore, Prevent8 and crowded places security 
have already been subject to public review; and this attention is particularly 
impressive given the UK government’s previously dreadful reputation for updating 
and communicating defence policy (see chapter 2). Specifically, the review of 
crowded places security followed the attempted bombings of the Haymarket area in 
London and Glasgow International Airport in July 2007. The Labour government 
asked Lord West to ‘specifically consider how best to protect crowded places from 
terrorist attack’ (Home Office, 2010d: 3). A public consultation period followed 
between 20 April – 10 July 2009, and three policy documents were finally published 
in March 2010 - these are the documents I use in this thesis as being indicative of the 
crowded places security regime. Working Together to Protect Crowded Places (hereafter 
WTP) is positioned as a general, umbrella document – it was also the document that 
was used in the public consultation (Home Office, 2010d). Protecting Crowded Places. 
Design and Technical Issues (hereafter PCP) (Home Office, 2010: c) and Crowded 
Places: The Planning System and Counter-Terrorism (hereafter CPPS) (Home Office, 
2010: a), are more detailed and directed towards the design of new buildings rather 
than so-called ‘retro-fitting’ (PCP: 3).  
In general, CONTEST has received very little attention from the academy. This 
is surprising given that it represents the unprecedented ‘bedding down’ of counter-
terrorism in political discourse, public spaces, and private lives. As illustration of this, 
CONTEST is explicitly designed for wide public consumption: it was a much larger 
document than its predecessors - a whopping 175 pages compared to the 38 pages 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See HM Government (2011) ‘CONTEST. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ 
[Online]. Available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/counter-
terrorism-strategy/strategy-contest?view=Binary (Accessed 19 August 2011).	  
8 Prevent was reviewed during 2010-11 by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, whose official position was the 
Independent Reviewer of Counter-Terror Legislation. The review process included a three-month 
public consultation between 10 November 2010 and 9 February 2011, including eleven consultation 
events with local authorities, and focus groups with the general public. Carlile presented his report in 
May 2011, and the revised Prevent strategy was published the following month. 
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of the 2006 version – partially because it contained strategic and ‘historical analysis’, 
and it was positioned as a key part of the Home Office’s ‘orientation’ process for 
organisations and agencies involved in delivering counter-terrorism in the UK 
(House of Commons, 2009: 9, 4). 
Any attention CONTEST does get tends to be directed towards Prevent. In this 
regard, the latter’s so-called ‘community-based intervention programmes’ are 
particularly notorious. Whilst CONTEST claims that the purpose of the CHANNEL 
programme, for example, is ‘to identify those at risk from violent extremism and 
provide help to them’ (CONTEST: 80), a report prepared by the Institute of Race 
Relations disagrees: it claims ‘there is strong evidence that a significant part of the 
Prevent programme involves the embedding of counter-terrorism police officers 
within the delivery of local services, the purpose of which seems to be to gather 
intelligence on Muslim communities’ (Kundnani, 2009: 6). The issue of the targeting 
of Muslim communities has therefore draw some academic riposte, with the most 
sustained and policy-oriented engagement in the applied social sciences, especially 
criminology (Lambert, 2011; McGhee, 2010, 2008; Mythen, Walklate and Kahn, 
2009; and Spalek et al., 2009). These issues also feature relatively frequently in the 
work of public organisations like the Institute for Race Relations, and in news stories 
on the attempts to tackle violent extremism, and the resulting difficulties and 
misfires. 
Crowded places security, however, receives no such attention – indignant or 
otherwise. What little engagement with crowded places there is, is confined to a 
small number of critiques within the academy, including Aradau (2010a) in 
international relations, and Coaffee in spatial planning (2009; also Coaffee, O’Hare 
and Hawkesworth, 2009), both of which have important limitations, as I discuss 
below. Perhaps because it is a recent phenomenon – at most five years old – 
sustained critical engagement with CONTEST is merely suspended in a scholarly 
‘time lag’. Or perhaps it reflects assumptions in public discourse, and scarcely less in 
academic discourse, that the securitization of space is not as politically relevant as 
that of identity and subjecthood. But it seems that from a policy perspective at least, 
materialising the geopolitics of the war on terror in public spaces may be no less 
important than in ‘at risk’ communities. 
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The holding of a crowded places review in 2007 is also important to the extent 
that there must be something already there to review. This, then, is the second 
direction from which to approach crowded places policy: through the work of the 
National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), a police unit created in 
2002 and funded by the Home Office to roll out counter-terror measures to the 
‘front line’ of the UK’s unprotected public spaces. As part of its remit to protect 
crowded places, NaCTSO provides advice for the full range of crowded places (as 
listed above) in the form of pdf documents openly available on its website. It is 
worth noting that the content of these documents has not changed as a result of the 
2010 review – they are instead currently positioned as part of a ‘strategic 
framework’ developed through the review.9 
The specific work carried out by NaCTSO is discussed more fully in chapter 5 – 
here, then, I will emphasise two key factors. First, although the exact dates are not 
clear, NaCTSO and crowded places security predates by at least four years the first 
public iteration of CONTEST, and is thus one of the earliest priorities of the UK 
government in the war on terror. Second, on its website NaCTSO identifies itself as 
‘contribut[ing] to the UK government’s counter terrorism strategy (CONTEST) by 
supporting the Protect and Prepare strands of that strategy’: specifically, the 
protection of crowded places and hazardous sites and substances, as well as the 
critical national infrastructure alongside the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI).10 Yet NaCTSO is also closely tied to the police force through 
the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), and crowded places security is 
delivered via Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) attached to local police 
forces: ‘bobbies on the beat’ war on terror-style. The post of CTSA was created in 
2006 to facilitate the movement of ‘protective advice’ from the Home Office 
through NaCTSO to local police forces and from there to crowded places. So 
although CTSAs are attached to local police forces they take their lead from 
NaCTSO. This means that like Prevent and its work with community groups and the 
education sector, crowded places can easily and quickly be materialised as part of 
daily life, so it must not be underestimated as ‘just policy’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See ‘Areas of risk - Crowded places’ on the NaCTSO website. Available at 
http://www.nactso.gov.uk/AreaOfRisks/CrowdedPlaces.aspx (Accessed 31 July 2011). 
10 See ‘NaCTSO – Who we are and what we do’. Available at http://www.nactso.gov.uk/Default.aspx 
(Accessed 31 July 2011). 
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1.1.3 Discontinuity and discourse – Crowded places in the national security 
imaginary 
 
To summarise thus far: crowded places security - counter-terrorism in the UK’s 
high street businesses and public services - is an important phenomenon deserving 
of, and indeed demanding, the focused analysis provided in this thesis. Yet, that is not 
to say its practices or rationales have sprung from nowhere. The history of the last 
forty years of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is itself 
enough to disabuse anyone of that notion. But yet history has also moved on. Peace 
(for the time being) was struck between Northern Ireland’s warring parties in 1998 
and many authors, like sociologist Zygmunt Bauman according to Mark Lacy (2008: 
336), now write of a shift in security discourses: ‘from a focus on shields, states, and 
the engineering power of ‘heavy’ modernity to the ‘liquid modernity’ of swarms, 
networks, and the deterritorialized dangers that emerge from ‘network’ or ‘control 
society’’. Yet, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose… the more things change, the 
more they stay the same. Recently, I heard a well-known Belfast-born singer 
describe a school-trip to London in the 1970s, when he stood in the doorway of a 
large department store with his hands up waiting for a pat down that never came. Of 
course, at that time no one was looking for bombs in London’s shops as they were 
in Belfast, although this can no longer be considered to be the case. So if crowded 
places security is not novel but it is different from what has gone before, how can its 
significance be grasped and its politics interrogated? 
In a 1978 interview,11 Michel Foucault explained that his particular mode of 
critique was concerned with recognising singularity and ‘discontinuities’: 
 
… making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a 
historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that 
imposes itself uniformly on all. To show that things ‘weren’t as necessary as all 
that’ (2002: 226). 
 
For example, he treated the prison as a discontinuity in terms of its use as a means 
of juridical punishment at the beginning of the nineteenth century (2002: 225-6). ‘All 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Originally titled ‘Round Table of 20 May 1978’ and published in 1980, the interview has been 
republished as ‘Questions of Method’ (2002). 
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the nineteenth-century texts and discussions’, he explained, ‘testify to the 
astonishment at finding the prison being used as a general means of punishment’; but 
instead of taking this ‘sudden change’ as ‘a result at which one’s analysis could stop’, 
he attempted ‘without eradicating it, to account for it’ (2002: 226). 
 The concept of the ‘discontinuity’ is a highly resonant one both within Foucault’s 
own work and in those works inspired by him. Nicholas Bourriaud, in his 
introduction to Foucault’s essay Manet and the Object of Painting, describes Foucault’s 
approach as that of ‘locating the tipping points in the field of knowledge… identifying 
with clinical precision… these moments where discourse splits up into a ‘before’ and 
an ‘after’’ (2009: 14, emphasis added). And in her genealogy of modern finance, 
Marieke de Goede argues that the ‘introduction of credit, paper money, and other 
modern monetary instruments was not a smooth or evolutionary process but a 
controversial, contingent, and ambiguous transformation’ (2005: xv, emphasis added). 
In particular, she isolates ‘moments of openness’ (after Jenny Edkins, 1999) as a way 
to not only better explore these controversies and contingencies, but to understand 
how ‘financial truth and monetary value’ are ‘created in discourse itself’ (2005: xxvi, 
xxii, emphasis added).  
The roll-out of crowded places security between 2007-2010 intuitively struck 
me as another such discontinuity, even though - as with the emergence of the prison 
in the 1800s, or the introduction of paper money at around the same time - it could 
easily be occluded within historical constants and anthropological traits, and both 
behind a more general banality or ‘obviousness’. The historical constants of crowded 
places would include the constancy of deadly threat. David Campbell (1998), for 
instance, has discussed how the ‘old international threats’ of the cold war were 
superseded by the ‘new global issues’ of the 1990s: the environment, drug trafficking, 
disease, migration and population issues, and ‘new forms of violence such as 
‘terrorism’ or ‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ (p. 7). ‘For the most part’, he argues, ‘these 
developments have been represented in ways that do not depart dramatically from 
those dominant during the cold war’; that is, they ‘are represented as dangers, 
located in an external and anarchic environment, which threaten the security of an 
internal and domestic society’ (1998: 8). The September 11 attacks and Al Qa’ida’s 
brand of ‘global terrorism’ can thus be represented in terms of the constancy of 
external danger threatening an internal society. In this way, Lord West is able to 
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claim at the beginning of his report that the UK ‘faces a threat from international 
terrorism of a nature and magnitude different to any we have encountered before’, 
so that the objective of crowded places is ‘to make it harder for terrorists to attack 
targets in this country’ (WTP: 3, emphasis added). Although, as I discuss in the next 
chapter, materialisations of threat in a so-called ‘global age’ mean that UK counter-
terrorism is no longer confined to, or a problem in, ‘this country’.   
The immediate anthropological traits of crowded places security would 
‘obviously’ be the existence of ‘the terrorist’ bogeyman. Crowded places, the policy 
explains, ‘remain an attractive target for terrorists’ because of their accessibility and 
availability, which in turn offer the prospect for ‘an impact beyond the loss of life 
alone (for example serious disruption or a particular economic/ political impact)’ 
(PCP: 3). At this and at other points (and as I discuss more fully in chapter 5), the 
terrorist bogeyman is portrayed in terms of almost magpie-like characteristics, 
attracted by the bright lights of the UK’s shiny shopping centres, restaurants, and 
visitor attractions. If the terrorist is typically portrayed as an individual who wants to 
destroy what is important in a particular polity – and this is as close to a definition as 
is probably possible, or indeed advisable, to get – what does it suggest when 
accessible and available spaces with economic/political impact are considered to be 
what is important? A question which also loops back into my earlier emphasis on the 
move of the crowded places literature away from an anthropocentric focus. So 
notwithstanding the fact that spaces frequented and used by the public have been 
attacked, and that people have lost their lives, what strikes me as singular here is the 
government’s desperation to protect the accessibility and availability of economic 
and commercial spaces through crowded places security. 
 However, recognising discontinuities within the continual and overlapping 
evocation of historical constants and immediate anthropological traits is only the 
opening gambit of what Foucault termed ‘the project of a ‘genealogy of morals’ 
(2002: 224) (for other appropriations of a Foucauldian genealogical project see 
Aradau and van Munster, 2011; Crary, 1992; Dean, 1990; and for general discussion, 
Hutchings, 1997; Kendall and Wickham, 1999; Saukko, 2003). Returning to the case 
of the prison, Foucault explained that ‘in order to get a better understanding of what 
is punished and why, I wanted to ask the questions how does one punish… how these 
divisions are effected’ (2002: 224, emphasis added). Likewise, I would question not 
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only what is crowded places security, but also how does one secure, and how are 
divisions effected between secure and insecure space, between crowded spaces and 
other spaces?  
All this amounts to, then, ‘a history not of the prison as an institution, but of the 
practice of imprisonment’; and practices are ‘not just governed by institutions, 
prescribed by ideologies, [or] guided by pragmatic circumstances’, but instead 
‘possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence, and ‘reason’’ 
(Foucault, 2002: 225). Practices of imprisonment – or of counter-terrorism – are not 
random; they are ‘programs of conduct that have both prescriptive effects regarding 
what is to be done… and codifying effects regarding what is to be known’ (Foucault, 
2002: 225). In this way, Paul Veyne writes of Foucault’s approach:  
 
Heuristically, it is better to start off with detailed practices, details of what was 
done and what was said, and then make the intellectual effort to make explicit 
the ‘discourse’ surrounding them. This is more fruitful… than starting off from 
a general, well-known idea, for if that is what you do then you are in danger of 
looking no further than that idea and failing to notice the ultimate, decisive 
difference that would reduce it to nothing (2010: 10). 
 
Exactly what kind of ‘intellectual effort’ is needed to make explicit the discourses of 
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1.2 Framing the problem - Performativity 
 
Like Foucault, the social theorist Judith Butler is also concerned with making 
explicit the discourses surrounding otherwise ‘obvious’ phenomena. In her early 
work, Butler focused on interrogating and re-articulating discourses of gender, 
sexuality, and heteronormativity in two seminal texts: Gender Trouble (1990) and 
Bodies That Matter (1993). More recently she has extended her concerns to violence, 
war and mourning (2004; 2009), and to the state and the economy (2010). Butler’s 
work on the performativity of discourse forms the conceptual engine through which 
my concerns with practices of crowded places security are articulated. 
In Bodies That Matter, Butler (1993: 9) claimed that bodies, sex, and thus ‘effects 
of gender’, are not natural but are instead materialisations of discourse, and 
stabilised through ‘ritualized repetition’ – in other words, performativity. ‘To claim 
that discourse is formative’, she writes: 
 
… is not to claim that it originates, causes, or exhaustively composes that 
which it concedes; rather, it is to claim that there is no reference to a pure 
body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body (Butler, 
1993: 10). 
 
In this way, there is no prediscursive body with one gender which determines the 
subject; nor is there a prediscursive subject which chooses its gender: ‘the ‘I’ neither 
precedes nor follows the process of this gendering, but emerges only within and as 
the matrix of gender relations themselves’ (Butler, 1993: 7). Likewise, Butler writes 
that analysis of the state or the economy cannot begin with ‘already delimited 
understandings’ of what they are, because there is no ‘metaphysical substance’ that 
precedes the expressions and activities of the same (2010: 147). 
If there are no a priori gendered bodies to be understood except through 
discourse, then their matter (for the body is, after all, material) should be 
understood not as a ‘site or surface’, but instead ‘a process of materialization that 
stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter’ 
(Butler, 1993: 9, emphasis in original). This process of materialization is 
performativity, ‘the power of discourse to produce effects through reiteration’, and 
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is crucial to Butler’s theory of performativity (Butler, 1993: 20). Unlike a Goffman-
esque ‘performance’, which focuses on interactions between audience and 
performer, performativity is not ‘a singular ‘act’, for it is always a reiteration of a 
norm or set of norms’ – in other words, it does not depend on the actions of 
subject agency (Butler 1993: 12).  
Butler’s approach is thus both a dismissal of (linguistic) constructivism – a 
cultural or social agency which is ‘imposed upon the surface of matter’ or ‘acts upon 
a nature’ (1993: 2, 4) - and a re-working of J.L. Austin’s version of performativity 
(1962; also Culler, 2000; Parker and Kosofsky Sedgwick, 1995). Austinian 
performativity, Butler explains, distinguishes between ‘illocutionary’ and 
‘perlocutionary’ performatives (2010: 147). Illocutionary performatives are ‘speech 
acts that bring about certain realities, as when judgments are pronounced by a court’ 
(Butler, 2010: 148); or what she terms the ‘biblical rendition of the performative, i.e. 
‘Let there be light!’’ (1993: 13). Perlocutionary performatives ‘characterize those 
utterances from which effects follow only when certain other kinds of conditions are 
in place’ – for example, ‘a politician may claim that ‘a new day has arrived’ but that 
new day only has a chance of arriving if people take up the utterance and endeavour 
to make it happen’ (Butler, 2010: 148). Butler’s theory of performativity as ‘a process 
of reiteration’ (1993: 10) may seem closer to Austin’s perlocutionary performative 
but for two crucial departures: first, her dismissal of the ‘model of the speaking 
subject’ (2010: 150); and second, her insistence on performativity as political. 
First, by the terms of speech act theory which was Austin’s point of departure, 
‘a performative is that discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it 
names’, but it is always ‘by virtue of the power of a subject or its will’ (1993: 13, 
emphasis in original). Against this interpretation, Jacques Derrida’s ‘critical 
reformulation’ asserted that the power of the performative is ‘not the function of an 
originating will, but is always derivative’ (1993: 13).12 Following on from this, then, 
Butler claims that ‘the model of the speaking subject fails to provide an adequate way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 He wrote: ‘Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or 
iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a 
ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then 
identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’?... in such a typology, the category of intention will not 
disappear; it will have its place, but from that place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene 
and system of utterance’ (cited in Butler, 1993: 13). 	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of understanding how performativity works’ (2010: 150). Rather, in addition to the 
‘explicit speech act’, other performative practices include: ‘mundane and repeated 
acts of delimitation’; ‘modes of prediction and anticipation that constitute part of… 
activity itself’; and ‘organizations of human and non-human networks… that enter 
into specific… activities’ (Butler, 2010: 150). Thus when a subject speaks it is not 
simply that a speech act is performed - rather, a set of relations and practices are 
constantly renewed and agency traverses human and non-human domains’ (Butler, 
2010: 150).  
Second, in this elaboration of practices, relations, and non-human alongside 
human agency, Butler obviously owes a debt to a Foucauldian understanding of 
discourse as a configuration or ‘matrix’ of regulatory productive power – a debt 
which she acknowledges (Butler, 1993: 2). Bodies That Matter ‘accepts as a point of 
departure Foucault’s notion that regulatory power produces the subjects it controls, 
that power is not only imposed externally, but works as the regulatory and 
normative means by which subjects are formed’ (1993: 22). In this way, discourses 
not only produce speaking subjects, but they are also exclusionary. As the 
performativity of gender, for example, produces the effect of ‘boundary, fixity, and 
surface we call matter’, at the same time it produces ‘abject beings, those who are 
not yet ‘subjects’; ‘the abject designates here precisely those ‘unlivable’ and 
‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life’ (Butler, 1993: 3). This is precisely the reason for 
Butler’s move from construction to ‘discursive performativity’: ‘it is not enough’, she 
writes, ‘to claim that human subjects are constructed’, without recognising that this 
process is a ‘differential operation’ which produces the human as well as ‘the more 
and the less ‘human’, the inhuman, the humanly unthinkable’ (1993: 12, 8). ‘These 
excluded sites’, she continues, ‘come to bound the ‘human’ as its constitutive 
outside, and to haunt those boundaries as the persistent possibility of their 
disruption and rearticulation’ (Butler, 1993: 8).  
In sum, there are two ways in which Butler is optimistic that exclusionary 
matrices can be contested. First, the reliance of performativity on recitation and 
repetition is a sign that it is never quite complete: that ‘bodies never quite comply 
with the norms by which their materialization is impelled’ (Butler, 1993: 2). Second, 
the production of a ‘constitutive outside’ of ‘abject beings’ and ‘uninhabitable zones 
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of social life’, is a ‘threatening spectre’ capable of exposing the ‘self-grounding 
presumption of the sexed subject’ (1993: 3).  
 
 
1.2.1 Performativity in geography 
 
Butler’s theory of performativity has been cited and reiterated in a range of 
disciplines, including (but by no means limited to) cultural economy and social studies 
of finance (see Aitken, 2007; Callon, 1998; Langley, 2010; Mackenzie, Muniesa and 
Siu, 2007), and human geography. In both these examples, performativity is made use 
of to account for the regulated and constrained conditions of subject formation, but 
also to account for the materialisation of discourses in ways that do not include, or 
perhaps it is better to say do not rely on, human agency at all. 
In geography, Nicky Gregson and Gillian Rose have advocated and used 
performativity as a ‘conceptual tool’ for a ‘critical human geography’ (2000: 433). In 
so doing, their objective is to move geographical debate away from ‘a rather narrow 
focus on and identification with performing bodies’, towards ‘a more expansive 
engagement with ‘the performative’’ (2000: 435). In particular, this is an engagement 
with performativity as a field of power relations. Here, they claim to go both ‘beyond 
Butler’ and against the grain of the geographical literature, by suggesting that ‘space 
too needs to be thought of as being brought into being through performances and as 
a performative articulation of power’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 434) (also Cloke, 
May and Johnsen, 2008; Kaiser and Nikiforova, 2008; Rose, 1999). 
Gregson and Rose go on to argue that ‘performances do not take place in 
already existing locations: the City, the bank, the franchise restaurant, the straight 
street’; instead, ‘specific performances bring these spaces into being’, so that ‘we 
need to think of spaces too as performative of power relations’ (2000: 441). In other 
words, such spaces are both materialised by, and in turn reiterate and reproduce, 
regulatory norms. They also transfer Butler’s notion of ‘disidentifications’ with 
political discourse to their own argument, 13  suggesting that space is always 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Butler writes: ‘Although the political discourses that mobilize identity categories tend to cultivate 
identifications in the service of a political goal, it may be that the persistence of disidentification is 
equally crucial to the rearticulation of democratic contestation… collective disidentifications can 
facilitate a reconceptualization of which bodies matter, and which bodies are yet to emerge as critical 
matters of concern’ (1993: 2). 
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‘threatened with its own instability’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 437). In this way, they 
declare their focus to be on the ‘complexity and instability’ of performed spaces. For 
example, in the discussion of the community arts research carried out by Rose, they 
argue that the full ‘radicalness’ of its politics lies not in what the artworks created 
‘meant’, but rather ‘a certain refusal of interpretation, a refusal to render everything 
legible and assimilable and knowable’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 448). In the view of 
the authors, this was ‘a strategy to resist the discursive power that had repeatedly 
labelled, categorised, and either sanctified or demonised these people and places’ 
(Gregson and Rose, 2000: 448). 
For me, the limitations of Gregson and Rose’s account (and I discuss these in 
more detail in chapter 4) appear partly in an over-emphasis on space as ‘unstable’ 
and ‘transitory’ as a way of speaking back to the recalcitrance of its formative 
discourses (2000: 447, 442). Whilst they do consider, for example, the role of 
gender differences in their example of the performativity of car-boot sale spaces, 
they do very little (and perhaps understandably so given their empirical material) to 
address Butler’s insistence on performativity’s ‘constitutive force of exclusion, 
erasure, violent foreclosure, [and] abjection’ – the primary reason she champions 
performativity over constructivism (1993: 8). Working to address this gap, scholars 
in political geography have used performativity to push further an understanding of 
how spaces are materialised by, indeed are materialisations of exclusion, erasure, and 
violence, and I discuss this scholarship further in chapter 2. If Butler’s theory of 
performativity is the conceptual engine for this thesis, then I am concerned to 
develop its usage in a specifically political geographical sense. 
 
 
1.2.2 Thoughts on the performativity of security 
 
‘What about the materiality of the body, Judy?’ I took it that the addition of 
‘Judy’ was an effort to dislodge me from the more formal ‘Judith’ and to recall 
me to a bodily life that could not be theorized away. There was a certain 
exasperation in the delivery of that final diminutive, a certain patronizing 
quality which (re)constituted me as an unruly child, one who needed to be 
	   31	  
brought to task, restored to that bodily being which is, after all, considered to 
be most real, most pressing, most undeniable – Judith Butler.14   
 
Butler’s description of her attempts to think about the materiality of the body 
beyond its supposedly ‘most real, most pressing, and most undeniable’ existence, and 
the incredulity and dismissal she met with as described in the passage above, put me 
in mind of the questions and doubts which are often put to critiques of security. 
How can one reject security? Or, if one can more pragmatically question whether 
security can exist in an absolute form, whether one can ever be truly secure, how 
can one deny the right to strive for it nonetheless? How can one deny there are 
people who want to hurt and maim, and a right to seek security in return?  
It is not her objective, Butler writes, to deny the ‘irrefutable facts’ of the body: 
they ‘live and die; eat and sleep; feel pain, pleasure; endure illness and violence’ 
(1993: xi). But their irrefutability, she continues, ‘in no way implies what it might 
mean to affirm them and through what discursive means’ (1993: xi). In the same way, 
a critique of security (to be more precise, a poststructural critique of security, and 
to be even more precise, this poststructural critique of security), accepts that 
bombers bomb, people die and are injured, and lives are ruined. But these irrefutable 
occurrences are still not the same as, or mutually inclusive with, their meaning. 
To give a simple but powerful example, why does terrorism mean catastrophic 
danger, whereas infant malnutrition, which kills millions more each year (not even 
taking into account the deep, lifelong, life-altering emotional distress of the mothers 
and fathers, the brothers and sisters, the families and friends left behind), does not? 
In his analysis of the September 11 attacks as the ‘beginning’ of the war on terror, 
Stuart Elden responds that such ‘tallies risk losing sight – and losing the site – of the 
problem in making such numerical accounts; with accountancy in place of grief’ 
(2009: xiii). ‘Let us not forget’, he continues, ‘that these events are a political, spatial, 
and temporal marker; yet they are one that we give a particular significance to 
through our complicity in a construction’ (Elden, 2009: xiii). In this way, the security 
which is the objective of crowded places security only appears and endures within a 
discourse (or discourses) of which 9/11 was a marker.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 1993: ix-x. 
	   32	  
To conclude, using performativity as a conceptual framework for critiquing 
security enables me to apply a Foucauldian conceptualisation of discourse to 
empirical research by focusing on the ways in which discourse becomes ‘effects in 
the real’ (Foucault, 2002: 232). Performativity allows for this by foregrounding the 
process and practices of ‘ritualized repetition’ by which the regulatory norms of 
security discourses are (re)produced and stabilized (Butler, 1993: x). In terms of the 
security discourses of the war on terror, performativity foregrounds that what can 
be known about the war on terror, terrorism, and state violence acquires its status 
as ‘knowledge’ only through the regulatory parameters of discourse. In particular, it 
allows me to make visible a range of security practices that would not be visible with 
other critical accounts that focus on the ‘sayings’ and ‘doings’ of an ‘active human 
agent’ (Gregson and Rose, 2000: 438); or on national security which focuses on the 
state in global politics, thus ignoring more ‘prosaic’ practices. In addition, 
performativity allows me to make visible those practices that are invisible, in the 
sense that by identifying performativities of security one can also identify how the 
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1.3      Aims and research questions 
 
The thesis will use the critical theory of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler to 
develop a framework for understanding the phenomenon of crowded places 
security. As such it aims to: 
 
• Advance understanding of the contemporary broadening of the meaning and 
coercive register of national security. This includes a deepened conceptual 
understanding of its regulatory discourses; a focus on how its performativities 
reiterate neoliberal globalisation; and a drawing out of the relationship 
between national security and counter-terrorism within the UK;  
• Move beyond geopolitical critiques of national security practices using a 
biopolitics framework;  
• Develop biopolitics as a conceptual framework for security practices by 
moving beyond a focus on circulation to consider cultural and other ‘prosaic’ 
practices; 
• Bring into view crowded places as a citational, reiterative practice of national 
security discourses; 
• Develop the potential uses of performativity as a tool for critical security 
scholarship by using it to account for and understand contemporary security 
practices of the war on terror. 
 
In relation to these research aims, the following questions will be addressed: 
1. What is broadening national security and what is politically at stake in its 
practices?  
2. What is crowded places security? What makes crowded places insecure? How 
is ‘crowded space’ secured? What knowledges make it possible to fight a war 
in the UK high street? 
3. How does crowded places security reiterate broadening national security and 
what are the implications of this relationship? 
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1.4 Strategies for the research 
 
The logic of strategy is the logic of the connection of the heterogeneous and 
it is not, repeat not, the logic of the homogenisation of things which are 
contradictory – Foucault.15 
 
In his 1978 interview ‘Questions of Method’, Foucault also claimed that in 
critique the ‘only important problem is what happens on the ground’ (2002: 235). 
Unfortunately, he wasn’t so forthcoming on how like-minded researchers might 
recognise, understand, separate, collect, organise, analyse, and communicate (and 
not necessarily in that order) the what of what happens on the ground. Where most 
of the social sciences methodology literature begins by discussing research ‘design’ 
and ‘methods’ (such as Gibson and Brown, 2009; Glesne, 2011; Gray, 2009), I 
instead follow Colin Robson (2002: 77) in being guided by the notions of research 
‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’. ‘Strategy’, Robson writes, ‘refers to the general broad 
orientation taken in addressing research questions’ (2002: 77) - my research strategy 
is the subject of this section. In the next section 1.5 I discuss my ‘tactics’: the ‘specific 
methods of investigation’ (Robson, 2002: 77).  
In terms of strategy, then, in their essay on postmodern methodology Atkinson 
and Coffey explain that ‘problems and methods come as part of packages of ideas, 
whether or not one chooses to call them ‘paradigms’’ (2003: 111). In this way, the 
problems of broadening national security and crowded places security cannot be 
separated from the poststructural paradigm with which I identify and within which I 
work; nor, indeed, can the tactics I will use to collect and analyse information about 
them. In particular, this collection and analysis of information happens as part of the 
questioning mode which is central to qualitative research: as Limb and Dwyer put it 
in their book on qualitative methodologies in geography, ‘wanting to get behind the 
‘facts’ as they appear to us in everyday life’ (2001: 1). Qualitative methodologies are 
‘a means by which the ‘messiness’ and complexity of everyday life can be explored by 
using research methods that do not ignore such complexity but instead engage with 
it’ (Limb and Dwyer, 2001: 2). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 2008: 42.	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But having set out my commitment to a qualitative strategy, I would like to put 
forward an important addendum about the difference my strategy recognises 
between on the one hand, the undoubted complexity of the social world, and on the 
other, assumptions about its ‘messiness’ and the political implications of such 
assumptions. Sociologist John Law, in his book on developing methodologies for 
engaging with what he terms the ‘messes of reality’, explains that ‘methods, their 
rules, and even more methods’ practices, not only describe but also help to produce 
the reality that they understand’ (2004: 5, emphasis in original). Yet, ‘much of reality 
is ephemeral and elusive’, he continues, so that when ‘social science tries to deal 
with things that are complex, diffuse and messy’, invariably it ‘tends to make a mess 
of it’ (Law, 2004: 2). He therefore argues in favour of ‘remak[ing] social science in 
ways better equipped to deal with mess, confusion and relative disorder’ (Law, 2004: 
2).  
There is certainly a strong case for developing methodologies within the social 
sciences that are more intuitive and responsive to the specificities of social 
phenomena, and generally less beholden to the explanatory and experimental 
strictures of their natural science forebears. My disagreement with Law’s arguments, 
however, stems from his emphasis on what is ‘vague, diffuse or unspecific, slippery, 
emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct’ in the world; what ‘changes like a 
kaleidoscope, or doesn’t have much of a pattern at all’ (2004: 2). He asks ‘how might 
we catch some of the realities we are currently missing?’ and ‘can we know them 
well? Should we know them? Is ‘knowing’ the metaphor that we need? And if it isn’t, 
then how might we relate to them?’ (Law, 2004: 2, emphasis in original). In effect, 
Law is suggesting that by accepting the mess and developing better ways to engage with 
it we may yet find some form of clarity. Therefore his argument for ‘greater 
methodological variety’ reproduces, in my view, the very limitations of the 
methodologies he purports to move beyond (Law, 2004: 4). Although academic, and 
moreover social science, traditions demand that research produces a specific kind of 
‘clarity’, the strategy of using Foucault and Butler’s focus on the practices and 
performativities which materialise regulatory norms draws attention precisely to the 
contingent and political process through which notions of clarity, knowledge, and 
understanding may be arrived at. In rejecting the possibility of attaining clarity 
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through methods which are either explanatory or ‘elusive and indistinct’, my strategy 
is distinctive through two main concerns. 
First, my strategy aims to connect, rather than homogenise, that which is 
heterogeneous and contradictory. Second, while I am sympathetic to Law’s argument 
that social science methods are ‘badly adapted to the study of the ephemeral, the 
indefinite and the irregular’ (2004: 4), my interest is in identifying, analysing, and 
communicating an understanding of the politicised constitution of the social world: 
particularly the relationship between performativities of space and performativities 
of security, a relationship that is very often overlooked and/or depoliticised. My 
reference point for analysis is what Butler terms the ‘constitutive force of exclusion, 
erasure, violent foreclosure, [and] abjection’ (1993: 8) (also Cloke, 2002). In terms 
of Law’s debate, then, I do not want to understand what is ‘slippery, indistinct, 
elusive, complex, diffuse, messy, textured, vague…’ etcetera (2004: 6). Instead I seek 
to understand what is closed, hard, discriminatory, exclusionary, and violent in the 
production of secure space (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Low and Smith, 2006; 
Schlottman, 2008). Instead, of the world as a ‘generative flux of forces and relations’ 
(Law, 2004: 7), I want to understand a world that is at best prone to stasis and 
sedimentation, and at worse, erasure and violence. 
 
 
1.4.1 Strategy I: Broadening national security 
 
The first part of my research strategy focuses on advancing understanding of the 
discourses and performativities of the contemporary ‘broadening’ of national 
security – the expansion of national security into non-traditional economic and social 
domains. The terminology is drawn from the new National Security Strategy of the 
United Kingdom (hereafter NSS), first published in March 2008 with an updated 
version in June 2009, which claims that ‘modern challenges require a broader 
understanding of national security and a broader range of responses’ (Cabinet Office, 
2009: 14). The NSS makes for a useful and revealing case study of contemporary 
iterations of national security for three reasons. First, it is unique to the extent that 
it is the first of its kind. The terms ‘national security‟ and ‘national security strategy‟ 
are of course familiar to American security discourse - from the creation of a 
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national security apparatus after world war II (Neocleous, 2008), to President 
George W. Bush’s publication of The National Security Strategy for the United of States 
of America in September 2002 and March 2006 (Der Derian, 2003). The UK, 
however, has traditionally focused on defence policy (Cornish and Dorman, 2009; 
Hopkinson, 2000). Furthermore, it is very important to note that whilst the UK’s 
official moves towards a national security culture can be considered to have been 
‘inaugurated’ by the New Labour government between 1997 and 2010, the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government which succeeded it has further 
embedded and developed these changes. For example, it immediately set up a new 
National Security Council (NSC) in the Cabinet Office in May 2010 (which 
succeeded Labour’s Cabinet Committee on National Security), and appointed a new 
National Security Adviser Sir Peter Ricketts. The coalition government also 
published a third National Security Strategy in October 2010. 
To recognise that the NSS is, in the UK context, unique and in many ways 
innovative, does not mean that it is not situated in dense discursive relations. For 
example, does it indicate a cold war-esque national security redux, as has been 
argued in the US context? (Gaddis, 2002). Or rather the increasing securitisation of 
everyday life in the era of a war on terror? (Collier and Lakoff, 2008). Or is this 
nascent national security era in UK policy simply a necessary policy recalibration by 
government to meet the ‘broader demands of the global age’? (NSS 2009: 5). Rather 
than being attributable to particular governments or individuals, it is one of the 
arguments I pursue in the thesis that these changes are tied to, and reproduce, the 
discourses of the war on terror. 
Second, one of the features that designates the NSS as a singular new type of 
UK security policy, is that it is publicly and easily available on the internet. Indeed, a 
2009 parliamentary report on the CONTEST counter-terrorism policy – a key 
component of broadening national security - welcomes the ‘government’s desire to 
be as open as possible on matters of counter-terrorism and security matters and to 
put as much information as possible into the public domain’ (House of Commons, 
2009: 4). In terms of conducting research, this easy availability circumvented the 
issue of trying to obtain confidential, or at least guarded, security policy. In terms of 
probing what makes the NSS singular, its uniquely ‘public-facing’ status raises the 
intriguing issue of the relationship between broadening national security and the 
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broad domain of ‘the public’. Indeed, Cloke et al. (2004) have commented that 
official documents ‘are not first and foremost a public service. The principal aim of 
their construction is to inform government policy’ (p. 52). In other words, the 
relationship between official security policy and its audience, ‘the public’, should be 
approached with a questioning attitude. Of course, this relationship could easily be 
situated in narratives of democratisation and the accountability of government, but I 
think it would be naïve to assume that the conduct of national security is any more 
transparent or benevolent than it ever was, as the on-going controversy around the 
UK’s complicity in so-called ‘extraordinary renditions’ illustrates. Rather, it is my 
view that the bringing together of national security strategy, public-facing availability 
and information technology in ways that support and facilitate each other, indicates 
an important step-change in the conduct of national security, and this thesis takes 
the first steps towards conceptualising the political implications of this relationship.   
Third and finally, national security strategy – albeit in the US context – has 
received particular attention in political geography and critical security literatures 
(Bialasiewicz et al., 2007; Campbell, 2007b, 1998). Focusing on the NSS therefore 
offers the additional benefit of allowing me to build on and develop existing 
scholarship making use of Butler’s theory of performativity to critique national 
security strategy.  
My discourse analysis of the National Security Strategy makes use of two 
prominent critical frameworks. The first is critical geopolitics, which emerged in the 
late 1980s and early to mid-1990s through the work of scholars including Gearoid Ó 
Tuathail (1996; 1986) and Simon Dalby (1991). Critical geopolitics, according to 
Campbell and Power (2010), builds on the work of Foucault and Derrida in seeking 
to develop not ‘a theory of how space and politics intersect’, but rather ‘a mode of 
interrogating and exposing the grounds for knowledge production’ (p. 243). It was 
thus, Ó Tuathail claims, the ‘starting point for a different form of geopolitics’ (cited 
in Campbell and Power, 2010: 243).  
Furthermore, in 2009 Ó Tuathail described three other characteristics of critical 
geopolitics which may support my objective of critiquing broadening national 
security. First, it recovers ‘textuality within practices which are represented as 
objective or practical… Geopolitics is inescapably cultural’ (Ó Tuathail cited in 
Campbell and Power, 2010: 243). Second, it displaces ‘state-centric readings of world 
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politics and aims for the recovery of the many messy practices that constitute the 
modern inter-state system. Geopolitics is inescapably plural’ (Ó Tuathail cited in 
Campbell and Power, 2010: 243). And third, it develops ‘critical histories of 
geopolitical thinkers and discourses. Geopolitics is inescapably traversed by relations 
of power and gender’ (Ó Tuathail cited in Campbell and Power, 2010: 243). Finally, 
Campbell and Power comment that this focus on the displacement of state-centric 
readings and the recovery of ‘complex and prosaic practices’ has ‘opened up the 
range of sites/ texts/ practices where ‘geopolitics’ is seen to take place’ (2010: 244). I 
therefore recognise that prosaic practices of national security can take place in a 
range of domains: cinema (Power and Crampton, 2007; Weber, 2007); video games 
(Power, 2009, 2007); magazines, comics, and cartoons (Dittmer, 2009, 2007; Dodds, 
2007; Sharp, 2000); art practice (Ingram, 2009); and military and media maps 
(Graham, 2004; Gregory, 2010).  
The second framework I use to critique broadening national security is 
biopolitical security, which emerged only in the last ten or even five years and draws 
heavily on Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in the late 1970s. As Michael 
Dillon claimed in 2007, ‘western security practices are as biopolitical as they are 
geopolitical’ (2007a: 7). Biopolitical security, with its emphasis on the relationship 
between security and circulating and contingent ways of life, may seem in many ways 
a more appropriate framework than critical geopolitics for understanding national 
security in a globalising world. But as it stands, the literature largely neglects 
precisely those features which have been identified by poststructural scholarship as 
essential features of contemporary politics - the textual, cultural and prosaic - in 
favour of what Jenny Edkins terms ‘a purely bare biological life of emergence’, so that 
the ‘goal of life, envisaged in this way, is nothing but the endless circulation of and 
reproduction of life’ (2008: 221). So whilst I use the concept of biopolitical security 
to further interrogate the discourses and performativities of broadening national 
security and crowded places security, my analysis also discusses in some depth the 
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1.4.2 Strategy II: Crowded places security 
 
The second part of my research strategy focuses on finding out about, 
understanding, and critiquing practices of crowded places security through an 
exploratory case study of the BALTIC Centre of Contemporary Art in Gateshead, 
England. Crowded places security is important as a further elaboration of broadening 
national security, but also, as I discussed above, as a key front of the war on terror in 
its own right. My objective with this case study was not only to gather information 
on practices of crowded places security, but also to explore how public spaces 
previously unconnected with national security were responding to inclusion within 
one of the government’s counter-terror programmes; and how everyday enactments 
and experiences of crowded places security contrasted with elite discourses. 
This sort of context-specific approach could be described as ‘ethnographic’, 
although as I discuss below, in this particular case it is better to say ‘micro-
ethnography’ in the style of participant observation (Gray, 2009). In this way, I aim to 
circumvent Nick Megoran’s (2006) criticism of the tendency of political geographers 
towards discourse analysis (drawing on critical social theory), which, he argues, puts 
such scholarship in danger of becoming ‘both repetitious and lopsided, relegating or 
even erasing people’s experiences and everyday understandings of the phenomena 
under question’ (p. 622). In contrast, ethnographic participant observation, ‘a 
method largely neglected by political geographers’, can be used to ‘address these 
imbalances and open new research directions’; with both approaches used to 
complement each other in a ‘critique of state violence’ (Megoran, 2006: 622).  
Because of the lack of literature on crowded places security, the structure of 
this case study was exploratory, flexible and iterative, and encompassed nine months 
of active information collection from January to September 2009. BALTIC was 
chosen as the site of my case study for two main reasons. First, in order to address 
particular gaps in the critical geopolitics and security studies literatures. Of all the 
social science disciplines, geography has unsurprisingly been exemplary in exploring 
the performativity of space, but as yet little attention has been given to 
performativities of security in cultural spaces and/ or visitor attractions. Security 
studies and international relations have a better record. In addition to analyses of 
security at borders (Amoore, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2010, 2009), airports (Salter, 
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2008), and critical national infrastructure (Aradau, 2010b; Collier and Lakoff, 2008), 
there has been considerable attention given to how dominant political discourses, 
including security, are articulated through cultural practices and institutions. Debbie 
Lisle, for example, looks at the post-9/11 reproduction of American superiority in 
the Whitney Museum of American Art (2007), and how war exhibitions in the US 
Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Imperial War Museum, London, function to 
restore the consensual politics of the status quo (2006) (also Luke, 2002). 
But these analyses typically lack a direct engagement with how politics not only 
takes place within space, as players act on a stage, but is also made possible by space. 
And it is precisely such an engagement that this thesis carries out in relation to 
broadening national security and crowded places security, therefore making a clear 
contribution to the security studies literature on the war on terror. What is at stake 
in this contribution includes, but also goes beyond, the recognition - such as that of 
Christine Sylvester (2008) - that art galleries have political agendas. For example, she 
writes that art museums cater to the ‘middle classes and middlebrow tastes’, and 
that ‘most surveys... indicate time and time again that the well-educated, affluent 
and/or upwardly mobile classes choose museum-going as their leisure pursuit’ (2008: 
3). It is rather, as Gregson and Rose would have it, the explicit un-working of how 
performativities of space materialise, reiterate and reproduce regulatory norms. 
How performativities of ‘zero space’ in modernist art galleries such as BALTIC 
reproduce zero change in the prevailing political status quo, and also make possible 
the emptying out or zero-ing of space sought by contemporary security practices. 
This relationship is absolutely key not only because it means that certain spaces 
make possible certain practices – that art galleries make possible crowded places 
security (and certainly they do) – but also that spaces are performed so as to make 
certain practices not possible, or certainly more difficult. And this has obvious 
repercussions for the possibilities of contesting the politics of security.   
This lack of attention to how space makes certain actions possible or, 
alternatively, more difficult is the same neglect that haunts urban geography analyses 
of security in public space. They are typically limited by what could be termed ‘banal 
materialism’; where the objects and practices of security just ‘are’ rather than being 
materialised through the citation of regulatory norms. One example would be Jon 
Coaffee’s (2004) analysis of the ‘ring of steel’, which was erected around London’s 
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financial district, the ‘City’, in the early 1990s in response to threats from the 
Provisional IRA, and maintained more recently because of the alleged additional 
threat from Al Qa’ida terrorism. Coaffee concludes that counter-terror strategies in 
the City, like the ring of steel, have to date ‘succeeded in creating an environment 
where the needs of safety and security sit side by side with business vibrancy’ (2004: 
295). Indeed, they might have done so. But I would counter to what extent do the 
counter-terror strategies represented by the ring of steel cite and regenerate the 
same discourses from which ‘business vibrancy’ draws its meaning? In other words, 
in this case ‘security’ and ‘business vibrancy’ may be both the means to the same end 
of a particular political and economic status quo. 
The second reason for choosing BALTIC as the site of my case study is that, 
most obviously, crowded places security is there. If crowded places security does 
indeed represent the encroachment of the war on terror into the UK’s public space, 
as has been argued (Coaffee, O’Hare and Hawkesworth, 2009), and as I believe also, 
then logically crowded places security should be observable in any crowded place. 
BALTIC has a very high profile both internationally as an important venue for 
contemporary art and in the northeast of England as a tourist and leisure attraction. 
It is also part of the equally high-profile regeneration of ‘NewcastleGateshead’,16 
including the Gateshead quayside area where BALTIC is located. BALTIC is 
therefore exactly the type of ‘prominent... crowded places business sector[s]’ which 
is the particular focus of crowded places policy (WTP: 18). So using BALTIC as my 
case study means that not only could I address the gaps in the literature, but also I 







 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ‘NewcastleGateshead’ is the brand developed by the Newcastle and Gateshead Councils to 
promote the area ‘nationally and internationally as a place at the forefront of innovative culture-led 
regeneration’. See ‘About the area – NewcastleGateshead’ on NewcastleGateshead website. Available 
at http://www.newcastlegateshead.com/site/about-the-area/newcastlegateshead (Accessed 17 March 
2011). 
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1.5 Tactics in crowded places 
 
1.5.1 Official documents 
 
As I discuss above, my research strategy posits the NSS and, it should be noted, 
crowded places publications as being indicative of the imaginative knowledges 
underpinning contemporary discourses of national security; discourses which are 
elite rather than everyday (although this is not to say that they are not ‘lived’ in the 
sense of impacting upon lives outside typical elite domains of government and policy) 
(Cloke et al., 2004). For this reason it is necessary to probe a little deeper into what 
documents actually are. 
When discussing the use of documents in social research, Lindsay Prior claims 
that like Marcel Duchamp’s urinal artwork Fountain, ‘it is no easier to specify what a 
document is than it is to specify, in abstraction, what is and what is not a work of 
art’ (2003: 1). Instead, Prior advises moving away from abstract definitions – for 
example, defining the NSS and crowded places publications as ‘policy documents’ – 
to instead ‘consider them in terms of fields, frames and networks of action’ (2003: 
2). In this way, I might point to the actions of the politicians and civil servants in 
central government who requested that these documents be produced, as well as in 
the Ministry of Defence and the police force. I might also point to the framing in 
which these individuals and these documents exist: that of the state. But does this 
take me any closer to what might be considered the ‘nature’ of these documents?  
There is the possibility of turning to the creators of the documents themselves – 
surely the persons who devised and produced these documents - the persons whose 
words they are – would know what they were? For Prior, however, returning to the 
original intentions of the creators would not solve the problem, ‘for their 
involvement with things was (necessarily) ephemeral’ (2003: 2). If we imagine that 
the creators of the NSS and crowded places publications were civil servants ‘doing 
their job’, invariably through discussions with a range of people and under 
instructions from more senior colleagues, in what ways could they access the nature 
of the document they produced? Indeed, in Prior’s account human agency of any 
kind – whether of the ‘creator’ or ‘receiver’ of documents – is bounded. ‘We should 
remain alert’, he writes, ‘to the fact that there is far more in heaven and earth than 
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human agents… for it is quite clear that human beings necessarily live and act and 
work in a field of things as well as of people’ (2003: 3). For this reason, ‘documents 
and the information that they contain can influence and structure human agents 
every bit as effectively as the agents influence the things’ (Prior, 2003: 3). 
Above all, Prior urges us to consider documents as products or works 
‘produced by humankind in socially organized circumstances’ – ‘consequently, one 
set of questions that may quite justifiably be asked by the social science researcher 
concern the processes and circumstances in terms of which document ‘X’ has been 
manufactured’ (2003: 4). In chapter 2, I consider the ‘processes and circumstances’ in 
which the NSS, CONTEST, and crowded places policy are manufactured – 
specifically through an account of how they materialise, through performativities of 
broadening national security, contemporary discourses of neoliberal globalisation. 
For this reason, I must also be cognisant that my analysis of these texts is part of the 
same citation; by ‘assuming’ the materiality of crowded places policy and practices to 
the extent that I am able to research them, to make them the subject of a PhD, I am 
part of their reiterative materialisation. 
 
 
1.5.2 Participant observation 
 
In the literature on social science methodologies, ethnography is used to 
describe extended periods of research in social and organisational settings (Gray, 
2009: 170); though ethnography itself has a distinct lineage tracing back to traditional 
anthropological studies. Furthermore, ethnography and participant observation can 
be used interchangeably (Gray, 2009: 170; also Megoran, 2006: 625). Following Gray, 
however, my research at BALTIC is best described as participant observation in 
terms of ‘micro-ethnography’, which ‘adopts a more focused approach on, say, one 
aspect or element of a work or social setting, allowing for observation over a few 
weeks or months’ (Gray, 2009: 170). During the nine months of my active on site 
research at BALTIC, I varied the time between mornings, 10.00am to 12.30pm, and 
afternoons, 12.30pm to 6pm, as well as the point of the week between early week - 
Monday and Tuesday - late week - Wednesday, Thursday and Friday - and the 
weekend.  
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Within the discipline of political geography, Nick Megoran strongly advocates 
the use of ethnography to produce fuller accounts of the ‘spatiality of political 
processes’ (2006: 625) (see Crang and Cook, 2007; and also Herbert, 2000 on 
ethnographies in human geography more generally). Megoran makes an explicit 
distinction between ethnographic participant observation and other ‘social science 
research methods’ such as surveys, semi-structured interviews, oral histories, and 
focus groups; which, he writes, ‘produce unique forms of data by creating particular 
controlled environments that are structured by power relations and discursive 
formats generally alien to everyday forms of interaction’ (2006: 626). Ethnographic 
participant observation, he continues, ‘tries to obviate these factors as the 
researcher patiently listens and takes part in social interactions that he/she has not 
created and does not control’ (Megoran, 2006: 626). Of course he admits that the 
physical presence of a researcher can alter the ‘dynamics of interaction’, that ‘power 
relations are never absent from research’, and that there is ‘no guarantee that an 
ethnographer can correctly understand what he or she witnesses’; but overall, in his 
view, ‘ethnography remains more sensitive to emic (self-described) than etic 
(researcher-described) categories and meanings’ (Megoran, 2006: 626).  
I cannot disagree that research on the spatial politics of security could be 
immensely improved within the disciplines of security studies, and to a lesser degree 
political geography, by more (in many cases any) attentiveness to the specific context 
of security practices. But at the same time, notwithstanding Megoran’s obvious 
experience - having spent three and a half years carrying out fieldwork in the 
Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley studying the imposition of a new 
international boundary after the dissolution of the Soviet Union - his case for 
ethnography does revert to a naivety which is problematic for carrying out the kind 
of research on security practices which I have outlined above. In particular, his claim 
that ethnographers are able to ‘witness’ social interactions which they will be able to 
‘understand’, ignores the important work which specifically problematises sight and 
the capacity to witness in the constitution of social phenomena (Berger, 1972; Crary, 
1992), including in relation to the production of space (van Hoven and Sibley, 2008) 
and to security (Amoore, 2009, 2007; Campbell, 2007a). 
There were also important ways in which in BALTIC I participated in that which I 
was aiming to observe. For example, walking around the spaces – not just the art 
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and commercial spaces, but also the lifts, hallways, and stairwells - going on the 
history and exhibit tours, and so on. In this way, it was difficult to separate myself 
the ‘researcher’ from the performativities of security and space which were the 
object of the ‘research’. Of course, the object of Megoran’s research was the impact 
of re-bordering practices on the local inhabitants – his friends and acquaintances. But 
as I discussed above in relation to spaces of security, it is not only problematic to 
posit the epistemological separation of social phenomena from their spatial context – 
the performativity of the political from the performativity of space - it is also 
politically self-defeating. For as long as this separation is maintained, understanding of 
how space makes possible political exclusion and makes impossible political 
contestation remains constrained. 
Indeed, it was precisely my participation in, as well as my observation of, 
BALTIC which led me figuratively and bodily to its Library & Archives, and the 
revelation that is the ‘BALTIC story’: a glut of highly manufactured narratives about 
the gallery’s origins and operations relentlessly churned out in a range of guidebooks 
and conceptual/intellectual texts. This ‘discovery’ convinced me that I was definitely 
not in an innocent ‘good’ space which played reluctant host to ‘bad’ security 
practices. As I discuss in chapter 4, BALTIC is subtly but effectively organised as 
what Keller Easterling (2005) terms ‘a spatial product’. A visitor to BALTIC is 
figuratively and literally navigated towards its shop and café, as well as its art spaces, 
whilst security remains firmly ‘back of house’. There are physical barriers in BALTIC 
– access control doors and walls – and there are also attitudinal, political barriers.  
Finally, regarding the limitations of discourse analysis, Megoran writes that while 
it has made an important contribution to the field of critical geopolitics, yet the 
‘study of elite discourses remains only a partial contribution to the construction of a 
fuller understanding of the spatiality of political processes’ (2006: 625). ‘Without a 
complementary study of the reception of these discourses by ‘ordinary people’’,17 in 
other words ethnographic participant observation, ‘there is an ever present danger 
of crafting lopsided or even irrelevant accounts’ (Megoran, 2006: 625). Here I would 
disagree with Megoran to the extent that he seems to be suggesting that elite 
discourses are separate from ‘ordinary’ life. I would counter that elites, like 
academics, live in the same world as ‘ordinary people’, although of course they may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Megoran understands ‘ordinary people’ not as a homogeneous subject group, but as ‘anyone who is 
not actively producing public geographical knowledge’ (2006: 625).  
	   47	  
in many respects experience and understand that world differently. I do not think 
that critique of elite discourses can ever be ‘irrelevant’: the point, it seems to me, is 
precisely to fathom the ways in which they impact – and often violently so – on lives 
which are outside typical elite domains. 
So although perhaps in an empty field a falling tree makes no sound, it does not 
follow that if political geographers desert elite discourses to focus on ‘ordinary 
people’, that the lives of the latter (or indeed their own) will stop being shaped by 
elites. Yes, the ‘Foucauldian model’ emphasises that power is dispersed, circulating, 
and productive, thus moving away from the notion that power can only be found at 
the top. However, it would be unhelpful I think for scholars to neglect the way in 
which elites continue to hold and to exercise a capacity for unilateral action. 
Anecdotally, this can be illustrated by the police action taken against student 
protestors at the end of 2010, and in any number of on-going military campaigns 
unleashed by UK parliamentarians and senior military personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Libya, and on and on.     
I think it is possible to get round this issue of which method is better, which 
method can ‘save the day’ (as Megoran elsewhere in the article claims to aspire to), 
by considering how methods can work together and supplement each other – 
indeed, with difficult to research phenomena like security and counter-terrorism this 
is not a matter of choice, it is absolutely imperative.  
 
 
1.5.3 Interviews and talk 
 
In contrast to the large range of material on the ‘BALTIC story’, BALTIC’s 
Library & Archives unsurprisingly had nothing on security practices in the building. I 
was already aware, for example, that there was no bag check at the front door (see 
chapter 4), but I had no way of understanding the context of these practices (or lack 
thereof), without speaking to those who were directly involved with security at 
BALTIC. In this way, Gubrium and Holstein describe the ‘postmodern interview’ as 
distinct from the ‘modern interview’, with its ‘designated roles, search for objective 
knowledge, and lack of political consciousness’ (2003: 4; also 1997). In contrast, the 
postmodern interview is ‘more a set of orienting sensibilities that contrast on many 
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fronts with modern interview prescriptions than it is a particular kind of 
interviewing’ (Gubrium and Holstein, 2003: 4).  
My leading questions were drawn from my understanding of the crowded places 
publications. In addition to finding out what crowded places security was, at the same 
time I wanted to put those practices in context, not least with broadening national 
security. How did staff feel about the intensification of security in the war on terror? 
Did they feel it was something to be concerned about? Had they noticed an 
intensification at all, or would another description be better? In this way, I was 
testing my own assumptions about the problem of crowded places security – in 
other words, my own research questions. I was also paying attention to the 
participants’ perceptions of the ‘reality’ I (thought I) was researching, which is a key 
characteristic of qualitative research (Gray, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
With these objectives in mind, the interviews as a set of ‘orienting sensibilities’ 
didn’t disappoint. Staff had noticed an intensifying emphasis on counter-terrorism, 
but they also appeared to accept that such an emphasis was necessary. This raises 
the issue of how much of what I was told accurately reflects what happens on the 
ground at BALTIC, as well as how the interviewees felt about it. Were the 
interviewees presenting things in the ‘best possible light’ and/or telling me what they 
thought the academic researcher wanted to hear? Is it even appropriate to make a 
distinction between actual, ‘true’ events and accounts of them? Atkinson and Coffey 
write that ‘we need to treat interviews as generating accounts and performances 
that have their own properties’ (2003: 116; also Gillham, 2005; Gubrium and 
Holstein, 2002). In this way, the researcher does not need to be concerned about 
whether the interviewee is ‘telling the truth, if by that one understands the analyst’s 
task to be that of distinguishing factual accuracy from distortion, bias, or deception’ - 
rather, ‘attention is paid to… their performative qualities’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 
2003: 116).  
The interviews also revealed the existence of other security practices beyond 
those referenced by either the NSS or crowded places: primarily, the Government 
Indemnity Scheme (GIS). Indeed, during the interviews it became almost immediately 
clear that staff were not familiar with the terms which were so prominent in the 
documents - ‘crowded places’, ‘NaCTSO’, ‘CTSA’, and so on. The Head of Building 
Services at BALTIC, who is responsible for security, referred to the Counter-
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Terrorism Security Advisers with whom he was in contact as ‘officers from Project 
Argus’ – whereas Project Argus is only one part of their role. 
At the time, however, and for the purposes of analysis, I decided to assume that, 
because BALTIC staff were involved in implementing counter-terrorism in 
consultation with CTSAs, I could call the ‘what’ of what was happening in BALTIC 
the implementation of crowded places security. But the question of my active 
involvement in the production of knowledge about crowded places security in BALTIC 
remains. Actually, my analysis draws out the different discourses which 
performativities of security in BALTIC cite and reinscribe, so I hope that in this way I 
make clear that the ‘what’ of what was happening on the ground depends on lots of 
other ‘whats’: some very visible, like the ‘BALTIC story’, and others largely silent and 
hidden, like the commitment of the contemporary art gallery to the political status 
quo. 
To sum up, then, what is important about my tactics in researching crowded 
places security is that one tactic is not meant to yield more valid or ‘true’ materials 
than the others. Atkinson and Coffey write that observation can yield ‘a more 
complete record and understanding’ of social processes than interviews alone (2003: 
112). Indeed, in the social sciences interviews are generally held to be particularly 
problematic. Atkinson and Coffee claim, for example, ‘it is hard to quarrel with the 
assertion that the study of observable events is better accomplished by the 
observation of those events than by the collection of retrospective and 
decontextualised descriptions of them’ (2003: 112). However, the assertion that 
observation is more reliable than interviews, obviously relies on the assumption that 
researchers are better able to identify and even understand what is going on better 
than ‘lay person’ interviewees. In terms of researching performativities of security, 
however, I would argue not only that observation is not more ‘reliable’ than 
interview material, but in fact the opposite may be more relevant. It is often very 
hard to observe security practices in the classic sense of with one’s own eyes. Of 
course, there are observable practices of security which can be recognised as such – 
CCTV, bag searches – but this is a very impoverished understanding of ‘security’, and 
one which I do not adhere to in this thesis. 
In other words, therefore, I do not hierarchise the material and information I 
collected from my time visiting, participating in, and observing BALTIC, and my 
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interviews and talk with staff. I do not use the interview material to verify my 
observations, or vice versa. Rather, they work together in what Atkinson and Coffey 
term a ‘productive combination’ (2003: 110). ‘Actions are understandable’, they 
argue, because ‘they can be talked about. Equally, accounts – including those derived 
from interviewing – are actions. Social life is performed and narrated, and we need 
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1.6 Thesis organisation 
 
This thesis steers away from the more usual format in the social sciences of first, 
the elaboration of a theoretical context; second, the description of a methodological 
approach; and third, the production of the ‘results’ of analysis, which is based on the 
experimental and explanatory format of the natural sciences. As Foucault wrote of 
his genealogical project: ‘[it is] certainly not a matter of contrasting the abstract unity 
of theory with the concrete multiplicity of the facts’; nor is it ‘a matter of some form 
or other of scientism that disqualifies speculation by contrasting it with the rigour of 
well-established bodies of knowledge’ (2004: 8-9). Instead, each of the following 
chapters blends conceptual frames, empirical material(isations), and analysis. It is, as I 
discussed above, a strategy of connecting rather than homogenising that which is 
heterogeneous and contradictory. In this way, the organisation of the thesis reflects 
my emergent attempt to play different knowledges off against each other, to resist 
their organization into ‘a true body of knowledge’ (Foucault, 2004: 9). 
Chapter 2 ‘The National Security Strategy and the geopolitics of the 
war on terror’ uses critical geopolitics literatures to set out my argument that 
contemporary national security practices, including counter-terrorism and crowded 
places security, must be understood as part of a broadening understanding of 
national security and a broadening register of coercive policy responses, which in 
turn cites and reinscribes neoliberal discourses. After discussing how national 
security can be conceptualised as a site of performative politics, I provide a 
genealogy of broadening national security which focuses on its role in the re-
ordering of global politics after the end of the cold war. In this way I circumvent a 
weakness of similar security policy analyses which tend to neglect the necessarily 
historical, but moreover discursive and regulatory context in which such policies and 
practices emerge. I then consider how the broadening of national security in the war 
on terror depends on performativities of interconnection. In the final part of the 
chapter I work these insights through my case study of The National Security Strategy 
of the United Kingdom.  
Chapter 3 ‘Broadening national security and biopolitical security’ uses 
the biopolitics literature to question how the contemporary broadening of national 
security can be further interrogated through the lens of biopolitical security. My 
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analysis in this chapter proceeds on the basis that broadening national security 
depends on modes of circulation and population, which have been analysed 
extensively as the object-products of biopolitical technologies. But my reading, in 
which biopolitics is considered as a mode of performative politics, diverges in one 
crucial respect: for me, circulation and population are the materialisations, rather than 
the objects, of biopolitical discourses. Specifically, they are performativities of 
‘natural reality’: the realities natural to liberal governance. In the final part of the 
chapter I feed this argument back into my case study of the NSS.  
Chapter 4 ‘Crowded places security I - Innocent and zero space’ uses 
literatures from critical architecture, social and cultural geography, and visual culture 
to assert that crowded places security cannot be interrogated while research 
maintains a stake in space as an innocent backdrop to counter-terrorism. To begin, 
using Keller Easterling’s concept of the ‘spatial product’, I argue that BALTIC’s 
spaces are already deeply politicised. In the rest of the chapter I trace the 
intertwining of performativities of space and security in BALTIC, arguing that 
performativities of ‘zero space’ in modernist art galleries such as BALTIC reproduce 
zero change in the prevailing political status quo, and also make possible the 
emptying out or zero-ing of space sought by contemporary security practices. 
Chapter 5 ‘Crowded places security II – Risk and biopolitical control’ 
uses literatures from security studies and political economy to explore the ways in 
which crowded places security is materialised through two performativities of 
contemporary biopolitical government: risk and control. Resisting the tendency of 
the extant literatures on biopolitical control to stray into a fetishised technologism, 
this chapter focuses on the way performativities of risk and control intersect with 
the daily business of the public art gallery. My argument is that counter-terrorism is 
becoming increasingly important in shaping daily life in the UK through a diverse 
range of spatial control practices. 
Chapter 6 Conclusion revisits the main themes and arguments of the thesis. 
It considers the value of the methodological and conceptual strategy in relation to 
the difficulty of researching the politics of security as an empirical phenomenon. It 
then discusses three main themes that have emerged in the thesis, and discusses 
directions for future research. These themes relate to terrorism in a global age, the 
biopolitics of national security, and the meaning of crowded places security. 
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Chapter 2 The National Security Strategy 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The UK is, in many ways, safer than ever before and the new, global age 
provides many opportunities. But it also gives rise to newer and more 
disparate threats to citizens. These modern challenges require a broader 
understanding of national security and a broader range of responses – The 
National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.18  
 
This chapter argues that contemporary national security practices, including 
counter-terrorism and crowded places security, must be understood as 
performativities of a broadening national security. Citing discourses of intensifying 
neoliberal globalisation19 since the end of direct confrontation between the ‘West’ 
and the Soviet Union in 1989, the broadening of national security is performed 
through a ‘broader understanding’ of threats, thereby licensing a ‘broader range’ of 
coercive, violent responses. The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 
(hereafter NSS) is an important site at which to interrogate performativities of 
broadening national security because, for the first time in UK security policy, it 
explicitly identifies ‘interconnectedness and interdependence between economies, 
societies, businesses, and individuals’ as the rationale of national security (2008: 16, 
emphasis added).  
The reasons for publicly acknowledging the prioritising of neoliberal 
globalisation, which had already been underway for some time, in the form of a 
National Security Strategy - when previously the UK government had confined itself 
to more narrowly-focused iterations of defence policy - is itself an interesting site of 
investigation, and one into which I make some in-roads in this chapter. My main 
objective, however, is two-fold: first, to explore performativities of broadening 
national security through their iteration in current UK policy, and in the critical 
geopolitics literature; and second, to consider the violent consequences of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Cabinet Office, 2009: 14. 
19 The concept of and/or usage of the term ‘neoliberalism’ are controversial according to Peck, 
Theodore and Brenner: they describe it ‘simultaneously as an oppositional slogan, a zeitgeist signifier, 
and an analytical construct’ (2010: 96). In this thesis I use it most definitely in a critical sense, as a way 
of ‘denaturalizing globalization processes, while calling attention to their associated ideological and 
political constructions’ – in this case, national security and more specifically, the terrorist threat 
(Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2010: 96). 
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broadening national security in more detail, particularly in relation to the re-making 
of the threat from terrorism. 
I begin in section 2.2 with David Campbell’s (1998) argument that the purpose 
of national security is to perform or ‘(re-)write’ the contemporary nation-state. 
Borrowing from Judith Butler’s work on the performativity of gender, Campbell 
argues that the state as a coherent identity is materialised through the ritualized 
repetition of boundaries between inside and outside, secure and dangerous, and 
domestic and foreign. Practices of national security therefore, by reiterating and 
reinscribing these boundaries, materialise domains of insecure others who can reside 
both outside and within the state’s territorial borders. In the second part of the 
section, I move on to discuss Edward Said’s seminal account of the ‘Orient’ as 
precisely such a materialisation of a dangerous Other in ‘their land’ (but also 
occasionally in ‘our land’) (2003: 54). The usefulness of this concept of the 
‘imaginative geographies’ of Orientalism (Said, 2003: 55), is its direct engagement 
with the materialisations of ‘foreclosure’ and ‘radical erasure’ which are at the centre 
of Butler’s account.  
In section 2.3 I begin to work these insights on the materialisation of national 
security and insecurity through the contemporary example of the 2008 and 2009 
NSS; focusing on their central demand for a ‘broadened view’ of national security 
appropriate for a ‘new, global age’. I discuss how broadening national security 
materialises discourses of neoliberal globalisation as a complex (in)security landscape 
and, in particular, as the ‘interconnectedness’ of threats and risks, which in turn 
licenses more extensive policy responses than has hitherto been the case. But 
broadening national security is both not as novel as the NSS claims, and distinct from 
the inside/outside, us/them problematics identified by Campbell and Said. In the 
second part of the section, I argue that broadening national security must be situated 
in the re-making of the geopolitical order after the end of the cold war. Taking the 
New Labour government as my jumping-off point, I look at its defence policy record 
from the much-trumpeted Strategic Defence Review in 1998 through the 2004 
Defence White Paper to the NSS and CONTEST in 2008 and 2009. My argument is 
that in the period after 1989, successive UK security policies were part of the on-
going materialisation of a geopolitical order which both enabled and protected the 
development of neoliberal globalisation.  
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In section 2.4, I consider how political geographers have sought to understand 
and challenge the contemporary role of national security in enabling neoliberal 
globalisation - in particular through the conduct of the war on terror. I focus on 
Bialasiewicz et al.’s (2007) argument that ‘a process of incorporation and the policy 
of integration’ are the ‘basis for the imaginative geography of the ‘war on terror’’ (p. 
415, 419). Whilst incorporation and integration are no less violent and exclusionary 
than Orientalism, they do move beyond the latter’s ‘simple binary oppositions’ 
(Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 415). ‘Integrating’ national security, they argue, is distinctive 
in the way it materialises insecurity as those actors and domains which will not join 
or participate in the global economy. In the rest of the section I work through how 
performativities of integration violently materialise interconnection through the 
‘God’s eye view’ of threat and response, and the assembling of roles of ‘leader’ and 
‘follower’ based on hegemonic claims to ‘core values’.  
In the final section 2.5, I return to the NSS to draw out how its own 
performativities of interconnection license a broadening register of coercive policy 
responses. These practices materialise or ‘bring to life’ a world in which the state’s 
monopoly of legitimate violence is increasingly woven into everyday spaces. In the 
final part, I focus on how through the re-making of the terrorist threat, broadening 
national security materialises a ‘domain of abject beings’ of diasporic communities in 
the UK (Butler, 1993: 2). In this way I argue that broadening national security, like 
the national security practices Campbell highlighted, cannot be an ‘obvious’ response 
to an external threat, but is instead the continued and violent reiteration of 
neoliberal discourses of global (in)security.   
This chapter takes a very different approach to the rationalist analyses which 
thus far make up the very small body of academic and public response to the NSS. 
These analyses debate national security strategy within the parameters of what 
Campbell termed ‘epistemic realism’ - whereby the ‘world comprises objects whose 
existence is independent of ideas or beliefs about them’ (1998: 4). So for example, 
James Gow (2009: 126) questions whether the NSS is ‘genuine strategy’ or just 
‘bland aspirational statements’; and Charlie Edwards (2007), in a report for the think 
tank DEMOS, foresees the potential of the NSS as a ‘collaborative strategic 
framework’ through which ‘departments and agencies can be more efficient and 
effective in working together’ (p. 3) (also Johnson, Kartchner and Larsen, 2009). In 
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contrast, my reading of the performative politics of the NSS foregrounds a different 
question: what do performativities of broadening national security make of the 
world, and make of us? 
 
 
2.2 Performing national security - Boundary-producing practices and 
imaginative geographies  
 
Providing security for the nation and for its citizens remains the most 
important responsibility of government – The National Security Strategy of the 
United Kingdom.20  
 
This statement is taken from the first page of the first ever National Security 
Strategy of the United Kingdom published in March 2008. As I go on to discuss in the 
following two chapters, the rationale of this document depends on the existence of 
‘external’ dangers and threats from which a government can secure its ‘nation and its 
citizens’. In the NSS, these threats include weapons of mass destruction, inter-state 
conflict, failed states, pandemics, transnational crime, and, of course, international 
terrorism. Indeed, it is because these threats are posited as existing in a ‘real’, 
objective sense that the ‘aim of this first National Security Strategy’ is ‘to set out 
how we will address and manage this diverse though interconnected set of security 
challenges and underlying drivers’ (2008: 3). 
David Campbell, however, challenges these claims of national security strategy 
precisely by stressing that, ‘danger is not an objective condition. It [sic] is not a thing 
that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat’ (1998: 1). To 
illustrate this he gives the example, vis-à-vis François Ewald’s influential 1991 essay 
Insurance and Risk, of how contemporary insurance constitutes danger as ‘risk’ 
through the mathematical calculus of probabilities. In insurance, Campbell explains, 
‘danger (or, more accurately, risk) is ‘neither an event nor a general kind of event 
occurring in reality’’, but instead, ‘a specific mode of treatment of certain events 
capable of happening to a group of individuals’ (1998: 2). Therefore, ‘nothing is a risk 
in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 2008: 3. 
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depends on how one analyses the danger’ (Ewald cited in Campbell, 1998: 2, 
emphasis in original). In performativity terms, then, insurance technologies 
materialise particular discourses of danger through citational practices including 
mathematical calculation. 
This understanding of the ‘necessarily interpretive basis of risk’, Campbell 
writes, has important implications for understanding geopolitical dangers and threats, 
such as those put forward in the NSS. Primarily, ‘those events or factors that we 
identify as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of 
their various dimensions of dangerousness’ (Campbell, 1998: 2). Campbell does not 
want to deny that ‘there are ‘real’ dangers in the world: infectious diseases, 
accidents, and political violence (among others) have consequences that can literally 
be understood in terms of life and death’ (1998: 2). Instead, his argument is two-fold: 
first, that threat is interpretive; and second, that the interpretation of threat tends to 
coalesce around particular referents, for example things and persons that are ‘alien, 
subversive, dirty, or sick’ (Campbell, 1998: 3). 
 So if national security strategy cannot, as the NSS claims, ‘address and manage’ 
threats because such threats do not exist external to the interpretive process which 
constitutes them, where does this leave the government and the state - the main 
responsibility of which according to the NSS is to do precisely the former? For 
Campbell, the state, like insurance risks, is performatively constituted. ‘Whether we 
are talking of ‘the body’, or ‘the state’, or of particular bodies and states’, he writes, 
‘the identity of each is performatively constituted’ (1998: 9). Drawing directly on 
Judith Butler’s early work on gender, Campbell writes: 
 
I want to suggest that we can understand the state as having ‘no ontological 
status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality’… and that the 
identity of any particular state should be understood as ‘tenuously constituted 
in time… through a stylized repetition of acts’, and achieved ‘not [through] a 
founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition’ (1998: 10, emphasis in 
original).21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Cynthia Weber, also drawing on Butler, puts it thus: ‘sovereign nation-states are not pre-given 
subjects but subjects in process’, and ‘all subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the 
ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted’ (1998: 78). 	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Specifically, the materialisation of state identity ‘is achieved through the 
inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self’ 
from an ‘other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’’ (Campbell, 1998: 9). Just as the ‘stable 
contour’ of the body is achieved through citational and reiterative practices (Butler, 
1993: 13), so too a stable state identity is materialised through citational ‘boundary-
producing practices’ between the self/other, and – in Campbell’s development of the 
argument - inside/outside and domestic/foreign (1998: 73). Furthermore, as the 
‘heterosexual matrix’ reproduces itself through the ‘forcible production of ‘sex’’ 
(Butler, 1993: 11-12), likewise Campbell argues that the production of external 
threat is compelled by the state matrix which needs that danger to survive. ‘For a 
state to end its practices of representation’, Campbell writes, ‘would be to expose 
its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death’ (1998: 12). Ironically 
then, ‘the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the 
state’s continued success as an impelling identity’ (Campbell, 1998: 12). 
As I discussed in chapter 1, the performativity of threat through practices of 
national security takes places at many sites; indeed, as Butler puts it, while 
performativity may ‘acquire[s] an act-like status in the present, it conceals or 
dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition’ (1993: 12, emphasis added). In 
Campbell’s argument, then, performativities of national security threats reiterate the 
problematic of identity/difference that serve the state and its survival. ‘Foreign 
policy’, Campbell explains, ‘is one part of a multifaceted process of inscription that 
disciplines by framing man in the spatial and temporal organisation of the inside and 
outside, self and other: i.e. in the ‘state’’ (1998: 10-11). The state, then, is the 
‘outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistance elements to a secure identity 
on the ‘inside’ are linked through a discourse of ‘danger’ with threats identified and 
located on the ‘outside’’ (Campbell, 1998: 12, emphasis added).  
Campbell illustrates his arguments using the example of American foreign policy 
texts, and in particular the Basic National Security Policy documents produced, 
drafted, and re-drafted by the US National Security Council (NSC) throughout the 
1950s. He describes how on the one hand, these documents focused on the danger 
represented by the ‘hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR’ – and 
certainly this was the perception of US foreign policy at this time – yet on the other 
hand, the American national security establishment was equally, if not more, 
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exercised by the more ‘fundamental’ danger of anarchy and disorder. For example, 
the document NSC-17 opined that ‘from the very beginning of organized living, of 
society, there have existed negative elements which would tear down and destroy 
the established order by force if necessary’, and of these ‘negative elements’ 
communists were only the ‘most dangerous’ and ‘contemporary’ (cited in Campbell, 
1998: 27). Likewise, NSC-68 was concerned with the USSR as ‘a new fanatical faith, 
antithetical to our own... [which] seeks to impose its absolute authority over the 
rest of the world’ (Campbell, 1998: 23). Yet the document went on to claim that, ‘in 
a shrinking world... it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check Kremlin 
design, for the absence of order is becoming less and less tolerable’ (Campbell, 1998: 
23-4). 
This duality of national security – directed at the same time to the repulsion of a 
threat made ‘external’ and the maintenance of an order made ‘internal’ - leads 
Campbell to conclude that although the post-war texts of US national security 
materialised insecurity as all things Soviet, yet ‘they always acknowledge that the 
absence of order, the potential for anarchy, and the fear of totalitarian forces… - 
whether internal or external – was their initial concern’ (1998: 31). The purpose of 
the NSC documents then, and US national security strategy more broadly, was to 
literally ‘(re)write’ a source of danger in order to materialise a stable, coherent 
American identity: ‘not rewriting in the sense of changing the meaning, but rewriting 
in the sense of inscribing something so that that which is contingent and subject to 
flux is rendered more permanent’ (Campbell, 1998: 31). 
Campbell’s analysis is important to the extent that it transfers Butler’s theory of 
performativity to the materialisation of state identity through reiterative practices of 
national security. In particular, Campbell argues that state identity materialises 
regulatory norms regarding what is internal and external, domestic and foreign, 
secure and dangerous. Next I consider how such norms are materialised as what 
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2.2.1 Said’s imaginative geographies – Materialising ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
 
In his 1978 book Orientalism, Edward Said writes that he accepts that ‘all cultures 
impose corrections upon raw reality’, and that it is ‘perfectly natural for the human 
mind to resist the assault on it of untreated strangeness’ (2003: 67). But he argues 
that with representations of the ‘Orient’,22 this ‘process of conversion’ has become 
‘more, rather than less, total in what it tries to do’; to the extent that there is a 
‘schematic, almost cosmological inevitability with which Islam and its designated 
representatives are creatures of Western geographical, historical, and above all, 
moral apprehension’ (Said, 2003: 67-8). Indeed, writing in 2003 in a preface for a new 
edition of the book, Said ‘raises the question of whether modern imperialism ever 
ended’ – and it seems not, as he laments the ‘illegal and unsanctioned imperial 
invasion and occupation of Iraq by Britain and the United States’ in March the same 
year (2003: xiii). He continues:  
 
… the terrible reductive conflicts that herd people under falsely unifying 
rubrics like ‘America’, ‘The West’ or ‘Islam’ and invent collective identities for 
large numbers of individuals who are actually quite diverse, cannot remain as 
potent as they are, and must be opposed, their murderous effectiveness vastly 
reduced in influence and mobilizing power (Said, 2003: xxii).  
 
As a means of unworking both the process of ‘herding’ into collective identities, 
and the ‘false unification’ of geographical rubrics like ‘The West’ and, of course, the 
‘Orient’, Said proposes the concept of the ‘imaginative geography’, as opposed to the 
‘positive geography’ (2003: 55). He argues that the ways in which the Orient is 
known as something ‘other’ depends on how an imagined ‘we’ (specifically the 
British, French, and latterly Americans) position themselves in a particular temporal, 
spatial, and moral order (Said, 2003: 16). ‘For there is no doubt’, Said writes, ‘that 
imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own self of itself by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In terms of explaining where and what is the ‘Orient’, the point of Said’s argument is that it does 
not exist outside out of a discourse of European otherness. ‘I shall be calling Orientalism’, he writes, ‘a 
way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European 
Western experience’. He continues that ‘the Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place 
of Europe’s greatest and richest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural 
contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other’ (2003: 1). 
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dramatizing the distance between what is close by and what is far away’ (2003: 55). 
But at the same time, he makes clear that ‘it would be wrong to conclude that the 
Orient was essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality’ (Said, 
2003: 5, emphasis added). To the contrary, ‘ideas, cultures and histories cannot 
seriously be understood or studied without their force, or more precisely their 
configurations of power, also being studied’ (Said, 2003: 5, emphasis added). He 
therefore borrows heavily from Foucault’s notion of discourse (especially The 
Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish): 
 
My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one 
cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which 
European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient 
politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively 
during the post-Enlightenment (Said, 2003: 3). 
 
In performativity terms, then, there are two important movements within Said’s 
account of the imaginative geography. First, geographical ‘knowledges’ can be 
understood as performativities which reiteratively materialise discourses of ‘us’ and 
‘them’: ‘one big division, as between West and Orient, leads to other smaller ones’ 
(Said 2003: 57). In this way, the Orient and the Occident are performed or ‘made up 
of human effort, partly affirmation, partly identification of the Other’ (Said, 2003: xii). 
Drawing on the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, Said claims that 
imaginative knowledge is a function of the human mind which ‘requires order, and 
order is achieved by discriminating and taking note of everything, placing everything 
of which the mind is aware in a secure, refindable place’ (2003: 53, emphasis added). 
Accordingly, ‘there is always a measure of the purely arbitrary in the way the 
distinctions between these things are seen’:  
 
… this universal practice of designating in one’s own mind a familiar space 
which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’ is a way 
of making geographical distinctions that can be entirely arbitrary. I use the 
word ‘arbitrary’ here because imaginative geography of the ‘our land-barbarian 
land’ variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. 
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It is enough for ‘us’ to set up these boundaries in our own minds; ‘they’ 
become ‘they’ accordingly (Said, 2003: 54, emphasis in original).  
 
Consequently and second, the ‘human effort’ of imaginative knowledge is 
enabled by a power relationship. ‘The Orient was Orientalized’, Said writes, ‘because 
it could be – that is, submitted to being – made Oriental’ (2003: 6, emphasis in 
original). So alongside the identification of that which is produced and enabled by 
imaginative geographies, Said also pays considerable attention to that which is effaced 
and erased. For example, Said reproduces the encounter between the French writer 
Gustave Flaubert and an Egyptian courtesan Kuchuk Hanem which resulted, he 
claims, in ‘a widely influential model of the Oriental woman’: 
 
... [she] never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence, 
or history. He spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively 
wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him 
not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell 
readers in what way she was ‘typically Oriental’ (2003: 6, emphasis in original).  
 
Submission to Oriental geographies is leveraged by the constant and enduring 
‘positional superiority’ of the Westerner (Said, 2003: 8). Thus, ‘it is Europe that 
articulates the Orient’; and this articulation ‘is the prerogative, not of a puppet 
master, but of a genuine creator, whose life-giving power represents, animates, 
constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ 
(Said, 2003: 57). So while Orientalism is assumed to be ‘a field of learned study’, in 
Said’s formulation it becomes a set of power relationships that are unprecedented in 
the degree to which they take ‘a fixed, more or less total geographical position 
towards a wide variety of social, linguistic, political, and historical realities’ (2003: 
50). Orientalism is ‘enormous’ and ‘indiscriminate’ in size, and has an ‘almost infinite 
capacity for subdivision’ (Said, 2003: 50). 
Both Campbell and Said’s analyses illustrate how geopolitics take place within an 
‘imaginative’ context, in which collective identities materialise discourses of internal 
and external, domestic and foreign, secure and dangerous, and us and them. But this 
emphasis on binary divisions or problematics has two important limitations. First, it 
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effects a somewhat totalizing and all-too-neat reinscription of the dominant terms of 
global politics, which seems to foreclose the possibility of what Butler termed 
‘disidentification’ with regulatory norms (1993: 2). Although the ‘political discourses 
that mobilize identity categories tend to cultivate identifications in the service of a 
political goal’, she writes, ‘it may be that the persistence of disidentification is equally 
crucial to the rearticulation of democratic contestation’ (Butler, 1993: 2). At the 
very least, the world is always more complex than is belied by a constant reiteration 
of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ problematic. 
Second, in important ways the world has moved on. As I illustrate in the rest of 
the chapter, performativities of national security in what has been termed a ‘global 
age’23 present their own particularities. Nonetheless, twenty-five years after the 
original publication of Orientalism, Said explained that it is still ‘quite common to hear 
high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the map of the Middle 
East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many 
peanuts in a jar’ (2003: xiii). In so doing, he put his finger on the importance of the 
conceptual framework of performativity for the social sciences, including the 
discipline of security studies: the emphasis on ‘power acting through an expedient 












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 NSS 2009: 3. 
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2.3 Broadened national security - Performing a(nother) new world 
order24 
 
… the nature of the threats and risks we face have – in recent decades – 
changed beyond recognition and confounded all the old assumptions about 
national defence and international security… [therefore] new threats demand 
new approaches – Prime Minister Gordon Brown, 2008.25  
 
What our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of 
understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so 
that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of 
life for these lesser people to follow – Edward Said.26 
 
The inaugural 2008 UK National Security Strategy ‘Security in an interdependent 
world’, immediately situates itself within a particular geopolitical order. ‘Since the 
end of the Cold War’, it claims, ‘the international landscape has been transformed. 
The opposition between two power blocs has been replaced by a more complex and 
unpredictable set of relationships’: 
 
Economic trends, including more open global markets, and technological 
trends, particularly in communications, have strengthened the connections 
between individuals, businesses, societies and economies. Travel is faster and 
cheaper than ever, the flow of ideas and capital around the world can be 
almost instantaneous, and distances between people are becoming less relevant 
(NSS 2008: 3). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This is a fairly generic term typically used by western governments in regards to their assumptions 
about a significant change in the international order. For example, the UK Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office has recently been discussing the ‘rise of emerging powers’ in Latin America, China, and South 
East Asia, and the ‘new world order their rise is creating’. See ‘Navigating the new world order: The 
UK and the emerging powers’, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=Speech&id=633554682 (Accessed 4 August 2011). 
25 BBC News Online (2007) ‘In full: Brown anti-terror speech’, 14 November 2007. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7094620.stm (Accessed 10 September 2011). 
26 2003: xiii.	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Whilst the NSS presents these as ‘positive changes, empowering individuals and 
creating new opportunities for businesses, organisations and whole nations’,27 it also 
claims they can ‘create new challenges’: for ‘if the international landscape as a whole 
is increasingly complex and unpredictable, so too is the security landscape’ (2008: 3). 
This is explicitly recognised in the NSS’s demand for a new and different mode of 
setting priorities in national security. ‘The scope and approach of this strategy’, it 
explains, ‘reflects the way our understanding of national security has changed’ (NSS 
2008: 3). ‘In the past’: 
 
… the state was the traditional focus of foreign, defence and security policies, 
and national security was understood as dealing with the protection of the 
state and its vital interests from attacks by other states. Over recent decades, 
our view of national security has broadened to include threats to individual citizens 
and to our way of life, as well as to the integrity and interests of the state (NSS 
2008: 3, emphasis added). 
 
In this way, discourses of neoliberal globalisation, and in particular regulatory norms 
around open global markets and the free mobility of ‘ideas and capital’, 28  are 
materialised as a broadening threat register. 
The broadening threat register of national security is reiterated in a number of 
ways. First, through the interconnection of threats. For example, the NSS explains 
that although ‘no state threatens the United Kingdom directly’, the ‘cold war threat’ 
has nonetheless been replaced by ‘a diverse but interconnected set of threats and 
risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the potential to 
undermine wider international stability’ (2008: 3, emphasis added). Second, through 
the designation of new, non-traditional ‘disruptive threats’ (NSS 2009: 27). ‘It is not 
straightforward to define national security’, the NSS explains, for while traditional 
approaches have ‘focused on military threats, on espionage, and on other threats to 
the state and its interests’, the ‘disruptive threats which could endanger our freedom 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  There are of course many many dissenting voices from this happy diagnosis of neoliberal 
globalisation (see Roberts, Secor and Sparke, 2003; Smith, 2005). 
28 Though not, it should be noted, free mobility of people. Although the NSS claims that ‘global 
migration’ supports ‘economic growth and labour market flexibility’, it also brings challenges for 
security: ‘including identifying, among these increasing flows, those individuals who are security 
threats; and managing the effects on infrastructure and social cohesion of large and relatively rapid 
inflows of people’ (2008: 22) (also Amoore, 2006; Larner, 2008). 
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come from a wide range of sources’ (NSS 2009: 27, emphasis added). Specifically, 
disruptive threats are those which ‘have the potential to provide severe and sudden 
damage to our people, our institutions or our way of life’ (NSS 2009: 27-8). This 
designation of disruptive threats allows diverse phenomena including transnational 
crime, health pandemics, and flooding to be incorporated into the register of 
broadening national security (NSS 2008: 4). Because they ‘can affect large numbers of 
our citizens’ they ‘demand some of the same responses as more traditional security 
threats’ (NSS 2008: 4). 
The third way in which the broadening threat register of national security is 
reiterated and resignified is through the designation of so-called ‘symbiotic’ threats, 
such as terrorism and insurgency: a process which absolutely depends on the 
particular performativity of neoliberal interconnectedness which characterises the 
NSS. Insurgencies, because of globalisation and the ‘increasing dependence of 
societies on international financial information and communication networks’, rarely 
pay heed to ‘geographical boundaries’ (NSS 2009: 81). In particular, the ‘networked 
migration of ideas’ characteristic to globalisation fuels the ‘unprecedented’ transfer 
of ‘ideas, money, tactics and personnel’ between insurgent and terrorist groups (I 
discuss this further in chapter 3) (NSS 2009: 81). 
 
 
2.3.1 Driving insecurity after 1989 
 
In materialising neoliberal norms as interconnected threats, the NSS makes use 
of another key catalyst of imaginative knowledge: ‘underlying drivers of security and 
insecurity’ (2008: 4). These so-called ‘drivers’, including climate change, competition 
for energy, poverty, inequality, and poor governance, as well as the ‘vulnerabilities’ of 
global economic, technological and demographic trends, are described as being ‘not 
in themselves direct security threats to the United Kingdom’, but that which ‘can 
drive insecurity, instability, or conflict’ (NSS 2008: 20, 16, emphasis added). Indeed, 
such is their status as ‘major global issues’ with ‘implications beyond national 
security’, that the latter ‘may not even be the reason for tackling them’ (NSS 2008: 
16). Of course, such provisos are nonsensical: the NSS is precisely materialising 
these ‘global issues’ as threats within a broadening view of national security. 
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The concept of the driver of insecurity is not, however, an innovation of the 
NSS. According to James Gow (2009), its use in the NSS locates broadening national 
security precisely as the one of the ways in which the Western ‘victors’ re-shaped 
the geopolitical order after 1989. It is difficult to overstate the pervasiveness of the 
assumption within government, the academy, and what Campbell and Power refer to 
as ‘popular geopolitical representations’ (2010: 244), that the end of the cold war 
radically changed the context for national security, and therefore the meaning of 
security. Hopkinson (2000: 2) exemplifies this assumption when he discusses the 
‘shift in the meaning of security’ which took place alongside the ‘geopolitical and 
geostrategic change’ represented by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact from late 1989, which was followed in December 1991 by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. ‘The shift’, he continues: 
 
… was not easy to define but consisted essentially of a heightened awareness 
of the significance of the potential impact on Western well-being of non-state 
actors and non-conventional threats such as terrorism, drugs and crime 
(Hopkinson 2000: 3). 
 
Despite being ‘not easy to define’, the international community under the 
leadership of the UN attempted to rewrite the meaning of (in)security. Now that the 
threat from the Soviet Union was no longer, it seemed that Francis Fukuyama’s 
infamous ‘end of history’ thesis - first set out in an article in the conservative 
magazine The National Interest in 1989, and developed into a 1992 book - was a 
possibility, and a consensus emerged in the UN that the international community 
should set about ‘winning the peace’ by removing what were assumed to be the last 
recalcitrant sources of international insecurity. In January 1992, the first ever Summit 
of Heads of State and Government of the UN Security Council released a statement 
proclaiming ‘a time of momentous change’, at which the ‘end of the Cold War has 
raised hopes for a safer, more equitable world’.29 But optimism (and, needless to say, 
self-congratulation) had to be tempered with the recognition that the ‘absence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 United Nations Security Council (1992) ‘Statement of the Summit of the Heads of State and 
Governments’ [Online]. Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-
92/Chapter%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/Item%2028_SC%20respons%20in%20maint%20IPS.pdf. 
(Accessed 8 June 2011). 
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war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace 
and security’; rather, ‘non-military sources of instability in the economic, 
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security’.30 The 
Security Council therefore affirmed its commitment to urgently addressing ‘all the 
other problems, in particular those of economic and social development, requiring 
the collective response of the international community’.31 
This re-imagining of a broader range of national security priorities was further 
developed in the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s much-lauded 
Agenda for Peace, published five months later in June 1992. ‘In the course of the past 
few years’, he wrote: 
 
… the immense ideological barrier that for decades gave rise to distrust and 
hostility, and the terrible tools of destruction that were their inseparable 
companions has collapsed… the improvement in relations between States east 
and west affords new possibilities, some already realized, to meet successfully 
threats to common security… our aims must be… in the largest sense, to 
address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and 
political oppression.32 
 
Notwithstanding Boutros-Ghali’s powerful message of hope, the UN and the 
western-dominated Security Council, by automatically moving from the ‘old’ threat 
of Soviet communism to a roster of potential ‘new’ threats in the ‘economic, 
humanitarian and ecological fields’, acted to close down political debate about the 
grossly danger-oriented and grossly unequal structure of global politics. Of the UK’s 
place in these events, Gow writes that as a Permanent Member of the UN Security 
Council the UK was ‘not only aware of developments there, but also highly 
significant in leading others to support them’ (2009: 127). Furthermore, the 
(allegedly) ‘changing nature of security questions has not been restricted to the 
dealings of the UN Security Council… those changes have affected all states, 
especially in the liberal and developed worlds’ (Gow, 2009: 127, emphasis added). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 United Nations (1992) ‘An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-
keeping’, Report of the Secretary-General [Online]. Available at www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html 
(Accessed 7 March 2010). 
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Unfortunately, Gow does not consider that this is the case precisely because the 
‘liberal and developed worlds’ are driving this broadened insecurity agenda.   
Scholars in critical geopolitics have been more vocal in their condemnation of 
the actions taken by the UN and the Western-dominated Security Council in the 
1990s. Simon Dalby (2007) argues that while ‘nuclear weapons may have imposed a 
stalemate on the United States and the USSR in the period of the Cold War’, what 
he calls ‘the victory of the globalizers’ in 1989 functioned to clear the way for ‘a new 
strategic landscape on a much larger scale’ (p. 300). Specifically, this is the strategic 
landscape of neoliberalising interconnection whereby ‘globalization will be an 
unstoppable force if it can be appropriately accelerated by the use of the American 
military’ (Dalby, 2007: 300). Bialasiewicz et al. (2007) also see neoliberal 
performativities of interconnection as emerging from this period. ‘To understand the 
power of the imaginative geographies guiding current US strategy’, they write, ‘it is 
important to look back at the recitation, reiteration and resignification of previous 
strategic formulations’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 409). Specifically these are the 
‘geopolitical opportunities and threats of a post-Cold War era’: from ‘specifications 
of the threat posed by international terrorism, ‘failed states’ and ‘rogue regimes’’, to 
‘the dangers posed by cultural/ civilizational conflicts’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 409).  
In this way, David Campbell challenges the assumption that the end of the cold 
war marked ‘a qualitative change in world politics’ (1998: 7). Referring to US foreign 
policy (which was a major driving force in the broadened insecurity agenda of the so-
called ‘international’ community at this time), he argues that ‘one does not have to 
deny that world politics exhibits considerable novelty at [that] juncture to appreciate 
that... a range of new dangers… might occupy the place of the old’ (1998: 7, emphasis 
added). So Campbell purposely sidesteps the question of whether the ‘new global 
issues’ of the 1990s – the environment, drug use and trafficking, disease, migration, 
Islamic fundamentalism etcetera - were indeed new (1998: 7). Instead, he advocates ‘a 
more radical response’ directed at the ‘strategies and tactics by which they are 
calculated as dangers’ (Campbell, 1998: 7). In particular, his approach focuses not on 
any sense of an unevitable globalisation of liberal systems (see Larner, 2008) but 
instead on a phenomenon he terms the ‘globalisation of contingency’: 
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The globalization of contingency invokes the increasing tendencies toward 
ambiguity, indeterminacy, and uncertainty on our horizon… these 
contingencies… can no longer be contained within established power 
structures and spatializations. Danger, in short, can no longer just be written as 
‘out there’. Security is not to be found ‘within’. This is more than just a result 
of interdependence, the proliferation of threats, or the overflowing of 
domestic issues onto the world state (the conventional response). This is an 
irruption of contingencies that renders all established containers problematic 
(Campbell, 1998: 7). 
 
Unfortunately but predictably, the New Labour party which succeeded John 
Major’s Conservative government in May 1997 sought to override this ‘irruption of 
contingencies’ in its successive defence policies. As Campbell admits, ‘over time, of 
course, ambiguity comes to be disciplined, contingency is fixed, and dominant 
meanings are established’ (2007b: 133). Thus, by the time of the attacks in New York 
and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, it was the government’s conclusion 
that the warnings in their 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) about ‘a changing 
and uncertain world’ (Ministry of Defence, 1998: 323), had simply been borne out – 
a self-fulfilling security prophecy. In ‘A New Chapter’, added to the SDR in July 2002 
in response to the attacks, the new defence minister Geoff Hoon conveyed the 
government’s shock at ‘a day we will never forget’, and announced their aim to 
‘eliminate terrorism as a force in international affairs’ (Ministry of Defence, 2002: 4). 
The government would pursue this aim with a broadened range of initiatives 
‘involving political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, financial, intelligence and law 
enforcement, as well as military, measures’ (Ministry of Defence, 2002: 4). 
So while the 2008 National Ssecurity Strategy heralds a changed, broadened 
understanding of national security, Gow counters that ‘nothing in this change is new 
to the United Kingdom’ (2009: 127). Instead, the disjuncture between the NSS’ claim 
that it is a new approach to national security, and what is actually a new approach is 
‘a marker of the limitations to be found in the document as a whole’ (2009: 127). 
Chiefly, the NSS ‘does not deal with strategy, as such, and does not constitute one’ 
(2009: 128). ‘Strategy’, Gow continues, ‘is at once concept and process’: ‘in its 
narrowest form it is about the creation and application of the use of force. It is, 
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therefore, about the relationship of means and ends’ (2009: 128). Yet of all these 
features, he argues are ‘absent from the putative national security strategy’:  
 
While there are broad and somewhat bland aspirational statements concerning 
the United Kingdom’s aims, these are not presented in terms of likely 
prospective achievement. Even less is there a conceptualisation and practical 
scheme for how to achieve these goals – in part because they are of such 
generality as to be effectively un-achievable. The document fails to identify 
seriously the key challenges faced by the United Kingdom and its allies. It 
follows, therefore, that it cannot offer anything in terms of the way in which 
the challenges to British security can, or will be faced (Gow, 2009: 128).  
 
But I argue that to conceptualise a practical scheme for achieving the UK’s national 
security aims is not the principal aim of the NSS. It is instead to drive the 
materialisation of a specifically neoliberal geopolitical order; the other, the abject 




2.3.2 Policy changes, the NSS and CONTEST 
 
The New Labour government that came to power in 1997 was especially prolific 
in the production of security policies. This is somewhat surprising given that 
previously the formulation of defence policy in the UK had been peripatetic and 
insular (Hopkinson, 2000). But at the same time it should perhaps have been 
expected given the new Prime Minister Tony Blair’s penchant for ‘modernisation’. 
Indeed, one of Labour’s election pledges had been to undertake a major public 
Strategic Defence Review (SDR); the motivation for which, according to Gow, was 
‘to bring approaches to national security in line with the realities of an increasingly 
internationalised and globalised world’, and to ‘settle Labour’s sometime demons and 
weaknesses in dealing with defence matters’ (including a unilateralist and anti-NATO 
stance in the 1970s) (2009: 126). 
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In the 1998 SDR, then, the Defence Minister George Robertson discussed the 
need to modernise the UK’s Armed Forces ‘to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century’: specifically, ‘a changing world, in which the confrontation of the Cold War 
has been replaced by a complex mixture of uncertainty and instability’ (Ministry of 
Defence, 1998: 4). ‘If we are to discharge our international responsibilities in such 
areas’, Robertson continued, ‘we must retain the power to act’ (Ministry of Defence, 
1998: 4). 
Cornish and Dorman (2009: 252) describe the SDR as ‘a major shift in the way 
government presented national defence policy’. First, the SDR reflected Robertson’s 
view that ‘defence should move to a more systematic approach’, similar to the US 
Quadrennial Defense Review whereby defence policy undergoes a major review 
every electoral cycle to ensure it remains in line with fiscal resources (Cornish and 
Dorman, 2009: 252). In promising to reinvent defence policy as ‘a recalibration by 
government, a sensible, periodic reflection’, the SDR could not have contrasted 
more sharply with the previous attempts of the Thatcher and Major governments to 
carry out defence reviews (Cornish and Dorman, 2009: 248). Hopkinson describes 
the unhappy experience of the Nott Review in 1981, which was carried out with 
little consultation either within or outside the cabinet, and which created 
considerable tension between the government and the services, including the 
resignation of a junior defence minister Keith Speed (2000: 8-9). 
The Nott Review, which had been launched in 1980 at a time of ‘great financial 
difficulty’, proposed substantial cuts with the Royal Navy particularly affected; the 
justification for these cuts being that the ‘future weight of Britain’s defence 
commitment was to be towards a continental strategy, and the maintenance of 
strong land forces in Europe’ (Hopkinson, 2000: 9). Little did Margaret Thatcher’s 
government know that less than ten years later these land forces in Europe would be 
defunct. Much sooner however, in April 1982, General Galtieri’s Argentinian military 
invaded the Falkland Islands, and the reliance on the Royal Navy for the UK’s military 
response only served to confirm the general opinion that the Nott Review was a 
disaster (Hopkinson, 2000: 10). 
The Nott Review was therefore the ‘last defence review which a Conservative 
government dignified by that name’ (Hopkinson, 2000: 10). The next attempt, the so-
called ‘Options for Change’ in 1990, was only undertaken by John Major’s 
	   74	  
government in response to the complete and wholly unforeseen collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact in late 1989. As a result, half of the UK’s much-vaunted land forces in 
Germany were cut, two RAF bases (out of four) were closed, and six jet squadrons 
withdrawn (Hopkinson, 2000: 6). However, despite the ‘quite radical changes 
proposed for forces in Germany’, Hopkinson describes Options as ‘far too modest 
given the changes which had taken place in the outside world’ (2000: 7, emphasis added). 
Second, the SDR was held to be unique in the extent to which it was conducted 
openly (after some initial opacity), and with input and discussion from academics, 
NGOs, and the media. Hopkinson comments that the SDR ‘was conducted in a 
more open manner than any other review in recent history’ (2000: ix). This new, 
more open and ‘touchy-feely’ way of formulating and communicating defence policy 
was considered a major success: it ‘enjoyed widespread support within the MoD and 
parliament, among the various London-based think tanks and policy research 
institutions and within the defence industry and academia’ (Cornish and Dorman, 
2009: 248). 
Third, and perhaps most importantly for my analysis of broadening national 
security in 2007-2010, the SDR was widely lauded for ‘bringing foreign and defence 
policy together in a clear, coherent and affordable fashion’ (Cornish and Dorman, 
2009: 248). Traditionally, defence policy is ‘concerned with why we have armed 
forces, what we expect to be able to do with them’, and what sort of ‘capabilities’ 
should be sought (Hopkinson, 2000: vii). By identifying itself as ‘foreign policy-led’, 
however, the SDR was able to absorb and reproduce elements of the new, post-cold 
war security agenda thus circumventing what were seen as the more narrow 
parameters of defence policy (Hopkinson, 2000: 8).  
This new security agenda is precisely what Gow (2009) is referring to when he 
discusses an iterative ‘broadening’ of security policy during the Labour government, 
which itself drew on the driving of insecurity in the post-1989 period. As part of this 
process the ‘old style ‘national security’’ which ‘focused on a country’s defence 
policy with some elements of foreign policy… had to give way to the realities of a 
world in which security had wider connotations and requirements, including social 
and developmental aspects’ (Gow, 2009: 126). In this context of the ‘wider 
connotations’ of security, Gow also identifies as important Labour’s transferral of 
international development work from a small section of the Foreign and 
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Commonwealth Office (FCO) to a new Department for International Development 
(DFID) with a sizeable budget in 1997 (2009: 126).  
Although the 2002 New Chapter was a hasty addition to the 1998 SDR, which 
was itself supplanted by the 2004 Defence White Paper ‘Delivering Security in a 
Changing World’ (Ministry of Defence, 2004), it should not in my view be dismissed 
simply as a kneejerk response to the events of September 11, nor as a filler 
document. First, the New Chapter re-iterated the familiar but important themes of a 
changing world with complex and uncertain security challenges – although in some 
senses in 2002 the wait for the ‘next big threat’ was over. Indeed, it is precisely 
because the New Chapter brought together the broadened security agenda of the 
1990s with the so-called ‘international terrorist’ threat – what Tony Blair described 
in a speech to the Trade Union Congress only an hour after the attacks as ‘the new 
evil in our world today’33 - that makes it so important. The ‘range of political, 
diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement, and 
military initiatives’ with which the New Labour government proposed to confront 
terrorism, serve as a prototype for the ‘broader understanding of national security’ 
and ‘broader range of responses’ which emerged in their NSS six years later (NSS 
2009: 14).  
According to a report by the pro-New Labour think tank DEMOS in 2007, the 
shock of the September 11 attacks had provoked the government into a major 
overhaul of the UK’s ‘archaic security architecture and systems’ (Edwards, 2007: 3). 
This overhaul was not unlike that attempted by the 1998 SDR by a modernisation-
obsessed new government, but it took place under intense political pressure to 
‘make Britain safe’ from terrorism, and had, I would argue, much more wide-ranging 
and significant results not only for defence and foreign policy, but for security 
practices within the UK. Just as Bialasiewicz et al. (2007) discuss in regard to the 
wide range of security documents issued by the US government and military in the 
aftermath of September 11, the policy changes in the UK each played their part in 
reciting, reiterating, and resignifying ‘both earlier strategic statements as well as each 
other, creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Usborne, S. (2011) ‘9/11: beyond words’, The Independent, 6 September [Online]. Available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/911-beyond-words-2349709.html (Accessed 20 
September 2011). 	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the world’ (2007: 414). In the case of the UK this is a broadening view of national 
security which builds on – and indeed is literally founded on – post-cold war 
concepts of a wider range of threats, but which is also an intensification and 
significant development of these concepts, producing a dangerous ‘God’s eye view’ 
of the world in which security threats can be, potentially, connected to and 
interdependent with many other social phenomena. 
Key in these changes was the consolidation in March 2007 of ‘various elements 
of the Government’s counter-terrorism apparatus’ in a new Office for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) (House of Commons, 2009: 5). This new organisation 
was created ‘to provide advice to ministers and develop policy and security 
measures to combat the threat of terrorism’, and was placed under the control of 
the Home Secretary (House of Commons, 2009: 5). 
The OSCT, operating therefore as part of the Home Office, was responsible for 
many of the key developments in UK counter-terrorism policy and practice towards 
the end of the decade. A counter-terrorism strategy which had been circulating in 
government since 2003 and released as a short document in 2006 – garnering little 
attention - was ‘refreshed’ and made public in March 2009 as Pursue, Prevent, Protect, 
Prepare – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism: better 
known as CONTEST (House of Commons, 2009: 9). Like previous defence policies 
from the 1998 SDR onwards, the publication of CONTEST was calculated to 
represent the government’s ‘determination to place as much information as possible 
in the public domain… [with regard to] security matters’ (House of Commons, 
2009: 4). Indeed, according to the 2009 parliamentary report the new CONTEST 
contained ‘as much material that could be left unclassified as possible’, as well as 
‘historical analysis, in order to provide context for readers’ (House of Commons, 
2009: 9). The report also praised CONTEST’s ‘full and open nature’: as I discussed in 
Chapter 1, it covered 175 pages compared to 38 pages in the previous 2006 version 
(House of Commons, 2009: 3). The report even urged the government to make 
more of their successes: ‘while we understand the constraints of the sub judice 
convention’, it explained, ‘we are concerned that the Government is imposing too 
strict a self-denying ordinance on itself and could be more open about the extent to 
which it is winning the battle against terrorism’ (House of Commons, 2009: 3).  
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CONTEST (2009) set out four strands for counter-terrorism strategy: Pursue, 
‘stopping terrorist attacks’; Prevent, ‘stopping people becoming terrorists or 
supporting violent extremism’; Protect, reducing the ‘vulnerability’ of the UK’s critical 
national infrastructure, ‘crowded places’, transport infrastructure, borders, and 
overseas interests; and finally, Prepare, ‘mitigating the impact of attacks’ by increasing 
CNI and community resilience (pp. 11-14). In my view, it is difficult to overstate the 
importance of these developments. Although the four strands are given an unifying 
coherence within the strategy, they are in fact incredibly diverse; deeply embedded 
in, but also productive of, practices, roles, policies, and even departments across 
government: from the Security Services to the Departments of Health, Education, 
and Communities and Local Government. CONTEST has also made a profound 
impact in the public and private sectors, as well as in ‘civil society’ (see Kundnani, 
2009). Indeed, the Protect workstream and its ‘crowded places’ policy which I 
investigate in the second part of the thesis, is a formidable ‘iterable structure’ 
(Butler, 2010: 149), which folds in and develops through scientists, trees, closed-
circuit television (CCTV), the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), devolved 
administrations, and assessments of the ‘relative risk’ for crowded places of terrorist 
attack (PCP: 18).  
It is particularly important to note that the Select Committee report explicitly 
links the noisy publication of CONTEST in 2009 to that of the first NSS the previous 
year. The new NSS, it noted, addressed the ‘diverse though interconnected set of 
security challenges and underlying drivers’ facing the UK, with the objective of 
‘safeguard[ing] the nation, its citizens, our prosperity and our way of life’ (House of 
Commons, 2009: 9). In the same way, CONTEST was situated to ‘reflect the 
changing security situation at home and abroad’ (House of Commons, 2009: 8). One 
factor of this ‘changing security situation’ was, according to the then Minister for 
Security Lord West, ‘to raise our game, break out of specialist ‘silos’, avoid being 
London-centric and ensure that lessons learned were being incorporated via a 
stronger central hub’ (House of Commons, 2009: 9). This unity of purpose was 
reflected in the identical objectives shared by the NSS, CONTEST and crowded 
places security: 
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Our vision of national security: our vision is to protect the UK and its interests 
in order to enable its people to go about their lives freely and with 
confidence – The National Security of the United Kingdom, 2009.34 
 
The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its 
interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about 
their lives freely and with confidence – Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare – 
The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, 2009.35 
 
Counter-terrorism protective security measures for crowded places must be 
proportionate to risk, reducing vulnerability but allowing individuals and 
businesses to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence – 
Working to Protect Crowded Places, 2010.36 
These three policies must therefore be seen as part of an unprecedentedly 
centralised, organised, and integrated security policy. This is not to give credit to the 
UK government where it is not due, by suggesting that this centralisation somehow 
makes the policies more successful ensuring that people can in fact ‘go about their 
lives freely and with confidence’. This is, after all, the ‘imaginative’ goal of neoliberal 
ways of living. 
In recognising the integration of these three policies then, it becomes absolutely 
central to question the discursive norms which makes it possible. In particular, I 
would like to draw attention to the way in which this particular terrorist threat was 
understood as demolishing the traditional divisions between external national 
security and internal counter-terrorism. ‘The threat we face crosses our borders 
and is international in scope’, CONTEST claims, and it therefore describes itself as 
‘an integral element of the UK’s National Security Strategy published for the first 
time in March 2008’ (2009: 11, 54). In addition, CONTEST shares both the ‘broader 
security principles’ of the NSS - such as tackling the ‘causes as well as the symptoms’ 
of threats to national security – as well as its ‘core values’: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Cabinet Office, 2009: 7, emphasis added. 
35 Home Office, 2009: 10, emphasis added.  
36 Home Office, 2010d: 5, emphasis added. 
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Our approach to national security in general and to counter-terrorism in 
particular is grounded in a set of core values. They include human rights, the 
rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance 
and opportunity for all (2009: 10, 54).  
 
In this way, CONTEST explicitly reflects what Bialasiewicz et al. identify as the 
primary performative function of national security in the era of the war on terror: to 
dissolve inside/outside spatializations and therefore open up new spaces for the 
movement and entrenchment of neoliberal globalisation (2007: 416). 
In this section I have carried out a genealogy of broadening national security to 
circumvent the weakness of similar policy analyses which tend to neglect the 
necessarily historical, but moreover discursive and regulatory context in which security 
policies emerge. In this way, I argue that the NSS and broadening national security is 
part of an on-going drive to materialise a specifically neoliberal geopolitical order; 
the other, the abject domain, of which is an international landscape of broadened 
dangers and interconnected threats. New Labour made an absolutely central 
contribution to this drive in two ways. First, by moving towards the more systematic 
and open review of security policies. Second, by striving to bring together the 
traditionally separate domains of foreign and defence policy into one modernised 
conception of security policy, in which traditional distinctions between the ‘outside’ 
and ‘inside’ of national security became more blurred. In many ways, the policy 
changes which followed the September 11 attacks, including CONTEST and 
crowded places, were made possible by New Labour’s innovations in this domain. 
But more important is the overall result: the multiplication of ‘contact zones’ 
between national and everyday security (Campbell, 2007b), and the accompanying 
translation of the monopoly of violence exercised by the state through national 
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2.4 Broadening national security in the war on terror 
 
This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are 
in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us re-order this world 
around us – Prime Minister Tony Blair, 2001.37 
… a range of economic, technological and social trends, often grouped under 
the heading ‘globalisation’, are increasing the interconnectedness and 
interdependence between economies, societies, businesses, and individuals. 
That generates new opportunities to work together to build not just a more 
prosperous world but a more secure world, based on shared economic 
interests – The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.38  
 
In attempting to critique the ‘imaginative geographies’ of the war on terror, 
there is no doubt that those of Orientalism remain a potent force for violence. 
Indeed, Derek Gregory has claimed they are at the ‘roots of the global crisis which 
erupted on September 11’ (2004: 11). ‘For what else’, he asks, ‘is the war on terror, 
other than the violent return of the colonial past, with its split geographies of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarism’, ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’?’ (2004: 11) (also Graham, 
2004; Gregory and Pred, 2007). In Gregory’s argument, the war on terror is part of 
an on-going and vastly unequal power relationship between ‘us’ - the ‘colonial 
modern’ - and ‘them’ - the ‘non-modern’, so that the September 11 attacks, whilst a 
‘horrifying event’, do not mark ‘an epochal rupture in human history’ (2004: 13). 
Instead, that day had ‘a complex genealogy that reached back into the colonial past’, 
and, at the same time, ‘was used by regimes in Washington, London, and Tel Aviv to 
advance a grisly colonial present (and future)’ (Gregory, 2004: 13) (also Elden, 2009). 
Gregory’s argument about the resilience of violent Orientalist geographies 
foregrounds the ‘production of spacings that set Europe off against its exterior 
‘others’’: a production that is moreover, ‘an economy of representation’ in which 
different spacings are of different value (2004: 3, emphasis added). In this way, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Comments in a speech to the Labour Party Conference, 2 October 2001. In ‘Full Text: Tony Blair’s 
speech (part two)’, The Guardian, 2 October 2001 [Online]. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour7 (Accessed 21 September 
2011). 
38 2008: 16. 
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production of spacings within colonial systems – as within all political systems for 
that matter – ‘was always as much about making other people’s geographies as it was 
about making other people’s histories’ (Gregory, 2004: 11). 
There are, however, scholars who while acknowledging the importance of Said’s 
and latterly Gregory’s arguments, nonetheless propose moving the concept of the 
imaginative geography beyond its foundational ‘us’ and ‘them’ binaries. Drawing on 
postcolonial frameworks, Angharad Closs Stephens (2011) argues that if the analytic 
tool of the imaginative geography is confined to the ‘exposure of Orientalism at 
work’, to the ‘identification of the terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘civilized’ and 
‘uncivilized’’, then it risks becoming a closed system just like the representations of 
the Oriental other that it purports to contest (p. 255, 260). 
For Closs Stephens, drawing on Butler’s 2008 article about the ‘problem of time’ 
in sexual politics, the task of critique in the war on terror is to ‘go further than 
correcting our ways of seeing: it must also subvert the terms of the debate’ (2011: 
261). Specifically, this means rejecting the origins and limits of linear temporal time 
as a refusal of the ‘origins and limits of what we are able to imagine’ (Closs Stephens, 
2011: 261, emphasis in original). Instead, world politics should be understood as 
‘plural and heterotemporal’: an understanding which is not about extending the space 
of the political but ‘allowing for the ‘possibility that the field of the political is 
constitutively not singular’’ (Closs Stephens, 2011: 265). I would add here that the 
war on terror may be opportune for exactly such a heterotemporal re-imagining of 
community and the political. As Samuel Weber (1997) has argued, ‘wartime’ has 
uniquely temporal and spatial characteristics. ‘The whirlwind of war has a temporal 
dimension’, he writes, it ‘marks time, as it were, inscribing it in a destructive 
circularity that is both centripetal and centrifugal, wrenching things and people out of 
their accustomed places, displacing them and with the places as well’ (Weber, 1997: 
92). Wartime, he concludes, ‘wreaks havoc with traditional conceptions of space and 
time and with the order they make possible’ (Weber, 1997: 92; also Edkins, 2008 on 
the ‘trauma time’ of the war on terror). 
 Arguments in favour of breaking away from the limitations of previous critical 
approaches in the time of the war on terror are important, but yet they still do not 
engage directly with the broadening of national security, which, as I argued in the 
previous section, has multiplied the contact zones between national and everyday 
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security since the end of the cold war, and intensified in the war on terror. What I 
will focus on then in the rest of the chapter are the performativities through which 
this process has been occurring over the last ten years. As Wendy Larner asks: 
 
… is it simply a discursive coincidence that both economic globalization and 
terrorism are now being described and analysed in terms of supranational 
flows, networks and mobilities? And what about the political mechanisms 
through which these flows, networks and mobilities are governed? Are there 
family resemblances between the techniques used to govern globalizing 




2.4.1 Performing interconnection 
 
In exploring the imaginative geographies of the war on terror, Bialasiewicz et al. 
while not wholly abandoning the ‘exposure of Orientalism at work’ nonetheless 
move the debate forward in important ways with their argument that ‘a policy of 
integration’ rather than the ‘simple binary oppositions’ of us and them, characterises 
the ‘principal foreign policy and security strategy’ of the US (2007: 415). Speaking 
about integration policy in a 2002 interview with The New Yorker magazine, Richard 
Haass, then Policy Director in the US State Department, claimed 
 
… the goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers 
to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition 
to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, 
democracy, [and] markets (cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 414, emphasis 
added). 
 
The ‘key ideas’ of integration are further explored in Thomas Barnett’s infamous 
2004 book The Pentagon’s New Map: war and peace in the twenty-first century. The New 
Map represents the world as being divided into a ‘Functioning Core’ and a ‘Non-
Integrating Gap’; whereby the ‘Gap’ is ‘figured as a dark stain spreading from the 
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equator, spanning most of Latin America, Africa and Asia, and leaching into the 
Balkans and Central Asia’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 413). In Simon Dalby’s reading, 
the ‘basic structure of Barnett’s world is one of a divided planet, one in which the 
majority of the world’s population is becoming integrated in the globalized core 
while the remaining parts live in the nonintegrated gap’ (2007: 297). What primarily 
distinguishes the Core from the Gap, then, is the latter’s estrangement or 
disconnection from the ‘global economy and the rule sets that define its stability’ 
(Barnett cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 413). As Dalby puts it: ‘connectivity is the 
key’: ‘those not connected are prone to violence and live under a variety of 
tyrannies’, whilst ‘those who are connected in the core live in better conditions 
because connectivity means a substantial degree of freedom to follow one’s own 
course in life’ (2007: 297). 
Even though Barnett is not a politician but at best an ‘intellectual of statecraft’ 
(Kuus, 2008), his schema of interconnection is closely linked to, and makes explicit, 
that which is implied by Haas and the US State Department’s idea of ‘signing on’ to 
key American ideas:39 
 
Remembering that disconnectedness itself is the ultimate enemy, America can, 
by extending globalization in a fair and just manner, not only defeat the threats 
it faces today but eliminate in advance entire generations of threat that our 
children and grandchildren would otherwise face (Barnett cited in Dalby, 2007: 
124). 
 
In particular, Barnett makes explicit what the US, having identified the alleged 
benefits of interconnection, should do to enforce it. ‘Eradicating disconnectedness’, 
he writes, ‘becomes the defining security task of our age’ - where ‘eradication’ 
specifically means ‘pre-emptive war against regimes that openly transgress the rule 
set’ (Barnett cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 413). As a result of the US strategy of 
integration Bialasiewicz et al. argue that ‘conflict is inevitable’ - ‘it is a foundational 
truth confirmed by the severed map’ (2007: 414).  
As performativities of integration materialise an interconnected globe as a 
condition of possibility for neoliberalism – backed up, it must be noted, by the full 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Bialasiewicz et al. (2007) discuss the relationship between the neoconservative administration of 
George W. Bush and ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ including Barnett and Robert Kagan in more detail. 
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force of the US (and allies’) military machine - they likewise materialise an ‘abject 
domain’ of insecure, disconnected peoples and spaces (closely linked to the 
geopolitical performativities of ‘ungoverned spaces’ discussed by Katharyne Mitchell, 
2010). So the policy of integration, despite what might appear as its positive 
associations of inclusiveness and even familiarity, is still a violent and exclusionary 
materialisation of self/other and inside/outside problematics through the writing of 
external danger. In the same way that Presidents Truman and Eisenhower spoke of 
communist satellites and an Iron Curtain during the cold war, President George W. 
Bush referenced rogue states and an ‘axis of evil’ in the conduct of the war on 
terror.  
But at the same time the literature also identifies important distinctions between 
performativities of global interconnection and the ‘Manichean conceptions of the 
world so familiar to Cold War politics’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 415). Primarily, 
integration dissolves the ‘inside/outside spatialization of security policy’ (Bialasiewicz 
et al., 2007: 416; also Bigo, 2001; Mitchell, 2010). And as illustration they point to 
the Strategy for homeland defense and support published by the US Department of 
Defense in 2005 which claims: ‘[we can] no longer think in terms of the ‘home’ game 
and the ‘away’ game. There is only one game’ (cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 416).  
Wendy Larner takes up this argument by challenging the widespread view that in 
the war on terror an assumedly ‘borderless’ world of economic globalisation is at 
odds with the closed borders of national security. ‘Does the new focus on security 
and risk-based technologies’, she asks, ‘mark the end of economic globalization?’ and 
‘have these new surveillance and security technologies indeed ‘brought back the 
walls’ and drastically curbed the flows of money, goods and people across national 
boundaries?’ (Larner, 2008: 41). Obviously the answer is no, and Larner points to 
the fact that ‘after a brief hiatus, global flows of goods, services and people have 
continued unabated’ (2008: 42). Her main argument, then, is that economic 
globalisation and the war on terror are ‘premised on the same political-economic 
imaginary’: they are both performativities of global governance dependent on 
‘openness and mobility rather than on boundedness and territoriality’ (Larner, 2008: 
45) (see chapter 3).  
Other writers go further than Larner in arguing that the national security 
practices of the war on terror do not so much share the political-economic 
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imaginary of globalisation, so much as they violently enforce it. Alan Ingram and Klaus 
Dodds, for example, claim that the war on terror is ‘linked into a much wider 
project: the goal of securing not just specific homelands but liberal globalization itself’ 
(2009: 2). Likewise, Stuart Elden returns to Giovanni Arrighi’s arguments in 1976’s 
The Geometry of Imperialism, that the United States ‘freed itself from the shackles of 
formal imperialism… in order to exercise its hegemony through market forces’ 
(2009: xix). Indeed, Elden continues that the war on terror has ‘demonstrated that 
military force may be needed to shore up the financial hegemony’ (2009: xix).  
David Campbell also traces the dissolution of inside/outside spatialisations in a 
2007 essay on the relationship between national security, oil policy, and automobile 
driving. Specifically, he argues that performativities of national security should be 
approached through ‘a spatial understanding’ which goes beyond the ‘domestic 
versus ‘the foreign’’, to ‘consider how the domain of the cultural, social, and political 
can be conceptualized so that the complexity of the interconnections can be 
appreciated’ (2007b: 132).  
Campbell begins by arguing that the discursive complex of ‘automobility’- a ‘self-
organizing autopoietic, non-linear system that spreads worldwide, and includes cars, 
car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies and many novel objects, technologies and 
signs’ - performs ‘an ‘unbordered’ sense of the state’ in which ‘security interests 
extend well beyond the national homeland’ (2007b: 130-1). But he also points out – 
and a crucially important point it is too - that this ‘does not mean we exist above 
and beyond territory’ (2007b: 131) (also Elden, 2009, 2005). To the contrary, the 
‘globalization of automobility and its security implications results in the creation of 
new borderlands with uneven consequences’ (2007b: 131, emphasis added). These 
‘borderlands’ may be understood as ‘distant, wild places of insecurity’ - ‘zones of 
exploration’ and ‘spaces traversed by pipelines’ (Campbell, 2007b: 131). 
But these spaces are also not borderlands at all. When viewed and experienced 
from agendas and positions other than that of the US, they are places where 
indigenous communities find themselves marginalized, impoverished, and subjected 
to ‘necessary’ foreign military intervention - all in the name of the ‘privilege accorded 
a resource central to the American way of life’ (Campbell, 2007b: 131). Nor need 
they even be considered as ‘distant’. If they are understood instead as ‘contact 
zones’, where ‘practices intersect, actors and issues meld into one another, and 
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conflicts potentially arise’, then the borderlands of automobility ‘encompass 
networks that connect cultures of individual consumption [of automobiles] with 
practices of global security through multiple sites of materialization and 
territorialisation at ‘home’ and ‘abroad’’ (Campbell, 2007b: 131-2, emphasis added). 
In this way, the invasion of Iraq and the oil strategy that acted as its condition of 
possibility, ‘reborder[s] the state in a multitude of cultural and political sites as a way of 
negotiating the social forces that have splintered both conventional locales and 
frames of mind’ (Campbell, 2007b: 132, emphasis added). Using Campbell’s 
arguments, if integration is a performativity of national security whereby a new 
‘unbordered sense of the state’ is materialised, then this terminally undermines those 
assumptions both that national security happens elsewhere, and that it occupies its 
own privileged domain distinct from those nominally called ‘culture’, ‘society’, and 
the ‘economy’. 
The project of securing neoliberal globalisation through the war on terror is 
made possible by the citation of political-economic discourses of neoliberalism 
through performativities of interconnection, which themselves depend on the prolific 
recitation of terms of geopolitical abstraction. If Said and latterly Gregory’s 
imaginative geographies are about ‘our land’ as a place of safety, versus ‘their land’ as 
places of danger (also Graham, 2008), then performativities of interconnection re-
imagine the world as ‘our land’. Dalby explains that following the September 11 
attacks, the ‘ensuing political crisis was resolved by invoking categories of warfare’, 
and in particular the need for ‘global war’ to meet the ‘apparent violation of the 
sanctity of the metropolitan center by terrorists, who had penetrated from the 
peripheral areas (2007: 295) (also Gregory and Pred, 2007). For Dalby, the ‘new 
language of the ‘global war on terror’’ (2007: 295) – what he elsewhere calls ‘a global 
war script’ (2010: 54) – recasts the entire world as a source of threat: a global 
cartography of danger. Yet that danger, he continues, ultimately turns back on itself 
and moreover on those caught in its path, just like the people described by David 
Campbell who find themselves in the unfortunate position of populating America’s 
oil borderlands. ‘The dangers of all geopolitical categories’, Dalby writes, ‘is precisely 
that they include too much and simplify the complex mess of human geographies 
into abstract human entities’ (2007: 303). Or to put it another way, ‘geopolitical 
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abstraction given the ‘objectivity’ of cartography renders people and places ready for 
military action’ (Dalby, 2007: 303). 
So although integration relies on representational and coercive practices of 
connection, at the same time it absolutely also ‘involves its own set of exclusions, 
with forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be 
incorporated’ (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007: 419). As Paul Langley has argued, 
‘performativity embodies its others’ (2010: 75). In this way, Dalby adds to his 
criticism of the geopolitical abstractions of the New Map, by challenging its crude 
caricatures of an ‘affluent technologically capable Last Man and a Hobbesian First 
Man mired in poverty and violence’, which are then mapped ‘very loosely on to 
contemporaneous specifications of the world into tame zones of civilization and the 
wild zones beyond’ (2007: 296). In this way, the ‘others’ embodied by global 
interconnection are not so much a danger to others, as they are a danger to 
themselves: in an age of economic globalisation, ‘[global] insecurity comes not from a 
specific threatening other but from all those unwilling to integrate; all those refusing 
their (prescribed) place on the map’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 414). 
Larner supplements these insights by arguing that interconnection and exclusion 
are also materialised through performativities of the network: the ‘metaphor of the 
current global movement’ (2008: 49). The emphasis accorded to free market 
deregulated networks vis-à-vis the ‘dominant nation-state geographic imaginary’ 
(Shapiro, 1997: ix), and the resulting difficulty of managing the former’s flows and 
mobilities with traditional statist methods, has led, Larner argues, to the emergence 
of particular ‘calculative regimes’ (2008: 50). These calculative regimes bring together 
benchmarking and best practice standards, with risk assessments and so-called 
‘expert knowledge’ into ‘an assemblage that makes it possible to put objects and 
subjects into the same space even though they may be geographically dispersed’ 
(Larner, 2008: 50, emphasis added). In other words, they make ‘objects and subjects 
visible in particular forms’, but the calculations on which they are based ‘embody 
particular conceptions of how these objects and subjects should be governed’ 
(Larner, 2008: 50). 
When these calculative regimes are used in the war on terror to manage global 
flows and mobilities in the name of security, they function to ‘visibilize’ terrorism as 
a global problem (Larner, 2008: 51). This in turn intensifies the so-called ‘problem of 
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mobility’ – another trope from the globalisation/ interconnection rostrum – in which 
the movement of particular population groups becomes a security problem by virtue 
of their ethnic, national, religious, or political origins and/or affiliations (Larner, 2008: 
53; also Amoore, 2006). Therefore, those whom Larner terms the ‘irreal subjects’ of 
globalisation (in an attempt to emphasise the imaginative rendering of this subject-
position), are cast into a binary of secure versus insecure mobility. In this binary, 
‘global nomads, transnationals, cosmopolitans, asylum seekers, economic refugees, 
migrants, [and] diasporic citizens’, are re-made as potential ‘religious fanatics’ and 
terrorists (Larner, 2008: 53). In other words, the ‘bad’ intermediaries who work 
against rather than go with the flow of the global system (Larner, 2008: 53).   
Equally important as drawing attention to such dividing practices, is the 
recognition that performativities of global interconnection also materialise those 
who can act – the leaders – and those who cannot – the ‘victim’, who is invariably 
the abject subject identified by Butler. Because the debased Hobbesian First Man 
cannot help himself, Western Last Man must act on his behalf – it is his ‘moral 
responsibility’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 413). This is, of course, the invocation of a 
particular kind of leadership role for the US (and its allies): 
 
… [it is] the only state able, due to its power-position, to perceive threats 
clearly; the only one with a God’s eye view of international affairs. It is thus, at 
once, the world’s geo-politician and its geo-police; the only state with the 
‘knowledge’ but also the capability to intervene (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 412, 
emphasis in original).  
 
In this way, the US can assume a position of unilateral leadership. But as well as an 
almost God-given knowledge, leaders must have the capability – the military nous and 
hardware – to act. As Barnett puts it, ‘if other Core powers want a greater say in 
how we exercise… our [American] power, they simply need to dedicate enough 
defense spending to develop similar capabilities’ (cited in Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 
412). 
Following the comfortable circuitry of this argument – that others cannot help 
themselves and the US is the only state with the knowledge as well as the capabilities 
to fill the breach - it becomes clear that, as I argue throughout this thesis, imaginaries 
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and performativities of space are in no sense whimsical or accidental. By assembling 
those who can and cannot act, the performativity of global connectedness licenses 
(or as Foucault would have it, makes ‘obvious’ and ‘self-evident’) particular policy 
responses – including the decision that a policy response – invariably backed up the 
coercive capabilities of the state – is needed at all. In the US, Bialasiewicz et al. trace 
how Barnett’s New Map was rearticulated in the 2002 and 2006 National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America as the doctrine of pre-emptive war (also Der 
Derian, 2003; Massumi, 2007). I will carry on with this work in the rest of the 
chapter by exploring how the representative and coercive practices of global 
























	   90	  
2.5 The NSS and the broadening of policy responses 
 
As our understanding of national security has broadened, so too has the range 
and nature of our response to security challenges – The National Security 
Strategy of the United Kingdom.40 
 
Just like the comfortable circuitry of the arguments for integration – the US re-
imagines the world as interconnected, thus licensing military force which actually 
‘brings to life’ that same interconnectedness – the reiteration and reinscription of 
broadening national security licenses a broadening register of coercive practices, 
which in turn bring to life a world in which national security is increasingly woven 
into everyday life. 
This broadening register of coercive practices begins with the ‘rigorous approach’ 
the NSS deems necessary for assessing and meeting the interconnected threats and 
risks of a globalised world (2008: 6, emphasis added). This is the privileged 
knowledge to perceive threats clearly - the ‘God’s eye view’. The UK government 
therefore perceives that ‘in an increasingly interdependent world, we cannot opt out 
of overseas engagement’; on the flip side of which is that within the UK ‘our aim 
should be that people are able to go about their business without fear and with a 
reasonable assurance of safety’ (NSS 2008: 6). These are integrated within the 
assurance that the government will be ‘hard-headed about the risks, our aims, and 
our capabilities’: meaning, it continues, using a God’s eye view to be ‘clear and 
realistic about our aims, and about the capabilities we and others have to achieve 
them’ (NSS 2008: 6). 
By sticking close to the workings of the NSS’s particular brand of ‘realism’, it is 
nonetheless possible to get a clear idea of the actual policy responses licensed by 
broadening national security. ‘Capabilities’ is a term which typically refers to the use 
of military manpower and hardware. The 1998 SDR, for example, discusses ‘military 
capabilities’ and the ‘capabilities of our Armed Forces’ many times over. Whilst the 
2004 Defence White Paper is subtitled ‘Future Capabilities’, and Jane’s Defense 
Weekly magazine is almost entirely geared towards assessing the weaknesses or 
otherwise, of various state, regional, and institutional capabilities. The NSS therefore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 2009: 17. 
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discusses continued investment in a ‘broad range of military capabilities’ including 
aircraft carriers, air defence, and submarine warfare: thus ‘safeguard[ing] our ability 
to prevent aggression, reinforcing our membership of NATO and our commitment 
to the international system’ (2008: 45). 
But the term capabilities is also used in other instances, for example ‘developing 
our capabilities for preventative action’, so that the UK government may tackle 
‘future security risks’ early (NSS 2008: 7). Here I would argue that the NSS’s use of 
‘preventative action’ crosses into what Brian Massumi (2007) discussed in relation to 
President George W. Bush’s own 2002 NSS as ‘potential politics’ and pre-emption 
(also Der Derian, 2003). ‘Prevention’, Massumi writes, ‘assumes an ability to assess 
threats empirically and assess their causes. Once the causes are identified, 
appropriate curative methods are sought to avoid their realization’ (2007: 5). And 
indeed, this straightforward process of threat assessment and avoidance is precisely 
what the NSS portrays and would have its audience believe. For example, in relation 
to the broadened security issue of disruptive threats, discussed in section 2.3, the 
NSS claims the need to address threats such as climate change, ‘even though its most 
serious impact may not occur within the next twenty years’, for in that period the 
‘global exhaustion of hydrocarbon fuel sources could become acute enough to 
constitute a security threat (2009: 28) (see Campbell, 2007b). For this reason the 
government will ‘continue to assess, through horizon scanning and on-going analysis, 
whether further refinement might be necessary’ (NSS 2009: 28). 
It is in this concept of ‘horizon scanning’, however, that broadening national 
security moves definitively away from prevention towards a more dangerous 
preemptive attitude. The practice of horizon scanning was officially inaugurated in 
the register of broadening national security by the creation of a Strategic Horizon’s 
Unit in central government (the Cabinet Office) in July 2008. Horizon scanning, the 
NSS explains, is the ‘systematic examination of potential future threats and 
opportunities, including those at the margins of current and future thinking or 
planning’ (2009: 44). The practice aims ‘to tackle not just threats as and when they 
become real, but also the drivers or causes of threats before they lead to potential 
damage to our security’ (NSS 2009: 28). This rather terrifying concentration of 
whimsy – tackling threats before they become real, before they may lead to potential 
damage – resonates with Massumi’s conception of pre-emption. The epistemology of 
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pre-emption, he writes, is ‘unabashedly one of uncertainty’ (2007: 13). This is not 
only ‘due to a simple lack of knowledge. There is uncertainty because the threat has 
not only not yet fully formed but… it has not yet even emerged’ (Massumi, 2007: 
13). The only certainty within pre-emptive performativities of national security is 
that ‘threat will emerge where it is least expected’ (Massumi, 2007: 13). This is 
because, Massumi continues, ‘what is ever-present is not a particular threat or set of 
threats, but the potential for still more threats to emerge without warning. The 
global situation is not so much threatening as threat-generating: threat-o-genic’ 
(2007: 13). In this way, broadening national security not only materialises an 
interconnected globe, but also a ‘threat-o-genic’ interconnected globe.  
Closely tied to the production of coercive capabilities – whether in military 
hardware or pre-emptive ‘horizon scanning’ - is the assembling of particular roles of 
those who can and cannot exercise agency and leadership. ‘Overseas’, the NSS 
explains, ‘we will favour a multilateral approach’; in particular ‘a rules-based approach 
led by international institutions’ (2008: 7). This ‘rules-based approach’ depends on 
so-called ‘core values’: ‘human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable 
government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all’ (NSS 2008: 6). 
Echoing Barnett’s ‘rule sets’, these core values represent ‘a potential basis for broad 
agreement, not just in the United Kingdom but everywhere’, and according to the 
NSS, the ‘best way to spread not just well-being and prosperity but also security is to 
build a progressive coalition of governments and people in support of those values’ 
(2008: 6, emphasis added). The institutions cited by the NSS are the UN, the 
European Union (EU), and the World Bank - all of which have been criticised for 
their exclusivity and neoliberal agendas - and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), whose capacity to act is explicitly supported by UK aircraft carriers, 
submarines, and so on. 
Actually, these ‘values’ are an interpretive grid for threat. In other words, they 
are materialised within regulatory norms and and through their reiteration 
materialise an ‘outside’: particular dangers and threats. It is in no way contradictory, 
then, that the UK’s core values are accompanied by coercion. For if ‘issues’ cannot 
be resolved through ‘discussion’ and ‘due process’, then force will be used as ‘a last 
resort’ (NSS 2008: 6). So while multilateralism may bring ‘greater legitimacy’ to 
‘collective action’, military capabilities ‘remain[s] the most effective way of managing 
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and reducing the threats we face’ (NSS 2008: 7). And not just the UK’s military 
capabilities either. ‘We also recognise’, the NSS explains, ‘that sometimes the best 
approach will be more flexible alliances, coalitions or bilateral relationships’ (2008: 
8). Of these, the United States, the progenitor of integration as national security 
strategy, is ‘our most important bilateral relationship and central to our national 
security’ (NSS 2008: 8).  
This policy of cloaking unilateral military action behind a veneer of collective 
legitimacy is not original. But it is important to emphasise here that this ‘core values’ 
rule set applies as much within the UK as it does ‘everywhere’ else, and therefore 
illustrates that broadening national security licenses particular roles and policy 
responses within the UK. ‘Traditionally’, the NSS explains, ‘the Government has been 
expected to deal with the threats and risks to national security through the Armed 
Forces, the police, border staff, and the intelligence and security agencies’ (2008: 8). 
But the ‘changing nature’ of these threats - that is, the accession of neoliberal 
globalisation as the primary objective of national security and the impossibility of 
protecting it solely through military force – and ‘our improved understanding of the 
best way to respond to them’ – the God’s eye view again – demand ‘broader 
partnerships’ (NSS 2008: 8, emphasis added). These include between ‘public, private 
and third sectors’ to protect critical national infrastructure, improve resilience, plan 
for emergencies, and counter violent extremism, as well as with ‘individuals, where 
changing people’s behaviour is the best way to mitigate risk’ (NSS 2008: 8).  
 
 
2.5.1 The 2007 financial crisis 
 
If broadening national security performs particular forms of external danger in 
order to protect ‘our spaces’ of neoliberal globalisation, then it would logically gain 
momentum as a result of the 2007 financial crisis.41 ‘The truly global nature of the 
crisis’, the NSS claims, ‘has emphasised the integration and interdependence of all 
countries into the world economy’ (2009: 6). As a result, the broadening of national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 What the NSS terms the ‘global banking crisis’ began with the failure of American sub-prime 
mortgages in autumn 2007, and hit its crisis peak in autumn 2008 with the collapse of the New York-
based investment bank Lehman Brothers (2009: 3) (also Langley, 2010). 	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security is reiterated and intensified in a number of ways. First, the ‘core values’ of 
national security have mutated into a ‘wider vision’ for society: 
 
The Government has a wider vision to create a strong, fair, prosperous and 
secure society in which everyone has the opportunity to live their lives and 
make the most of their abilities, with fair chances for all, and governed by fair 
rules. This wider vision embraces a world based on cooperation between 
people and nations, with collective responsibility taken for collective problems, 
and every nation state, including the UK, playing its part in working for this 
better world (NSS 2009: 27). 
 
Second, the drivers of insecurity have both intensified and been intensified by 
the crisis. For example, while NSS 2009 assesses that the ‘crisis has not 
fundamentally altered our assessment of key security threats’, it also issues a proviso: 
‘That is not to say it has no impact. The downturn has increased the risk that 
poverty acts as a driver of insecurity at the global level’ (p. 6). This linking of poverty 
to insecurity is not original, and since the September 11 attacks it has been put 
forward many times to ‘explain’ the phenomenon of so-called ‘international 
terrorism’ (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Pape, 2005, 2003). The NSS explains its 
claim that poverty is a driver of insecurity through its ‘contribution to conflict and 
fragility in developing countries’, which in turn poses a threat to the UK ‘whether 
manifested through flows of illegal drugs and firearms into our cities, or the current 
terrorist threat’ (2009: 59).  
The NSS’s response to poverty includes ‘continued action towards the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’ and ‘an increased development budget’ 
(2009: 60). Regarding the links between poverty and conflict, national security is part 
of an approach which ‘brings together the full range of development, diplomatic and 
military tools’: specifically the Foreign Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of 
Defence, and the Department for International Development. The ‘priorities for UK 
engagement’ regarding the alleviation of poverty include Pakistan, Africa (particularly 
Sudan and the Horn of Africa), the Middle East, and the Balkans (NSS 2009: 69-70). 
But foremost is Afghanistan, which the NSS claims is ‘relevant to at least four of the 
major sources of threat set out in the National Security Strategy’: terrorism; conflict; 
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transnational crime; and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, Bialasiewicz et al. 
claim that integration as an ‘emergent imaginative geography’ precisely ‘materialized 
in the invasion and occupation of Iraq – which was carried out in the name of terror 
and has created the very terror it named’ (2007: 419). Likewise in Afghanistan: ‘Al 
Qa’ida grew under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its senior leadership now 
operates out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan’ (NSS 2009: 69) 
(see Amoore and de Goede, 2011). Yet when Osama bin Laden, the assumed leader 
of Al Qa’ida, was executed by US special forces in May 2011, he was hiding out in a 
large villa in metropolitan Pakistan, not in the borderlands. 
NSS 2009 also uses the financial crisis to reinforce the performativity of global 
interconnection in two further ways. First, the world is interconnected through the 
global economy: there is no alternative. In the twentieth century, UK national 
security was ‘dominated by direct threats to the UK as a sovereign nation of free 
citizens’ (NSS 2009: 19). But now, the ‘absence of a competing, state sponsored 
challenge to the democratic, liberal, free market based societies of the UK and our 
allies’, goes hand-in-hand with ‘a drive towards the opening up of trade and travel 
routes… sometimes called the ‘Washington Consensus’’ (NSS 2009: 19). 
Second, ‘prosperity and financial stability are critical for security’ (NSS 2009: 22). 
On this interdependent global stage, a challenge to the global economy becomes a 
challenge to global security, and vice versa, so that military force applied in the 
service of national security becomes legitimate in the service of the global economy. 
So the NSS goes from an emphasis on multilateralism in 2008, to extending the 
‘range of international partners needed to deliver decisive action’ under the leadership 
of the UK and the ‘UK’s closest ally, the United States’ in 2009 (NSS 2009: 25, 
emphasis added). In other words, NSS 2008 was more restrained, but by NSS 2009 
the UK government was panicking and switching all too quickly to unilateralism and 
military action. Likewise, ‘global problems’ need ‘global responses’ (NSS 2009: 3). 
Just as the other of integration is non-integration into the global economy, the 
other of broadening national security is non-integration too, but it is also the neglect 
of, and laissez-faire towards, the global economy, whereby it is left to the devices of 
the so-called invisible hand of the market. In this way, broadening national security 
reconfigures and combines ‘national security’ and ‘economy’ in a Butlerian ‘iterable 
structure’ (2010: 149). Yet, notwithstanding what Campbell refers to as a Marxist 
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‘economistic understanding’ of international relations, in which the ‘underlying forces 
of capital accumulation are determinative of state behaviour’ (1998: 4-5), this iterable 
structure exceeds traditional disciplinary approaches to national security. Peter Gill’s 
(1994) claims are representative of the usual separation of the two domains. ‘In one 
sense’, he writes, ‘the idea of an economic threat to national security is a 
contradiction in terms, particularly where the state supports the pre-eminence of a 
market economy’ (Gill 1994: 93). ‘Uncertainty, competition, and risk’, he continues: 
 
… are all indispensable conditions of the market place which is alleged to be 
the most superior method of organising production and distribution. 
Therefore ‘threat’ to national economic actors may be no more than a 
reflection of their inferior performance, and to attempt to protect them would 
be simply to distort the operations of the market (Gill, 1994: 95). 
 
Of course, Campbell argues that these domains were never separate anyway. He 
points out how the ‘economic disintegration of Europe’ was a danger cited by US 
policymakers during the cold war, even though it did not pose a threat in terms of a 
‘traditional calculus of (military) power’, nor was it reducible to the Soviet Union 
(Campbell, 1998: 31). Instead, economic collapse was seen as a fundamental threat 
to a particular political-economic status quo, the maintenance of which was then, as 
now, the rationale of national security. 
Using performativity enables us to understand that ‘national security’ and the 
‘economy’ are materialisations of particular regulatory norms. As Judith Butler puts 
it: ‘it is not possible simply to situate certain processes and activities within a state 
or, indeed, an economy, as if ‘state’ and ‘economy’ were pre-given entities, already 
bounded, identifiable, and knowable’ (2010: 147). She continues that ‘if such notions 
of the state are produced through state effects’ – as I argued at the beginning of the 
chapter – then the ‘same goes for ‘the economy’ which only becomes singular and 
monolithic by virtue of the convergence of certain kinds of processes and practices 
that produce the ‘effect’ of the knowable and unified economy’ (Butler, 2010: 147). 
In this way, broadening national security is one of the practices by which the global 
economy is performed as ‘knowable’ and ‘unified’.  
 
	   97	  
2.5.2 Re-making the terrorist threat - The place of diasporic communities  
 
… immigration becomes a problem, a challenge for European societies because 
scenes from everyday life are politicized, because day-to-day living is 
securitized, and not because there is a threat to the survival of society and its 
identity – Bigo.42 
 
In this final section I look at how performativities of global interconnection re-
imagine and re-shape the terrorist threat and their impact on diasporic communities 
in the UK, beginning with the reiteration of the core values of neoliberal 
globalisation. ‘We cannot predict’, NSS 2009 explains, ‘what causes or ideologies will 
give rise to terrorism in the future’, however:  
 
Globalisation, the Internet and the increasing ease of travel will increase the 
extent to which territorially driven or constrained grievances are played out 
on a worldwide stage. The UK may be particularly exposed to this risk because 
we are a very open and diverse society with numerous diaspora communities. 
Political events in countries thousands of miles away are closely reflected in 
communities in the UK (p. 77).   
 
The abstractions of broadening national security are also used to situate the 
9/11 attacks. ‘The preparations for the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001’, NSS 
2008 explains, ‘spanned several continents, and so did the effects: the World Bank 
estimated the reduction of global GDP at almost 1%’ (p. 7). In this way, trans-
national threats and drivers require ‘trans-national responses’ (NSS 2008: 7). 
Likewise, the international terrorist threat is ‘rapidly evolving’, and it functions 
something like a meta-enzyme present in the global system, which can metabolise 
any number of latent drivers of insecurity into threats (NSS 2009: 19). For example, 
as regards energy, it is ‘a fundamental building block of the global economy’, and 
‘secure supply is crucial to ensuring stability and growth’ (NSS 2009: 54). Yet, energy 
supply is highly vulnerable: it could be used as ‘a geopolitical lever’ by a state 
threatening to restrict its supply; and, of course, ‘we also know that some terrorists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 2001: 100. 
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aspire to attack critical national energy infrastructure’ (NSS 2009: 54, 56). This 
almost works as an extreme example of Campbell’s argument that: 
 
… given the amorphous and often virtual nature of the ‘war on terror’, in 
which the adversary is by definition largely unseen, the association of other 
resistant elements with terrorism has become a mechanism for materializing 
the threat (2007b: 129). 
 
This materialisation also takes place through the linking of diasporic communities to 
terrorism as I discuss below. 
Enzymic international terrorism works equally well with: state-led threats, 
whereby leaders may ‘sponsor[ing] terrorist activities against the UK or its 
interests’; with threats from failed states, whereby ‘instability and violent conflict 
overseas provide an opportunity for other threats such as terrorism… to flourish’; 
and lastly, with a range of threat domains. ‘The asymmetric, low cost, and largely 
anonymous, nature of cyber space’, the NSS explains, make it an ‘attractive domain’ 
for use by terrorists, as well as organised (as opposed to disorganised) criminals, and 
state-led espionage (NSS 2009: 102). The UK public are already very aware of the 
claim that terrorists wish to acquire CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear weapons), as this was the justification given by Prime Minister Tony Blair for 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003.   
Closely tied to the re-shaping of the terrorist threat is the assembling of 
particular roles of those who can and cannot exercise agency and leadership. NSS 
2009 announces the ‘theme’ of ‘protecting and involving our citizens in national 
security’, with priority given to ‘countering international terrorism’ (p. 30, emphasis 
in original). ‘Our approach’, it continues, ‘seeks to engage the public as fully as 
possible on national security issues’ (NSS 2009: 30). This would include then, 
services such as the Confidential Anti-Terrorist Hotline, which exhorts the public to 
‘remain alert and aware of their surroundings at all times’  (see Amoore, 2007). 43  
The ‘Preventing Terrorism’ page on the Northumbria Police website (see chapters 4 
and 5) asks that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See ‘If you suspect it, report it – 0800 789 321’ on Northumbria Police website. Available at 
http://www.northumbria.police.uk/advice_and_information/crime_prevention/terrorism/index.asp. 
(Accessed 6 July 2011).	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If something strikes you as suspicious and out of place then trust your instincts 
and call the police. Terrorists have to live somewhere. They store their 
equipment and materials somewhere. They need vehicles… They may make 
unusual financial transactions or use false documents to hide their real 
identities. Perhaps someone you know has been behaving differently lately?44  
  
Other examples of when ‘citizens’ can be involved in national security include 
combating serious crime (‘recognising the harm and direct consequences that such 
crime can have on our people, communities and economy, through drugs, violence, 
people-trafficking and fraud’), and managing the risks of cyber security (‘so that our 
people’s ability to do business, communicate, learn, and interact socially… [is] 
secure’) (NSS 2009: 30-1).   
Whilst British citizens – ‘our people’ – can play an important role in national 
security, the UK’s ‘diaspora communities’ are written into a powerless binary of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’. The NSS may begin by positioning diasporic communities as having a 
positive role within the ‘key characteristics of the UK’ (with their ‘key implications’ 
for national security strategy), but this is a brief respite. ‘We are one of the few 
major European states with a growing population’, the NSS claims, and ‘an increasing 
proportion of our population (8.9 per cent in 2005) is made up of ethnic minorities’ 
(NSS 2009: 38). ‘In an increasingly globalised world’, it continues, ‘diaspora 
communities can contribute to the UK’s economic and cultural success’ (NSS 2009: 
38). 
But the NSS goes on to claim that diasporic communities simultaneously 
undermine the UK’s national security, precisely because the world is ‘increasingly 
globalised’. The UK’s identity as ‘a hub of international communications, travel and 
migration’ means that ‘it can act as a stage where international events can be 
played out domestically’, yet it gives only one example: the ‘growth of diaspora 
communities in the UK means that some overseas conflicts or instability can be felt 
acutely at home’ (NSS 2009: 38, emphasis in original). In other words, ‘they’ bring 
danger into ‘our land’. This is why Cynthia Weber (2006), in a critique of 
Werenotafraid.com’s attempt to promote an ‘imaginary of British unity’ and 
fearlessness after the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, argues that the website 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid, emphasis added. 
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ultimately failed. It failed because it was unable to reconcile its message of a rational 
and cosmopolitan British fearlessness of terrorist violence with the fact that the 
bombers were British nationals. And furthermore, that the British security services 
unlawfully killed the Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes in the name of maintaining an 
environment of fearlessness which British Muslims and other ethnic minorities felt 
did not extend to them. 
In this way, it must be clearly understood that the global discourses of 
integration and broadening national security, and the performativities of global 
interconnection on which they rely, are not ‘global’ in the sense that they are 
‘spaceless’ or operate beyond territory (Elden, 2009). Rather they perform an 
‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, a secure and an insecure, to the neoliberal economy which 
can be located at many sites. With the materialisation of the international terrorist 
threat through broadening national security, and the linking in of diasporic 
communities, this happens chiefly through the flow of violent ideologies. Diasporic 
communities ‘resident here’ are linked in with ‘Al Qa’ida inspired ideology’ and other 
‘regionally based ideologies’ in ‘the countries and regions from which they come’ 
through the internet and the increasing ease of travel (NSS 2009: 38, 40-41). 
Interestingly, this process also happens in reverse: the NSS justifies UK counter-
terror operations in Pakistan because the latter represents ‘important national 
interests’ for the UK that are founded, it continues, ‘in our historical association 
with the Indian sub-continent’, and the ‘close familial links between many UK and 
Pakistani citizens’ (NSS 2009: 75). But the NSS considers military operations in 
Pakistan to be entirely legitimate, in a way that the presence of diasporic 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I explored how the inaugural UK National Security Strategies 
published by the New Labour government in 2008 and 2009 make explicit that 
neoliberal globalisation is the objective of UK national security in the ‘new global 
age’. The significance of this is that discourses of neoliberal globalisation must be 
understood as the condition of possibility for UK national security, in the sense that 
through ritual repetition and reiteration the latter’s many practices ‘fix’ on the one 
hand, security as economic interconnectedness, and on the other, insecurity as an 
unwillingness to cooperate with the global economy. This is illustrated in obvious 
ways, such as NSS 2009’s claim that the ‘continued openness of global economies’ is 
the ‘best route to long-term stability and security’, whilst ‘moves towards closed 
societies, or economies, would decrease overall stability and increase risk’ (p. 51). 
But it is also illustrated in less obvious ways too. For example, ‘values’ become a 
border too – where acquiescence demonstrates connectedness, and dissent points 
to danger.   
My discussion of national security as performative politics distills into two main 
points: first, the key role of national security in performing a coherent, stable state 
identity; and second, how collective identities exist as the reiteration of ‘imaginative 
geographies’. This is more than claiming that the state imposes certain political 
knowledges on pre-existing spaces and populaces. Rather, what is known about 
space – either that which we assume is ‘ours’ or ‘theirs’ – is already the constitutive 
force of exclusion, erasure, and abjection. Therefore if, as David Campbell argues, 
national security strategy during the cold war was a bordering practice materialising 
the identity of the sovereign nation-state, can broadening national security be 
understood as a bordering practice materialising the neoliberalised global? And if so, 
what are the violent geographies of this performativity? Who are the ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
and what are the coercive practices by which this violent division is maintained? 
Broadening national security performs the abstracted global spatialities of a 
neoliberal geopolitical order, which have been materialised by UK security policy in 
successive Labour defence policies from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review up to 
and including the 2009 National Security Strategy and CONTEST. In the war on 
terror, broadening national security reiterates neoliberal performativities of 
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interconnection as a broadening register of coercive practices. For example, ‘horizon 
scanning’ – the dubious art of materialising threats which do not yet exist – and the 
building and strengthening of broader partnerships between national security, the 
public and private sectors, and citizens. These practices materialise or ‘bring to life’ a 
world in which the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence – which is at present what 
national security remains – is increasingly woven into everyday spaces. 
 Finally, broadening national security re-materialises the terrorist threat and the 
place of diasporic communities, so that the latter have become trapped in the ‘abject 
domains’ materialised by performativities of terror and counter-terror. In an 
‘interconnected globe’ the UK is materialised as ‘a stage where international 
events can be played out domestically’ (NSS 2009: 38, emphasis in original). In 
other words, and to paraphrase Edward Said, interconnection – particularly through 
the internet and ease of travel - means that ‘they’ bring outside dangers into ‘our 
land’. 
This thesis proposes and begins to tease out the significance of the relationship 
between the broadening view of national security put forward by the NSS and 
contemporary counter-terrorism practices, a relationship which becomes crucially 
important in the light of my main claim in this chapter: a broadening understanding of 
threat with a broadening range of coercive policy responses brings to life a world in 
which the violence of national security can be more present in everyday life. In the 
final section I suggested that the re-making of the terrorist threat through 
broadening national security coalesces around the flow of violent ideologies into the 
UK through diasporic communities. I continue with this focus in the next chapter by 
considering how the materialisation of global interconnection through the reiterative 
practices of broadening national security can be conceptualised using the biopolitical 
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3.1  Introduction 
 
The UK has a particular interest in contributing to shared responses to shared 
problems, because our way of life is dependent, to a greater extent than in 
many other countries, on the free movement of goods, money, people and 
ideas – The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.45 
 
… almost every aspect of national security has an important information 
dimension. In the information age, the world is increasingly interconnected and 
information is instantaneous. The sphere of public opinion, of culture and 
cultures, and of information and information operations is therefore an 
important domain in its own right – The National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom.46 
 
The performativities of interconnection by which broadening national security 
reinscribes, extends and enforces neoliberal globalisation is about more than co-
option into shared economic values. As the above quotations from the NSS 
demonstrate, in addition to economic and financial interconnection, a neoliberal 
globe is also underwritten by the ‘free movement’ of people, ideas, information, and 
culture: amounting to a ‘way of life’ requiring protection from a broadening coercive 
register of national security. In this chapter, I develop my critique of broadening 
national security by a closer examination of these performativities of ‘free 
movement’ and ‘ways of life’; how they have been analysed as the object-products of 
biopolitical security (Dillon, 2010, 2007a, 2007b; Reid, 2006); and how this latter 
concept, as it currently stands in security studies, must be re-formulated to meet the 
critical challenge of broadening national security  
The biopolitical security literature has been useful to the extent that it has 
begun the necessary task of re-conceptualising contemporary security practices 
through Foucault’s arguments on biopolitical government and the securitisation of 
docile populations (2004; 2007; 2008). Specifically, it deals with the government of 
contemporary ways of living recognisable by their unprecedented complexity (Dillon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 2009: 59. 
46 Ibid: 14.  
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and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009). However this literature also has a number of important 
limitations which I will explore over the course of this chapter. Foremost, it largely 
skims over Foucault’s linking of biopolitical security mechanisms to a ‘political-
economic program’ performed by ‘laws of nature’: specifically, circulation and 
uncertainty (2007: 41; 2008: 16). This chapter re-orients the concept of biopolitical 
security in relation to this ‘political-economic program’, and uses Judith Butler’s 
theory of performativity to explore how performativities of circulation, population, 
and so on, materialise this programme. They are, in effect, the already-secured 
realities natural to political-economic government, rather than pre-existing ‘analytical 
categories’ which biopolitics must address, as Michael Dillon would have it (2007a: 
8).  
Re-orienting biopolitical security as political-economic government, however, 
leads to a further conceptual challenge. For while my approach does not seek to 
dismiss the important ways in which biopolitical discourses are materialised as 
complex ways of living, it is nonetheless primarily concerned with grasping and 
appreciating the inescapable prosaic-ness of broadening national security; specifically, 
crowded places security. Crowded places security is the biopolitical government of 
ways of life too, but the biopolitical security literature as it stands simply offers no 
framework to adequately conceptualise this domain. For example, Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero’s (2009: 13) argument that ‘biopolitical rule’ addresses the ‘radical 
relationality of the circulation of species-being as emergent life’, appears somewhat 
inadequate for grasping the political stakes of national security in the UK’s high 
street businesses and public services. 
To finish, I would point out that there is no binding reason why the concept of 
biopolitical security has to be trapped in this way. In 2003, the art historian and critic 
Jonathan Crary wrote that ‘our lives are divided between two essentially incompatible 
milieus’: on the one hand, the ‘spaceless electronic worlds of contemporary 
technological culture’, and on the other, the ‘physical extensive terrain on which our 
bodies are situated’ (2003: 7, emphasis added). But rather than commit to 
‘hyperbolic theories about the disappearance of space or the ubiquity of 
instantaneous speed’, Crary instead quite sensibly counsels that ‘we must begin to 
understand the strange kinds of dislocations and associations that now constitute 
subjective reality’ (2003: 7). In this chapter I begin to develop an alternative 
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framework by which the ‘strange dislocations’ of contemporary biopolitical security 
practices may be understood. 
In the next section 3.2, I step back from the chapter’s analytic focus on 
broadening national security to consider how scholars in security studies and 
political geography have theorised biopolitics: the relations between power, life, and 
security. I begin with Foucault’s work on biopolitics - ‘power’s hold over life’ (2004: 
240) – which by and large remains the template for biopolitical critique in the social 
sciences. In the second part of the section, I consider the ways in which a 
Foucauldian biopolitics has been used to counter what is to many scholars the failure 
of geopolitical imaginaries to adequately account for the practices and violences of 
global politics in the era of the war on terror. Finally, in the third part of the section, 
I consider how such engagements have raised the question of the emergence of a 
biopolitical subject. 
In section 3.3, I explore Foucault’s biopolitics in greater detail, beginning with his 
initial work in 1976 which focused, I argue, on three biopolitical performativities of 
the multiplicity, population and the milieu. In the second part, I discuss his work on 
biopolitics in 1978 and 1979 which moved on to consider biopolitics as the 
materialisation of realities natural to a political-economic liberal form of government.  
In section 3.4, I consider how, and with what results, Foucault’s biopolitics 
schema has been re-worked in the last decade. In particular, I consider the 
‘biopolitics of security’ approach within security studies, and its attempts to re-
imagine what Foucault posited as the natural realities of political-economic 
government in terms of complexity, contingency, and emergence (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2009, 2008). In the second part of the section, I consider a possible 
direction for moving beyond this literature which takes into account Foucault’s 
‘other’ biopolitics of sexuality, as well as recent work on the nexus between 
biopolitical security and culture (Campbell, 2007b; Gregory, 2010). 
An exploration of biopolitical security norms cited and reiterated by broadening 
national security is my task in the final part of the chapter. In section 3.5 I look at 
three such materialisations: traditions of openness and a British ‘way of life’; cyber 
space and the ‘symbiotic nature’ of terrorism and insurgency; and lastly ‘Public 
opinion, culture and information’ (Poci).  
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3.2 Situating biopolitics - From Society Must Be Defended to terror  
 
The current attention given to the concept of biopolitics in security studies is 
based, and draws very heavily (through not exclusively), on the work of Foucault in 
his late-1970s lecture seria: 1976’s Society Must Be Defended (2004), 1978’s Security, 
Territory, Population (2007), and 1979’s The Birth of Biopolitics (2008). Although the 
concept appears as a largely ‘political’ one, it has travelled with surprising speed and 
penetration across the social sciences and the humanities since the lectures were 
translated into English between 2003 and 2008. Thus, biopolitics has been used as a 
critical framework in, for example, anthropology (India, 2005), cultural geography 
(Comaroff, 2007), and literary studies (Morton and Bygrave, 2008). There are, 
however, dissenting voices. Most notably, in 1998’s Homo Sacer the Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben contested what he termed the ‘Foucauldian thesis’ of 
biopolitics:  
 
Foucault argues that the modern Western state has integrated techniques of 
subjective individualization with procedures of objective totalization to an 
unprecedented degree… Yet the point at which these two faces of power 
converge remains strangely unclear… where, in the body of power, is the zone 
of indistinction (or, at least, the point of intersection) at which techniques of 
individualization and totalizing procedures converge? (pp. 5-6). 
 
In response to Foucault’s ‘blind spot’, Agamben sets out a genealogy of modern 
biopolitics going back to a classical Greek distinction between zoē – that which 
‘expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings’ - and bios - that which 
‘indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or group’ (1998: 6,1). In 
Agamben’s framework, modern power relations – biopolitics – are materialised not 
in the optimisation of bios, as Foucault argues, but instead in zoē, bare life (1998: 4). 
Bare life is exemplified in the figure of homo sacer, sacred man, ‘whose life cannot be 
sacrificed, yet may nevertheless be killed’ (Agamben, 1998: 10). Homo sacer is ‘an 
object of violence that exceeds the sphere of both of law and of sacrifice’ (Agamben, 
1998: 86). This understanding of biopolitics as the materialisation/inclusion of bare 
life as the constitutive outside of contemporary politics, fits well with Butler’s 
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argument that performative politics ‘require[s] the simultaneous production of a 
domain of abject beings’, whereby the abject designates: 
 
… those ‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life which are 
nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the 
subject, but whose living under the sign of the ‘unlivable’ is required to 
circumscribe the domain of the subject (1993: 2; also 2004). 
 
These arguments have been combined implicitly or explicitly by scholars in 
disciplines including international relations (Edkins, 2008), and geography (Minca, 
2007; Minca and Giaccaria, 2011). 
The intersections and divergences between the biopolitics of Foucault and 
Agamben are the subject of a scholarly genre in its own right (see Okajangas, 2005). 
My thoughts on the matter are that despite the shared usefulness of Agamben’s and 
Butler’s approaches in analysing the constitutive outsides of contemporary politics - 
for example ‘queerness’ or the camp – in many cases such a movement cannot even 
become a possibility until certain ways of living are recognised as being (bio)political as 
such. That is, until it is recognised that certain spatialities and identities are only 
made possible within the regulatory matrices of biopolitical norms. This is the urgent 
political problem posed by the broadening of national security and the protection of 
crowded places which this thesis begins to address. 
 
 
3.2.1 The politics of making life live 
 
Foucault first began to discuss an explicit schema of biopolitics in 1976: in the 
last of the Society Must Be Defended lectures (hereafter SMBD), 47 and in the final 
chapter of the first volume of The History of Sexuality (hereafter HoS), titled ‘Right of 
Death and Power over Life’ and published the same year. His analysis in these 
opening salvos centred on the now-famous claim that biopower, distinct from 
sovereign and disciplinary power, ‘optimize[s] a state of life’: that it is ‘bent on 
generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them’ (SMBD: 246, 258; also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 He had spent the first ten lectures, ‘trying to raise the problem of war, seen as a grid for 
understanding historical processes’ (Foucault, 2004: 239). 
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HoS: 136). ‘I wouldn’t say’, he continued, ‘that sovereignty’s old right – to take life or 
let live was replaced’; instead, from the nineteenth century ‘it came to be 
complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does 
penetrate it, permeate it’ (SMBD: 241). This new right is ‘precisely the opposite 
right… the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die’ (SMBD: 241, emphasis added). 
The sovereign right to take life is therefore joined by the biopolitical right to 
make life live; a formidable combination witnessed no more clearly, Foucault argued, 
than in the phenomenon of genocide. When the sovereign power of the gallows is 
joined by the ‘right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life’, wars 
are ‘waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized 
for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have 
become vital’ (HoS: 136-7). The most important implication or political problem of 
biopolitics, then, is that ‘a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that 
endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls 
and comprehensive regulations’, is at the same time, ‘a formidable power of death’ 
(HoS: 137). In other words, biopolitics are a uniquely modern way of retaining life 
within its old relation with power.  
Much space has been devoted in the secondary literature on Foucault to 
discussing the import and meaning of these shifts (Collier, 2009; Dillon, 2004). How, 
and to what extent the biopolitics schema replaced in Foucault’s thought the 
disciplines, which themselves seemed to succeed a model or paradigm of sovereignty 
(see Foucault, 1991). But as Foucault illustrated in the example of genocide discussed 
above, and as he made explicit at many other points during the three lecture seria, 
he was not interested in theories of power as such. He did not want to analyse 
biopolitics at the ‘level of political theory, but rather at the level of the mechanisms, 
techniques, and technologies of power’ (SMBD: 241). He thus goes on to argue that 
biopolitics emerged in the nineteenth century through two main performativities, or, 
as he put it, around two ‘poles’ (HoS: 139). The first of these is of: 
 
... the body as as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, 
the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, 
its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls (HoS: 139). 
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Whilst the second: 
 
... formed somewhat later, [and] focused on the species body, the body imbued 
with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: 
propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their 
supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and 
regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population (HoS: 139). 
 
Foucault’s main claim here then, is that disciplinary mechanisms perform what 
he terms ‘an anatomo-politics of the human body’, confined and extorted, whilst 
biopolitics materialise the ‘species body’ or population through the ‘mechanics of 
life’: the birth and death rate, and so on (HoS: 139). As Stephen Collier (2009) puts 
it, in HoS and SMBD Foucault is offering an analytic of biopolitical government in 
which disciplinary ‘micro-powers’ take ‘care of the details in circumscribed spaces’, 
whilst regulatory ‘macro-powers’ form ‘complex systems of coordination and 
centralization’ over populations, allowing for ‘control over new domains: the 
population, productive processes, biological life’ (p. 84). Collier goes on to argue, 
however, that this concept of two interlocking but distinct poles of disciplinary and 
regulatory power is not the ‘definitive elaboration’ of Foucault’s biopolitics – it is too 
indebted to a ‘systemacity’, a ‘functional coherence’ and a ‘totalizing’ sense of reach 
which does not reflect the usual sophistication of Foucault’s analysis (2009: 85, 79, 
80). Instead, the notion of two poles is something like a ‘warm-up’, to be replaced 
with the ‘more supple analysis’ of 1978’s Security, Territory, Population (hereafter STP) 
(Collier, 2009: 80). 
A second important point to draw out from Foucault’s initial analysis in HoS and 
SMBD is that biopolitical performativities are regulatory. ‘A power whose task is to 
take charge of life’, he wrote, ‘needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms’ 
(HoS: 144, emphasis added). In other words, reiterative ‘regulatory and corrective 
mechanisms’ function to materialise ‘a normalizing society’ in which ‘it is no longer a 
matter of bringing death into play but of distributing the living in the domain of value 
and utility’ (HoS: 144, emphasis added). These mechanisms include ‘more 
economically rational’ social interventions than were traditionally provided by the 
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charity of the church, such as ‘insurance, individual and collective savings, safety 
measures, and so on’ (SMBD: 244). 
Foucault took sabbatical leave in 1977. In 1978’s STP he returned to the theme 
of biopower: ‘namely, the set of mechanisms through which the biological features of 
the human species became the object of a political strategy’ (p. 1). As their title 
suggests, these lectures, as well as the following year’s The Birth of Biopolitics 
(hereafter BoB), are key to the ‘biopolitical security’ literature which has emerged in 
security studies and international relations in recent years. In particular, Foucault’s 
(STP: 7) concept of ‘security mechanisms’ as the interface between ‘biological 
features’ and power, has become very popular as a rebuke to practices of so-called 
‘homeland security’ since 2001, as well as to the inability of geopolitical frameworks 
to adequately conceptualise and critique them. 
The concept of the ‘mechanism’ is key in STP, and Foucault spends a large part 
of the first lecture explicating ‘mechanisms of power’ vis-à-vis his disinclination to do 
likewise for a theory of power. The ‘analysis of these mechanisms of power’, he 
claimed, ‘is not in any way a general theory of what power is. It is not a part or even 
the start of such a theory’ (STP: 2). Instead, it ‘simply involves investigating where 
and how, between whom, between what points, according to what processes, and 
what effects, power is applied’ (STP: 2). He then goes on to discuss how mechanisms 
of security manage the open and ever-widening seria of ‘natural givens’ (STP: 18). 
The ‘management of these series’, he writes, ‘because they are open series, can only 
be controlled by an estimate of probabilities, [and this] is pretty much the essential 
characteristic of the mechanism of security’ (STP: 20). This idea of making life live by 
materialising ‘open seria’ and ‘ever-widening circuits’ (STP: 20, 45), is absolutely key 
to understanding broadening national security. 
 
 
3.2.2 Biopoliticising the war on terror  
 
In 2007 Michael Dillon wrote - taking up where he assumed Foucault had left off 
in his work on security mechanisms - that ‘modernity has been distinguished by at 
least two great dispositifs for the problematizations of security’:  
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One, revolving around the referent object of sovereign territoriality has been 
the geopolitics of security. The other, revolving around the problematic of life, 
specifically addressed in terms of population, has been the biopolitics of 
security (2007a: 10). 
 
In the war on terror, however, Dillon claimed that ‘it is neither geopolitics nor 
biopolitics alone but the toxic combination of the two that now drives western 
security practices’ (2007a: 9, emphasis added). Indeed, while there have been a 
number of critiques focusing on either the geopolitical (see chapter 2) or the 
biopolitical problematisation, there have been few which explicitly address this ‘toxic 
combination’.  
Dillon begins by allowing that the war on terror is ‘driven by a complex of 
geopolitical factors both local and global’: in particular, ‘a contingent terroristic event 
directed against the epicentre of geopolitical hegemony in the United States’ (2007a: 8, 
emphasis added). Or as John Agnew puts it, the US ‘sustained the attacks because of 
its global geopolitical centrality’ (as well as he adds, because of its ‘support for 
governments – particularly those of Israel and Saudi Arabia – that excite much 
hostility from Muslim extremists’) (2003: 1, emphasis added). Dillon’s overall claim, 
however, is that to approach the war on terror through geopolitical imaginaries is in 
a very important sense to miss the point. For the war on terror, he argues, ‘emerged 
out of a generic biopolitics of contingency in the west and is being conducted 
according to its political technologies and governmental rationalities’ (2007a: 8, 
emphasis added). In particular, these are technologies and rationalities of risk 
emanating from the ‘economic, techno-scientific, and political supremacy of the 
west’, which have turned back on themselves as the ‘occasioning of terrifyingly 
dangerous uncertainties amplified and circulated by its [the west’s] very own forms 
of existence’ (Dillon, 2007a: 9). Dillon would therefore seek to explain the 
phenomena of globalisation (and much more besides) as the reiteration and 
reinscription of contingency on a global scale: 
 
The contingency around which biopolitics revolves has been evolving since the 
beginning of the modern age. It includes within its compass almost every aspect 
of western life: from capital accumulation, financial flows, information and 
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communication systems, business continuity, health care, container shipping, 
port management, food chains, and energy grids to counter-terrorism, 
globalized criminality – especially in people, drugs, sex, organs, and many other 
illegal substances – popup warfare, transcontinental tourism, the design of 
street architecture, and the risk-based governance of life assurance, pension 
funds, school outings, and nursery provisions (2007a: 9). 
 
However, there might not be such a wide gulf between geopolitical and 
biopolitical imaginaries as Dillon argues. According to Alan Ingram and Klaus Dodds, 
geopolitical security practices make use of the spatial vocabulary of the state and the 
inter-state system: they are concerned with securing ‘zones’ of instability and failed 
‘states’, as ‘western governments worry that such regimes might ‘export’ security 
threats’ (2009: 7-10; also Jeffrey, 2009). On the other hand, biopolitical security 
practices include ‘stabilizing civilian populations in global danger zones’, ‘stemming 
refugee and migrant flows’, and ‘protecting welfare systems from undesirables’ 
(Ingram and Dodds, 2009: 10). But in distinguishing geopolitical from biopolitical 
imaginaries it is important, I think, not to cling too rigidly to the concept of 
population. My concern is that, as with traditional geopolitics and international 
relations approaches in which the state and the inter-state system are taken as pre-
existing facts, biopolitics may come to be confined to performativities of population: 
their absence or presence, their patterns or aporia. 
But an even more troubling implication from this biopoliticising of the war on 
terror is the way in which the concept of population becomes part of what is 
essentially a sovereign rather than biopolitical relationship. The populations of global 
politics may indeed become stabilised or repressed, but these actions more closely 
indicate the sovereign power of the sword rather than the biopolitical making life live. 
Furthermore, the particular populations caught up in these analyses – of civilians, 
refugees, migrants, and so on – completely miss out the other senses of multiplicity 
which figure in biopolitical control: such as Deleuze’s (1992) ‘dividuals’, as I discuss in 
chapter 5, or even Foucault’s own sense of security as the production of multiple, 
ever-widening circuits. What emerges, then, is a need for a recognition of the 
specifically biopolitical aspects of the war on terror that does not just substitute 
‘population’ for ‘state’, thereby repeating the limitations of the critical geopolitics 
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literature: its relationship to the inter-state system, albeit a negative relationship of 
repudiation. Rather, the biopolitics of the war on terror would more appropriately 
signal a geopolitics of everyday spaces and making life live. This thesis takes the first 
steps towards the development of such a framework.  
 
 
3.2.3 The emergence of a biopolitical subject 
 
Although in Dillon’s argument biopolitical security practices do not result from 
the war on terror so much as they produce the discursive parameters within which it 
is conducted, many scholars have nonetheless brought attention to their increasing 
intensity since 2001. Louise Amoore (2006) focuses on the biometric border, a 
prominent practice of ‘homeland security’, arguing that it ‘cannot be understood 
simply as a matter of the geopolitical policing and disciplining of the movement of 
bodies across mapped space’ (p. 337, emphasis added). Instead, it is ‘a mobile 
regulatory site through which people’s everyday lives can be made amenable to 
intervention and management’, and is therefore ‘more appropriately understood as a 
matter of biopolitics’ (Amoore, 2006: 337) (also Adey, 2009; Muller, 2008). 
In her critique, Amoore draws attention to how in the practice of the biometric 
border, personal and biological data such as health, financial, and travel records, facial 
and gait recognition, and fingerprints and iris scans, are used to pre-emptively assign 
risk profiles to travellers; segregating ‘legitimate’ mobilities for leisure and business, 
from ‘illegitimate’ mobilities including terrorism and illegal immigration. Amoore 
rejects the depolicitising framing of the biometric border as simply an expert or 
‘smart scientific solution to fighting the war on terror without impeding globalization’ 
(2006: 343). Instead, she draws attention to the ways in which the biometric border 
produces the human body as an ‘indisputable anchor[s] to which data can be safely 
secured’ (Amoore, 2006: 342). Through technologies like the biometric border, 
bodies become ‘infallible and unchallengeable verifiers of the truth about a person - 
the ultimate guarantors of identity’; leaving people, in the words of one civil rights 
lawyer, ‘having to dispute their own identity’ (Amoore, 2006: 340). 
Such contradictions may not trouble former US Secretary of Homeland Security 
Tom Ridge who launched the scheme in 2005, with his ‘trusted traveller’ status. But 
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an assortment of advocacy groups, civil liberty and privacy organizations, and 
immigrant rights groups were extremely concerned about how the ‘preemptive 
fixing of identities’ by which the biometric border operates can fix the ‘wrong’ 
identity; and what happens to the person at the end of this process. Amoore 
therefore concludes that the biometric border is not simply geopolitical, because 
under its purview ‘the bodies of migrants and travellers themselves becomes sites of 
multiple encoded boundaries’ (2006: 336, emphasis added). 
Amoore’s analysis also sheds light on the conditions of emergence of what could 
be termed a biopolitical subject. As Foucault argues in Discipline and Punish, ‘we must 
cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’’; rather, 
‘power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth’, and ‘the individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production’ (Foucault, 1991: 194). Amoore’s analysis therefore points us towards 
how in the war on terror new economies of power are being produced at the 
border, in which the rights-bearing citizen gives way to (wo)man stripped naked to 
his or her biological essentials; sometimes literally, as in the case of the controversial 
body scanners installed at airports which render ‘naked’ images of passengers 
(Amoore and Hall, 2010).  
A key difference between geopolitical and biopolitical imaginaries of security, 
then, is the different political subjectivities they make possible. Geopolitical 
imaginaries are concerned with the citizen of the nation-state (or, if one were very 
cynical, the issue of who can die and who may live vis-à-vis the state’s monopoly of 
legitimate violence). Biopolitical imaginaries do not produce apolitical subjects, even 
if the former could be confined to scientific renderings of species life and population. 
So while biometric bordering practices may rely on technological innovation, Wendy 
Larner (2008) argues that the power/knowledge claims about safe and dangerous 
forms of life on which they rely, have a much deeper and violent history. In this way, 
the biometric border may be more familiar to those who have experienced imperial 
and/or colonial rule, than to those travellers or holiday makers encountering body 
scanners at Manchester Airport.  
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3.3 Foucault’s biopolitics 
 
… to act in the political domain is still to act in the domain of nature – 
Foucault.48  
 
Liberal thought held that the attribution by nature of goods and ills is, in itself, 
just – François Ewald.49 
In the last chapter of HoS, Foucault described the ‘circular process’ which 
marked the ‘entry of life into history… into the order of knowledge and power, into 
the sphere of political techniques’ (pp. 141-2). This circular process includes of 
course the development of the life sciences – particularly biology - but it also takes 
in the improvement of agricultural techniques, the Industrial Revolution, and the 
birth of capitalism (HoS: 142). Together these events brought about ‘a relative 
control over life’, and ‘in the space for movement thus conquered… methods of 
power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook 
to control and modify them’ (HoS: 142). The circular links between politics and 
biology have been thoroughly dealt with in the literature (Braun, 2007; Marks, 2008), 
as have those between biology and political economy (Cooper, 2008; Mitchell and 
Waldby, 2010; Sunder Rajan, 2006). In the next two sections I will explore the 
lesser-spotted relationship between biopolitical performativities, discourses of 
political economy, and security. 
In his earliest work on biopolitics, then, Foucault focused on how the 
development of capitalism from the 1700s onwards depended on biopolitical 
performativities. Capitalism, he wrote, ‘would not have been possible without the 
controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment 
of the phenomena of population to economic processes’ (HoS: 141). 50 But: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 STP: 47. 
49 1991: 207.	  
50  Populations are not, of course, the only political subjects possible of capitalism. In visual culture, 
Gen Doy writes of capitalism (and rationalist Enlightenment thought) in terms of the production of 
‘strong, controlling and exploitative subjects increasingly required by a developing capitalist, and later 
imperialist, economy’ (2005: 2). As John Stuart Mill famously stated in 1859’s On Liberty: ‘over himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’ (1999: 47). This notion of an ‘entrepreneurial 
subject’ also features in recent cultural economy analyses of the contemporary financial system (see 
Langley, 2008, 2006). 
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… it also needed the growth of both these factors, their reinforcement as well 
as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of 
optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time 
making them more difficult to govern… The adjustment of the accumulation of 
men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the 
expansion of production and the differential allocation of profit, were made 
possible in part by the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of 
application (HoS: 141). 
 
This is not to say, however, that capitalism did not also need the disciplines. In 
his essay on spaces of biopolitical control, William Bogard (2007) explains that 
‘disciplinary institutions, like the factory or the school, physically enclose diverse 
populations and force their unification’, so that the ‘confinement of labour within the 
factory and factory-city gave Capital much power over the accumulation process in 
the 18th and 19th centuries’ (p. 2). Indeed for Bogard, the shift from the disciplines to 
biopolitics identified by Foucault, is ‘a problem of capitalist governance’; reflecting ‘a 
move by Capital to modify disciplinary forms of enclosure, to counter the resistance 
they provoke and intensify the accumulation process’ (2007: 2).  
Bound up in the re-adjustment of social domains to capitalism, then, were new 
performativities and thus new materialisations of power, as Foucault describes in 
SMBD. ‘Unlike discipline which is addressed to bodies’, he wrote, ‘the new 
nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-
living being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species’ (SMBD: 242, emphasis added). 
The materialisation of ‘man-as-species’ is in turn reiterated by three other 
biopolitical performativities, which I will explore in turn. 
First, there are performativities of the ‘multiplicity’ and/or ‘mass’. Whilst 
discipline performs ‘a multiplicity of men to the extent that their multiplicity can and 
must be dissolved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance’, 
biopolitics instead performs ‘a global mass that is affected by overall processes 
characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on’ (SMBD: 243). This 
notion of the ‘global mass’ emphasises the contiguity of the concept of population 
with the emerging life sciences. Foucault explores this new performativity of 
multiplicity through the ‘problem of morbidity’ (SMBD: 243). He looks back to the 
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‘famous epidemics’ such as the Black Death, which between 1348 and 1350 is 
estimated to have claimed anywhere between 30-60% of Europe’s population, and 
has ‘haunted political power’ since then (Foucault, SMBD: 243). He then moves 
forward to the eighteenth century when epidemics were not the primary problem 
but ‘something else – what might broadly be called endemics, or in other words, the 
form, nature, extension, duration, and intensity of the illnesses prevalent in a 
population’ (SMBD: 243, emphasis added). 
Population, then, is the second biopolitical performativity Foucault identified: 
‘biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a 
problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s 
problem’ (SMBD: 245). In HoS, Foucault described population as the ‘underside of 
the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence’, so that the right to life 
exists alongside the ‘wholesale slaughter’ of ‘entire populations’ (p. 137). In SMBD, 
he draws out the ‘biological or biosociological processes’ of population: birth, death, 
and reproductive rates (p. 250, 243). As Colin Gordon put it, ‘[biopolitics is] a 
politics concerned with subjects as members of a population, in which issues of 
individual sexual and reproductive conduct interconnect with issues of national 
policy and power’ (1991: 5). In STP, Foucault claims that population emerged, ‘when 
for the first time, men are no longer called ‘mankind’ (le genre humaine)’, but instead 
begin to be called ‘the human species (espèce humaine)’ (p. 75, emphasis in original). 
Continuing with this ‘biosociological’ theme, he goes on to describe population as ‘a 
datum that depends on a series of variables’ such as climate and ‘material 
surroundings’, rather than the ‘simple sum of individuals inhabiting a territory’ or the 
expression of ‘a sovereign that may encourage or shape it’ (STP: 71) (for another, 
more neglected reading of population in Foucault’s biopolitics see section 3.4.1). 
Again through the example of epi-/en-demics, Foucault also illustrates how 
biopolitical performativities re-imagine death itself: death became ‘no longer 
something that suddenly swooped down on life – as in an epidemic’, but instead 
‘something that slips into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it’ 
(SMBD: 244). 
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Third and finally, Foucault introduces the milieu, not surprisingly a term drawn 
from the life sciences.51 ‘Biopolitics’ last domain’, he wrote, is ‘control over relations 
between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are living beings, and their 
environment, the milieu in which they live’ (SMBD: 244-5). Here Foucault is explicitly 
focusing on the materialisation of connections and relations within ‘life’, rather than 
discrete entities like the disciplined, extorted, and docile body. 
Before going on I would like to draw attention to a key point emerging from this 
somewhat schematic rendering of the biopolitical performativities in Foucault’s 1976 
work. Rather than presenting the multiplicity, population, and milieu in the mode of 
the ‘key analytical categories’ of biopolitics as per Dillon (2007a: 8), I want to 
emphasise instead that as biopolitical performativities, as the materialisation of 
biopolitical norms, there is nothing inevitable, or as Foucault would put it ‘obvious’, 
about them. As Butler points out, performativity is ‘a process of materialization that 
stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call 
matter’ (1993: 9-10, emphasis added). So the concept of population, for example, has 
proved so resilient in contemporary political imaginaries (and it must be noted, in 
academic imaginaries of these imaginaries) not because it is the perfect or natural 
exemplar of biopolitics, but because it has been reiterated and reinscribed – that is, 
produced as fixed – with more success. Foucault points towards the reasons for this: 
the contiguity with the life sciences and their classification of the natural world into 
domains, classes, orders, genera and so on, and of course the needs of Capital 
backed up by the military force of the State.  
But Foucault, it should be pointed out, is also to blame for such 
misunderstandings. Throughout his long and varied body of work he repeatedly 
stressed that power is productive, that social phenomena can only acquire the status 
of that which can be known through discourse. Yet in this early work on biopolitics 
he focused so intensely on how it - for want of a better word - works, that he 
neglects the larger argument that discourses, whether sovereign, disciplinary, or 
biopolitical, do not do anything – rather they make possible what can be done. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Foucault explains that his ‘resignification’ of the term milieu as an ideal space of security follows 
directly from its appearance in 19th century biology, particularly in the writings of Jean-Baptiste Monet 
de Lamarck (SMBD: 20). According to George Canguilhem, Lamarck used milieu to designate ‘fluids 
like water, air, and light’ (cited in SMBD: 27 n.36). ‘When Lamarck’, Canguilhem continues, ‘wants to 
designate the set of actions exerted on a living being from outside... he never says the milieu, but 
always ‘influential circumstances’’ (cited in SMBD: 27 n. 36).     
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example, in SMBD he comments that one of the most important things about 
biopolitics is the ‘nature of the phenomena that are taken into consideration’: 
‘phenomena that are aleatory and unpredictable when taken in themselves or 
individually, but which, at the collective level, display constants that are easy, or at 
least possible, to establish’ (p. 246). 
Statements like these have led contemporary scholars like Dillon to posit 
contingent ways of life, for example, as the exclusive targets of biopolitics, like 
enzymes that can only catalyse certain reactions from certain chemicals and no 
others. Whilst it is certainly important to consider how contingent, circulating, and 
emergent ways of living are governed, like for example global maritime trade (Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008) and immigration (Gill, 2009), at the same time it must be 
remembered that they are materialised and given meaning within biopolitical 
discourses. They cannot therefore be ‘revolved around’, ‘considered’, or ‘taken in 
themselves’ in any way which implies they exist previous to or independent of 
(bio)power. This recognition is so important for my own account of the biopolitics 
of broadening national security and crowded places security because it enables me to 
consider the performativity – the ‘constitutive constraint’ – by which other ways of 
living are materialised beyond population and contingency (Butler, 1993: 15). 
 
 
3.3.1 The politics of ‘natural reality’ 
In the STP and BoB lectures in 1978 and 1979 respectively, Foucault develops 
his earlier concern with the ‘biological or biosociological processes’ to which he 
claimed biopolitics is variously directed (misleadingly as I have argued), by resolving 
them into a more unified imaginary of ‘natural reality’ or the ‘naturalness of the 
human species’ (STP: 41, 21). ‘It seems to me’, he explained in STP, ‘that this sudden 
emergence of the naturalness of the species within the political artifice of a power 
relation is something fundamental’ (p. 22). It is fundamental I would argue, because it 
points towards biopolitics as being not directed to the ‘natural processes’ of life as 
such (STP: 45), but instead as those performativities which materialise realities which 
are natural to a specific form of government. This form of government is no longer 
the crude capitalism of Foucault’s 1976 work, but is instead the ‘political-economic 
program’ of liberalism; and the realities natural to liberalism are no longer the 
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closed, constructed spaces of the disciplines, but instead the ‘open series’ and 
‘natural givens’ of security (STP: 40, 20, 18). So, whilst ‘baldly… we could say that 
sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory, discipline is exercised on 
the bodies of individuals, and security is exercised over a whole population’ - this 
does not ‘hold together’ (STP: 11). Instead, the materialisation of the political-
economic norms of liberalism - their effects of boundary, fixity, and surface as per 
Butler (1993: 9) – are better explained through performativities of circulation and 
uncertainty.  
First, then, what was at stake in political-economic government was ‘the 
question of the spatial, juridical, administrative, and economic opening up of the 
town’: ‘resituating the town in a space of circulation’ (STP: 12) (also Elden and 
Crampton, 2007). But the problem of ‘opening up’ is of course that it potentially 
opens up to or lets in everything. So in the example of the town, ‘connecting up th[e] 
network of streets to external roads in such a way that goods from outside can 
arrive or be dispatched’, also means that the ‘insecurity of the towns was increased 
by the influx of the floating population of beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, 
thieves, murderers, and so on’ (STP: 18). In BoB, Foucault explains that circulation 
was a ‘modern problem’ in that natural reality was imagined to be essentially ‘poly-
functional’: in other words, circulation had both positive and negative functions (p. 
13, 19). 
The sovereign thus becomes in addition to the ‘architect of the disciplined 
space’, the ‘regulator of a milieu’: involving ‘not so much establishing limits and 
frontiers, or fixing locations, as, above all and essentially, making possible, 
guaranteeing and ensuring circulations’ (STP: 29, emphasis added). In this way, the 
reality natural to political-economic government is paradoxical or even necessarily 
unstable because it simultaneously makes possible both good circulations – which it 
effects to maximise - and bad circulations – which it effects to minimise (STP: 30). As 
I discuss further in section 3.5, this instability can be clearly observed in the 
materialisation of neoliberal globalisation by broadening national security, which 
strives to maximise the opportunities of global, and mainly economic, 
interconnectedness, whilst constantly engaging with and seeking to remove the 
(security) ‘challenges’ arising from the same. 
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Second, because political-economic norms are concerned with opening up, 
Foucault explains that ‘the town is seen as developing: a number of things, events, and 
elements, will arrive or occur’ (STP: 19, emphasis added). This ‘involves organizing, 
or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits’: ‘an infinite series of 
mobile elements... an infinite series of events that will occur... an indefinite series of 
accumulating units’ (STP: 45, 20). So the performativity of circulation is also that of a 
particular kind of uncertainty: the integration of ‘possible future developments within 
a present plan’ (STP: 19). What then, Foucault asks, ‘must be done to meet [that is, 
secure] something that is not exactly known in advance?’ (STP: 19, emphasis added). 
To elaborate further on biopolitical performativities of uncertainty, Foucault 
gives the example of food scarcity. He describes how within the ‘new conception of 
the economy’, food scarcity was not denounced as an ‘evil’ event, unpredictable and 
devastating, which had to be stopped at all costs through legal controls on prices, 
storing, export, and cultivation (STP: 33-36). Instead, it was resituated as ‘a 
phenomenon that, in the first place, is natural, and so consequently… neither good 
nor evil, it is what it is’ (STP: 33-36, emphasis added). Situated within political-
economic rather than moral and/or supernatural discourses, unpredictable food 
scarcity was re-materialised as that which would cancel itself out naturally: ‘by 
connecting up with the very reality of these fluctuations [in the food supply] and by 
establishing a series of connections with other elements of reality’, Foucault 
explained, ‘the phenomenon is gradually compensated for, checked, finally limited, 
and in the final degree, cancelled out’ (STP: 37). Therefore by rejecting an 
understanding of food scarcity ‘in terms of morality’, biopolitical performativities 
materialise not the ‘obsessive fear of scarcity’ but the ‘reality of grain’ (STP: 36, 
emphasis added). Biopolitical performativities materialise not the closed, fixed space 
of the disciplines but the space of an event: specifically, a reality which is open, 
uncertain, and not known in advance. 
Such an open reality, Foucault continues, is therefore necessarily also 
‘centrifugal’ with the ‘constant tendency to expand’, in contrast to the reality natural 
to disciplinary norms which is centripetal to the extent that it isolates a space - 
concentrating, focusing, and enclosing (STP: 44-45). Into this space, ‘new elements 
are constantly being integrated: production, psychology, behavior, the ways of doing 
things of producers, buyers, consumers, importers, and exporters, and the world 
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market’ (STP: 45). As Graham Burchell puts it, ‘liberal governmentality carves out a 
space in which the natural processes of the population are designated as economic; 
namely market competition, enterprise and entrepreneurial spirit (1993: 274). An 
expanding, natural reality amounts to what Foucault describes as a ‘broadened 
analysis’ and ‘conception of market mechanisms’:  
 
First, [analysis] had to be broadened on the side of production... we must 
consider not only the market, but also the entire cycle from the initial actions 
of producers up to the final profit... Second, the analysis was broadened on the 
side of the market, for it is not just a matter of considering one market... the 
world grain market must be taken into account and connected with every 
market on which grain may be put on sale... So, the analysis must be broadened 
on the side of production and on the side of the market... [Third] the analysis 
must be broadened also on the side of the protagonists, inasmuch as instead of 
subjecting them to obligatory rules, we will try to identify, understand, and 
know how and why they act… that is to say that completely concrete element 
of the behaviour of homo oeconomicus must also be taken into account. In other 
words, it is an economics, or a political-economic analysis that integrates the 
moment of production, the world market, and, finally, the economic behaviour 
of the population, of producers and consumers (STP: 40, emphasis in original). 
 
Finally, the materialisation of an open, uncertain, and broadened reality natural 
to political-economic norms enables, and indeed is reiterated and enforced by, a self-
limiting form of government: 
 
... this fundamental principle, that political technique must never get away from 
the interplay of reality with itself is profoundly linked to the general principle 
of what is called liberalism. The game of liberalism – not interfering, allowing 
free movement, letting things follow their course; laisser-faire, passer et aller – 
basically and fundamentally means acting so that reality develops, goes its way, 
and follows its own course according to the laws, principles, and mechanisms 
of reality itself (BoB: 20).  
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Indeed, it is not difficult to apprehend how liberal tenets of laissez-faire government, 
independent civil society, and the invisible hand of the market were materialised 
alongside and reiterated by performativities of species life as self-governing and 
naturally occurring beyond human (and even divine) agency. 
As I outlined above, Foucault’s working out of the ‘space of security’ as the 
ever-wider circuits materialising reality natural to the regulatory norms of liberalism 
is absolutely central to my analysis in the rest of the thesis. First, much of what is 
termed ‘biopolitical security’ in security studies, based on Foucault’s late-1970s 
lectures, should be conceptualised as performativities of political-economic liberal 
norms. Specifically, biopolitics is the regulation and enforcement of that which is 
‘natural’ or ‘alive’ to liberal modes of governmentality as well as that which is 
considered to be ‘alive’ in the biological, vitalist sense. I am not ignoring Foucault’s 
arguments that the contiguous emergence of the life sciences and liberal 
governmentality point to how they depend on each for meaning (see for example 
HoS: 142). But I feel that much of the biopolitical security literature labours these 
links – either explicitly or, in the case of Dillon’s arguments about the ‘biopolitics of 
contingency’ (2007a: 8), implicitly - and neglects those of the ‘natural reality’ of 
liberalism. This thesis is aimed directly at this gap. After all, if biopolitical 
performativities were reiterated only within scientific discourses, with no impact 
upon governmental practices, they would not exercise such dominance over 
contemporary politics. 
In consequence, I suggest developing the concept of biopolitical security using 
Butler’s theory of performativity, and in this way shifting the emphasis from how 
biopolitics work - the securing of various biological and biosociological processes - to 
how biopolitics fix liberal norms. Liberal norms are fixed through a broad range of 
biopolitical performativities: multiplicity, population, the milieu, circulation and the 
uncertain. The reality natural to liberal norms is the space of security: a reality which 
is open, uncertain, and broadening. In this way, biopolitics do not regulate or even 
secure populations and circulations: instead, they materialise the space of security, 
and in this sense populations and circulations are already secured. This is not to claim 
that ways of living characterised by circulations and populations – including the 
neoliberal globalisation which is the object of broadening national security - do not 
exist without, or independent of, biopolitical performativities. Rather that they 
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cannot be materialised – given the effect of boundary, fixity, and matter - outside 
regulatory discourse. 
The implication of this argument is that what are commonly posited as 
biopolitical security mechanisms in the security studies literature – biometrics, etc. – 
are instead the attempt to bring the excess of human life – ‘bio’ - into line with these 
already-secured realities. Here I do not mean excess as any tangible or even 
intangible object – such as Dillon’s contingency of species life – rather excess is only 
that which operates beyond founding political-economic liberal imaginaries. It is 
something like the constitutive outside, the abject domain, of contemporary 
biopolitics. Essentially, these are not mechanisms situated within the ordinary 
workings of biopolitical discourses, they are practices at the very edge of political 
possibility, made necessary when biopolitics fails or goes wrong. Though it may be 
little consolation, the biopolitical practices of the war on terror, which have 
galvanised an entire counter-discourse in the academy, the media, and the general 
public, demonstrate not the apogee of power over life but its glitches – the failure of 
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3.4 Beyond biopolitical security? 
 
Having to take into account the autonomous nature of the thing to be 
governed biopolitics therefore seeks to govern through contingency since 
contingency is what characterises its very object of government, namely the life 
of species existence – Michael Dillon.52 
 
Taking up Foucault’s work on the relationship between biopolitics, liberal 
governmentality and security, Dillon argues that scholars have been slow to 
appreciate both the extent to which ‘liberal societies are themselves governed and 
seek to govern globally through… biopower’, and the ‘kinds of imperatives to which 
the biopower of biopolitics now orders the political rationalities and governmental 
technologies of the west’ (2007a: 8). In seeking to remedy these twin lacks, Dillon 
outlines a conceptual framework of what he variously terms ‘biopolitical security’ or 
the ‘biopolitics of security’, and which I will critique in this section (for a different 
critique of biopolitics of security vis-à-vis Karl Marx, see Aradau and Blanke, 2010). 
Dillon claims that for Foucault, security ‘did not mean a universal value, or 
condition of possibility for a political subject’, but instead ‘a certain set of 
mechanisms through which species life is regulated’ – in other words, biopolitics 
(2007a: 8). And biopolitics, he continued, is ‘itself governed by certain key analytical 
categories, foremost among which is contingency’ (Dillon, 2007a: 8). In other words, 
biopolitical security describes the mechanisms by which an irrevocably contingent 
species life is governed. 
In developing his biopolitical security approach ‘with Foucault beyond Foucault’, 
Dillon along with Luis Lobo-Guerrero, argues that from the twentieth century the 
‘generic referent object of biopower which is ‘life’’, has changed under ‘the twin 
pressures of the molecular and digital revolutions’ (2008: 66). So whereas in 1970’s 
The Order of Things Foucault discussed life, labour, and language as the quasi-
transcendentals of Man, and in his biopolitical lectures he elaborated the circulating 
and aleatory phenomena of ever-widening natural seria, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 
claim to ‘unpack and extend’ these quasi-transcendentals further so that 
contemporary life should be conceptualised as the ‘contingency that now unites 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 2007b: 46. 
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circulation, connectivity, and complexity’ (2009: 11, 1). Furthermore, this complex 
life is emergent. Whilst ‘complicated refers to closed systems of many elements’, they 
write, ‘complex refers to dynamic open systems’ characterised by ‘emergent 
properties, phase changes and nonlinear transformation and change’ (Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2009: 13). Although they concede that the ‘vocabulary of 
connectivity and complexity is not Foucault’s’, nonetheless they position it as being 
‘consistent with the operational dynamics and generative principles of formation that 
characterize the biopolitical imaginary of species-being that takes ‘life’ as its referent 
ontological and epistemic object of being’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009: 13).  
This approach to biopolitical security effectively splits Foucault’s ‘political-
economic program’ into on the one hand, ‘empiricities’ and objects such as 
population and open systems, and on the other, an ontological category of life – 
what they elsewhere refer to as ‘Being’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009). This 
latter move especially Foucault was always loath to carry out.53 In other words, 
Dillon re-imagines Foucault’s account of biopolitical security from the production of 
realities natural to political-economic government, to an ontological grid in which 
that which is natural is ‘life’, and that which is life is what it is before it becomes 
dangerous vis-à-vis biopolitical security mechanisms. In this way, Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero argue that living beings pose a problem for biopolitical security because 
biopower seeks their ‘fructification’ rather than ‘their simple protection’ (as per 
Foucault’s claims about the biopolitical optimisation of life), yet that fructification 
necessitates a sort of radical contingency or freedom of existence (2008: 271). ‘In 
order for living entities to fructify’, they claim, ‘they have to be allowed to do so. 
Their biological freedom to adapt and change is integral to securing their very 
existence and the realisation of its potentialities’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 
271). And it is this very freedom which means that ‘for contemporary biopolitics 
being tout court is becoming-dangerous’ (Dillon, 2007a: 17, emphasis in original). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 In the first lecture of STP, for example, Foucault explains that although his analysis of biopower 
relations ‘may, of course, open out onto or initiate something like the overall analysis of a society’, 
this was not his objective (p. 2). Rather than making truth claims about biopower, Foucault’s aim was 
a ‘politics of truth’; insofar, he claimed, ‘as what is involved in this analysis of mechanisms of power is 
the politics of truth, and not sociology, history, or economics, I see its role as that of showing the 
knowledge effects produced by the struggles, confrontations, and battles that take place within our 
society’ (STP: 3, emphasis added). There, is, then a significant problem with analyses like Dillon’s 
which draw directly on Foucault’s work in order to explicitly produce more truth claims. 
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Two important concerns emerge from this biopolitical security literature. First, 
in effect its arguments lead back to an account of (bio)power as repressive – another 
move which Foucault explicitly rejected. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero’s claim that 
biopolitical security is directed to the ‘fructification’ of species life cannot disguise 
that what they are positing is the repression – the making dangerous – of some kind 
of pure, or at least pre-existing, life/Being. The need to move beyond this limited 
appraisal of a ‘repressive biopolitics’ becomes particularly apparent when, in chapter 
5, I discuss the norms of biopolitical security and control performed by counter-
terrorism in the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art. BALTIC is a space devoted 
to the pleasures of life such as leisure, culture, eating, drinking, and shopping, and 
biopolitical control mechanisms play their part in making these pleasures possible. 
But until the concept of biopolitical security is developed so as to distinguish 
between on the one hand, the making possible of certain ways of living, and on the 
other hand, a more or less crudely imagined constraint upon ways of living, it will fall 
short of the task of contesting contemporary security practices.  
The theory of performativity provides such a useful intervention into this debate 
because it moves the focus away from how regulatory norms repress something – 
which, as the above demonstrates, is an easy trap to fall into no matter how 
committed a Foucauldian one is - to how a constrained something is materialised and 
given the appearance of ‘fixity’ through repetition and reiteration. In other words, 
performativity is absolutely committed to contesting repressive norms; but it 
emphasises, like Foucault, that that repression is only visible in its effects, in those 
subjects and spaces which are its materialisation, and not in a repressive-type 
relationship with pre-existing ‘preferred’ targets. In this way, the objective of 
biopolitical critique should not be on trying to work out how we are secured 
through our biological features or our Being - because neither of these can be 
known independently of their iteration within regulatory discourses. This is not to 
say that biological processes and even a core essence of ‘life’ do not, or could not, 
‘exist’; only that their meaning and their materialisation cannot be accessed outside 
discourse. In this way, biopolitical security mechanisms do not ‘intervene’ at the level 
of population, circulation, and so on, because, as materialisations of regulatory 
discourse, population and circulation are already ‘secured’.  
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The second concern that emerges from the biopolitical security literature 
regards the important political implications which attend the unreflexive use of 
analytical abstractions, whether they are those of a ‘global war script’ as per Simon 
Dalby in the previous chapter, or those of ‘emergent life’ or ‘fructifying living entities’ 
as per Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero. Referring precisely to the account of life given in 
the biopolitical security literature, Jenny Edkins (2008) problematises this notion of 
the biopolitical ‘state of emergency’ that is assumed to arise when ‘life is conceived 
as always emergent, always becoming, and hence always dangerous’ (p. 221). She 
equates it with the ‘form of life that liberal governance sees… a purely bare 
biological life of emergence’, so that the ‘goal of life, envisaged in this way, is nothing 
but the endless circulation of and reproduction of life’ (Edkins, 2008: 221). 
In other words, to what extent do academic accounts of the question of 
‘emergent life’ contribute to – or at least reiterate in a performative sense – the 
instrumentalisation of life that Edkins argues was so brutally set in motion by the 
authorities in the aftermath of the London bombings in July 2005? ‘There is no room 
in this vision’ of biopolitics, she writes, ‘for the person or for responsibility’ (Edkins, 
2008: 221). Marieke de Goede (2005) discusses a similar blind spot in some critiques 
of late modern capitalism. The ‘emphasis on the depersonalizing effects of money on 
social relations’, she writes, ‘obscures the fact that modern monetary instruments 
are equally dependent on social networks and geographical nodal points of authority’ 
(de Goede, 2005: xxiii). The account of biopolitical security that I develop in the rest 
of the thesis attempts to ‘fold back in’ these neglected facets: people, social and 
government responsibility, and, of course, the politicised spaces in which security 
practices are made possible and, indeed, ‘authorised’. I begin in the next section by 
reviewing the work already done by Foucault and others in the direction of the 
‘human’ and ‘cultural’ realities natural to biopolitics. 
 
 
3.4.1 Securing a human and cultural reality? 
 
The emphasis in the biopolitical security literature on what Edkins terms the 
‘purely bare biological life of emergence’, becomes even more problematic given its 
neglect even of all of Foucault’s published work on the subject. I do not mean to 
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suggest that writing on one aspect of Foucault’s work cannot be regarded valid 
unless all of his work is taken into consideration – perhaps it is better articulated as 
a question of what claims can be made. In Dillon’s case, these are totalising claims 
about what Foucault’s biopolitics is, and what therefore it cannot be. For example, he 
writes: 
 
How biopolitics operates is also simply put, and it is as well to put it now. 
Biopolitics is a dispositif de sécurité that secures – that is to say regulates, 
strategizes, and seeks to manipulate the circulation of species life – by 
instantiating a general economy of the contingent throughout all the processes 
of re-productive circulation that impinge upon species existence as such 
(Dillon, 2007a: 9, emphasis added). 
 
As I have argued above, ‘re-productive circulation’ does not ‘impinge’ on species life 
as such. Rather what can be known of species life, including the ways in which it can 
be considered circulating, is known through regulatory discourse. 
So to Dillon’s claim that biopolitics is the security of the circulation of species 
life, I would counter that Foucault’s work after 1979 (and, as I illustrate, before this 
year too), which is so often dismissed as the ‘ethics of the subject’ or ‘technologies 
of the self’ and considered peripheral, at best, to political questions, instead points to 
his own further thoughts on how modern forms of power act on the individual. In 
performativity terms, this work develops Foucault’s ideas on how contemporary 
subjects are materialised through the reiteration of biopolitical discourses. 
First, I would like to consider population, considered by the extant literature – 
and most certainly by Dillon - as the ‘ideal’ biopolitical performativity. In the latter 
parts of STP, Foucault begins to talk about the population as a ‘political personage’ 
(p. 67). Previous to the 1600s, he explained, the behaviour of the population was 
understood vis-à-vis ‘epidemic, war, or food shortage’ – in other words, ‘one of 
these great dramatic moments in which people died with a spectacular rapidity and 
intensity’ (STP: 67). In the 1600s, mercantilists imagined the behaviour of the 
population in relation to ‘the strength of the state and sovereign’: the population was 
the ‘source and the root’ of the state’s power and wealth if it could be made to 
‘work properly, in the right place, and on the right objects’ (STP: 69; also Gordon, 
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1991: 10). With the emergence of liberal political economy in the 1700s, however, 
the behaviour of the population began to be imagined differently. As I discussed 
above, political economy was primarily addressed to a natural reality, which 
encompassed but was not limited to a biological life - accordingly, population was 
‘considered as a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what 
is natural in these processes’ (STP: 70).  
This is an interesting point in Foucault’s analysis. Previously he described the 
naturalness of the population in socio-biological terms (birth and death rates, and so 
on), but here for the first time he seems to split it up into first, the socio-biological 
concept of the population as a regulable milieu, and second, as ‘different kinds of 
conduct’ (STP: 71). The natural reality of the population is therefore not the 
biological bare life it offers up to power, but instead its ‘transparency’ (STP: 27). That 
is, ‘if one says to a population ‘do this’, there is not only no guarantee that it will do 
it, but also there is quite simply no guarantee that it can do it’ (STP: 72). The 
naturalness of population can only be intervened in through ‘a range of factors and 
elements that seem far removed from the population itself and its immediate 
behaviour, fecundity and desire to reproduce’ (STP: 72). 
Foucault continues that one of the first of these elements through which the 
naturalness of the population could be penetrated was ‘desire’. Within this imaginary 
of natural reality, ‘every individual acts out of desire. One can do nothing about 
desire’ (STP: 72). But if the desire of the individual is given ‘free play’ it will - by what 
Foucault describes as ‘arbitary’ but what I would describe as an imaginative process  
- ‘produce the general interest of the population’ (STP: 72). Finally, then, ‘from one 
direction... population is the human species, and from another it is what will be 
called the public’: 
 
The public... is the population seen under the aspect of its opinions, ways of 
doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements; 
it is what one gets a hold on through education, campaigns and convictions 
(STP: 75).       
 
This brief discussion illustrates that in STP Foucault was already beginning to 
move towards a more ‘embodied’, or at least more humanised, reading of biopolitics 
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than he had heretofore offered, so that despite its grandiose claims, Dillon’s work on 
biopolitical security is far from capturing the essence of a Foucauldian biopolitics, 
even within the pages of STP. In my view, Dillon’s ‘de-humanised’ reading of life as 
emergence is still indebted to the ‘biopolitics as biology’ reading that was so 
prominent in Foucault’s 1976 work and in much of the secondary literature.   
There is, then, a counter-proposition that it was precisely Foucault’s attempt to 
develop his biopolitics schema – and by develop I mean to consider its ‘effects in the 
real’ – that led to his focus after 1979 on the ethics of the modern subject through 
the problem space of sexuality. This proposition finds support both from Foucault 
scholars and Foucault himself. Michel Senellart in his essay on the context of the STP 
course commented that: 
 
… the question of bio-power… is inseparable from the work on the history of 
sexuality pursued concurrently with the courses [STP and BoB]. In 1976 he 
[Foucault] asserted that sexuality ‘exists at the point where body and 
population meet’. From 1978, and throughout the development that results in 
The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self in 1984, it will take on a new 
meaning, no longer representing only the point of articulation of disciplinary 
mechanisms and regulatory apparatuses (dispositifs), but the main theme of an 
ethical reflection focused on techniques of the self. A level of analysis is 
brought to life that was no doubt absent from the earlier works, but the 
contours of which are outlined from 1978 in the problematic of 
governmentality (STP: 370-1).  
 
So if, as Merquior (1985) claims, sexuality was the ‘chief subject matter of a 
generalized thrust of truth about the individual’, with sex as the ‘epitome of this soul 
searching individuality’ (p. 121), is it and not security (nor the camp as Agamben 
would have it) the biopolitical exemplar? Sexuality had, after all, been present in the 
biopolitics literature from the beginning - in 1976’s HoS – and it thus both precedes 
and succeeds the relatively brief sojourn into security. And more than that, does it 
matter? In HoS, Foucault wrote: 
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By creating the imaginary element that is ‘sex’, the deployment of sexuality 
established one of its most essential internal operating principles: the desire for 
sex – the desire to have it, to have access to it, to discover it, to liberate it, to 
articulate it in discourse, to formulate it in truth. It constituted ‘sex’ as 
something desirable. And it is this desirability of sex that attaches each one of 
us to the injunction to know it, to reveal its law and power; it is this 
desirability that makes us think we are affirming the rights of our sex against all 
power, when in fact we are fastened to the deployment of sexuality that has 
lifted up from deep wthin us a sort of mirage in which we think we see 
ourselves reflected – the dark shimmer of sex (p. 157). 
 
Does it change that much if we substitute ‘sexuality’ for security? 
Whilst these arguments have yet to be taken up, there is a nascent body of 
literature which approaches biopolitical security through its ‘cultural strategies’. In 
his critique of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, Derek Gregory (2010: 68-9) 
identifies a ‘cultural turn’ or ‘new cultural awareness’ in American military 
imaginaries. Perhaps this cultural turn is a result of the extreme detachment which 
characterises ‘late modern war’: the global cartographies and ‘war scripts’ in which 
war is global but at the same time violence happens somewhere else; the visual 
economies by which ‘the space of the enemy’ is performed as ‘an abstract space on a 
display screen’ (Gregory, 2010: 69-70). Gregory gives the example of the ‘Shock and 
Awe’ bombardment of Baghdad in March and April 2003, which ‘at once de-
materialized (‘targets’, ‘the capital’) and de-linked (‘buildings’, ‘bunkers’)’ (2010: 70). 
‘We are’, he continues, ‘invited to contemplate such scenes not only from a safe 
distance and without human presence... but also without any sense of the very 
interconnectedness of life that is being sundered’ (Gregory, 2010: 70, emphasis added). 
Nor can America’s military imaginaries in Iraq and their ‘discourse of object-ness’ be 
separated from neoliberal globalization, and vice versa: in the military imaginary of 
‘culture-centric warfare’, Gregory claims, ‘the economic and political march in 
lockstep’ (2010: 70, 66. 68). 
Gregory goes on to describe how various US military officials involved in the 
occupation of Iraq came to focus on the acquisition of ‘cultural knowledge’ to 
enhance their ability to meet ‘the ‘basic social and political needs’ of the population’; 
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thereby reducing, so the argument goes, ‘domestic’ support for the ‘insurgents’ 
(2010: 73). This cultural knowledge was then processed, packaged, and passed on to 
soldiers at training bases in the US through, for example, virtual simulations which 
staged military operations ‘in the places of everyday life, not in an abstracted 
battlespace, but in homes, neighbourhoods and clinics’ (Gregory, 2010: 80). 
Furthermore, these simulations foregrounded interpersonal transactions: gaining the 
trust of the local population was the condition of the soldier’s success (in this virtual 
simulation, at least) (Gregory, 2010: 80). 
According to Gregory, these simulations ‘mimic the closeness and intimacy that 
is the fulcrum of the cultural turn’, but it is a ‘presumptive’ and ‘transactional 
intimacy’ which he argues may claim ‘familiarity, understanding, and even empathy’ 
but is nonetheless ‘conditional [and] forcefully imposed’ (2010: 83, 76). These virtual 
worlds register military violence as a sort of present absence: it makes the scenarios 
possible and necessary, but yet it is scripted firmly in the background (Gregory, 
2010: 80). He concludes that the cultural turn in fact reiterates and reproduces 
cultural difference:  
 
... the attempt to hold the Other at a distance while claiming to cross the 
interpretative divide produces a diagram in which violence has its origins in 
‘their’ space, which the cultural turn endlessly partitions through its obsessive 
preoccupation with ethno-sectarian division, while the impulse to understand is 
confined to ‘our’ space, which is constructed as open, unitary, and generous: 
the source of a hermeneutic invitation that can never be reciprocated 
(Gregory, 2010: 82). 
 
The security practices identified by Gregory perform a forced intimacy between that 
which is imagined to be benign and that which is imagined to be malignant, which 
nonetheless runs alongside a permanent estrangement. In this way, they mirror the 
practices of the biometric border identified by Amoore which juxtapose an intrusive, 
physical, even biological intimacy with a detached and ‘business-like’ deference 
towards frequent flyers (2006, also Amoore and Hall, 2010).  
David Campbell (2007b: 129) also discerns biopolitical performativities in 
attempts in the US since 2001 to make ‘a causal connection between individual 
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behaviour and international danger’. For example, the Bush administration’s linking of 
individual drug use to support for terrorism abroad, and, in retaliation, the Detroit 
Project’s attempts to link petrol consumption by SUVs to ‘the international threat of 
the moment’ through increased revenues for Middle Eastern states which (are 
considered to) assist Islamist extremists (Campbell, 2007b: 130). Campbell goes on 
to point out that foreign military interventions in order to secure flows of petrol to 
the US, and the marginalisation (and worse) of the indigenous people that get in the 
way, are done in the name of securing ‘the American way of life’ (2007b: 131). For 
Campbell, the connections between the cultural, social, and political foregrounded 
by the SUV controversy are more usefully conceptualised as ‘a cultural politics of 
desire’ (2007b: 132), which is, as both Foucault (in the previous section) and Hardt 
and Negri tell us, a biopolitical strategy: 
 
In the postmodernization of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends 
ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of 
social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly 
overlap and invest one another (cited in Campbell, 2007b: 134, emphasis added). 
 
These arguments represent, I think, the starting point for understanding the 
performative securing of natural reality beyond biological and/or the ontological 
category of barest life, and within so-called cultural, popular, and commercial 
domains. 
The importance of the arguments in this section is not to suggest a new ‘gold 
standard’ understanding of biopolitics whereby biology is replaced by political-
economy, which is replaced by contingency and emergence, which is replaced by 
culture and the ethics of the subject. Although the latter in particular is an important 
and necessary future direction for work on Foucault’s biopolitics, it is a furrow 
which remains largely unploughed. Rather, I want to suggest only that other readings 
of biopolitical security are possible and important if scholars are to understand 
contemporary materialisations of power as security practices. Such readings do not 
have even to rigidly stick to the terminology used in this section -  sexuality, ethics, 
culture - as the literature has in the past tended to cling to Foucault’s (few) quotable 
comments on ‘security’. But at the least it must acknowledge that both biology and 
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emergence are limited for understanding contemporary security practices. Support 
for my argument is not far away – in the next section I discuss how the broadening 
of national security performed by the NSS casually defeats both geopolitical and 
biopolitical security frameworks as they currently stand. 
Indeed, it is important for security scholars not to be naïve here, or, for that 
matter, cautious and unsure in their choice of research object. Broadening national 
security and crowded places security at the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art 
both demonstrate that performativities of national security are necessarily 
intertwined with those of the ‘public’ – their opinions, expectations, behaviour and 
attitudes – and of culture.54 This is not a novel argument. Dillon (1996: 16), for 
example, describes security as a ‘radically inter-textual signifier’ floating through the 
‘defining technologically inspired discourses of Modernity: state security; national 
security… economic security; financial security; individual security; collective 
security; personal security; physical security’, and so on. Then in the succeeding two 
chapters I explore alternative conceptions of biopolitics through the analysis of 















 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Not to mention sport, as evidenced by the centrality of the London 2012 Olympics to broadening 
national security (see NSS 2009: 45). The relationship between politics, security and sport is the 
subject of a wide literature (see for example Bairner, 2011; and Whannel, 2008). 
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3.5 Biopolitical performativities in the NSS 
 
In this final part of the chapter I will draw out the ways in which the policies and 
practices of broadening national security materialise ‘realities’ which are ‘natural’ to 
neoliberal discourses, and – equally importantly - how those realities are violently 
enforced under the rubric of the war on terror. First, I look at the stated objective 
of broadening national security to protect a British ‘way of life’, imagined as 
economic and social ‘traditions of openness’, and in particular, open flows of energy, 
information, resources and capital - in other words, the project of neoliberal 
globalisation (NSS 2009: 37). I then discuss how broadening national security 
‘responds’ to two particular issues: first, the ‘emerging national security challenge’ of 
cyber space; and second, the remaking of an old threat, terrorism, as the insecurity 
of ‘public opinion, culture and information’ (NSS 2009: 40, 105). My objective here is 
progressively to illustrate that practices of broadening national security strive to 




3.5.1 ‘Traditions of openness’ 
 
Broadening national security sets out the ‘positions and interests’ of the UK ‘as a 
free market economy, with a tradition of openness’ (NSS 2009: 37). The UK is 
‘relatively densely populated’ but has ‘limited domestic food and energy resources’; 
thus it relies on its economic links with other states to import primary and 
manufactured products; export services and high value-added manufactured 
products; and for ‘substantial foreign investment in our infrastructure and economy’ 
(NSS 2009: 37). Given ‘the openness of our economy and our dependence on trade 
from around the world, and flows of energy, information, resources and capital, we 
need to be able to ensure that these flows are open and secure’ (2009: 38, emphasis 
added).  
The UK’s open economy and dependence on ‘open and secure’ flows is 
reinscribed by the UK’s ‘open’ social characteristics. The ‘core British values’, the 
NSS claims, are ‘fair play, human rights, openness, individual liberty, accountable 
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Government and the rule of law’ (2009: 3, emphasis added). The UK is also variously 
described as ‘an open, pluralist democracy based on the rule of law’; as having ‘a 
tradition of open debate supported by a lively free press’; and as ‘a very open and 
diverse society with numerous diaspora communities’ (NSS 2009: 7, 38, 77, emphasis 
added). 
Furthermore, the UK’s current identity as ‘a highly ‘globalised’ nation’, reflects 
‘our long history as an open, outward facing, trading nation and a hub of global activity’ 
(NSS 2009: 49, emphasis added). This ‘long history’ includes, the NSS claims, the 
willingness of ‘our people’ to support ‘overseas intervention and/or the use of 
military force… given our history in past centuries’ (2009: 37, emphasis added). Of 
course, the issue not being addressed here is precisely the role of violence in the 
long history which has shaped the UK’s present as an ‘open nation’ (NSS 2009: 49) 
(see for example, Gregory, 2004, and Kearns, 2009, on the legacy of violent 
imperialist geographies in the Arab world and Ireland). The NSS does all but admit 
that ‘openness’ goes hand-in-hand with military force.   
Performing ‘traditions of openness’ is an attempt to naturalise broadening 
national security, by, in a sense, losing it in history - much like with the constant 
citation of the end of the cold war and the dawn of a new international order which 
I discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, the latter also makes an appearance in 
the UK’s traditions of openness: the removal of the Soviet threat in 1989 cleared the 
way for the ‘liberal market-oriented vision of a free society championed by the UK 
and our key allies’ (NSS 2009: 5). And the ‘triumph’ of the liberal vision has been 
accompanied by ‘a drive towards the opening up of trade and travel routes’, with all 
the benefits that follow: ‘wider choices of goods and services’, and ‘considerable 
increases in capital flows and trade opportunities’ at home, and increased 
productivity and ‘millions lifted out of poverty’ abroad (NSS 2009: 19, 5). 
There is no doubt that performativities of ‘traditions of openness’ cite 
discourses of liberal government, and they can be linked to similar projects: for 
example, the ‘democratic peace theory’ – that no liberal democratic state has ever 
gone or will ever go to war with another liberal democratic state (see Russett and 
Oneal, 2001) - and a liberal ‘end of history’55 global order where states co-exist in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This phrase was made famous by Francis Fukuyama in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last 
Man; in which he argued that contemporary western liberal democracy signals both the endpoint and 
the highpoint of social evolution. Although Fukuyama’s thesis has been largely rejected as the 
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prosperous, and thus peaceful, tranquility. For example, the NSS discusses its 
commitment to ‘internationalism’: ‘in an increasingly globalised world, the UK’s 
security and prosperity are dependent on international stability’ (NSS 2009: 106). 
Actions that threaten international stability are those which are ‘isolationist’: ‘one 
country may be tempted to take damaging action in its own interests… [which] may 
only have limited impact but it might then provoke a similar response by other 
states’ (NSS 2009: 106-7). The example that is given is - unsurprisingly given the 
earlier reiteration of the financial crisis as a national security threat - of economic 
isolationism. ‘In the economic context’, the NSS explains, ‘this risk [of isolationism] 
can be seen in the… temptation to impose restrictive trade measures for the benefit 
of a particular country’, and ‘more generally, it can be seen in the potential for states 
to use energy supplies or other economic levers as hostile policy tools’ (NSS 2009: 
107). 
What is missing of course from this account of damaging isolationist behaviour is 
that its meaning is materialised within neoliberal discourses – what the NSS earlier 
described in typical ‘newspeak’56 as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (2009: 19, emphasis 
added). But as Dillon and Reid point out, such claims conveniently ignore what they 
term the ‘liberal way of war’, which is so often used to enforce the failure of 
biopolitical performativities. That is, the ways in which ‘war has always been as 
instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical  thinkers’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 7). For in 
the attempt of liberal democracies ‘to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in 
pursuit of its own global project of emancipation’, they claim that ‘the practice of 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
simplicity and speciousness of its claims became progressively harder to ignore through the 1990s and 
2000s, the belief that western liberal democracy is both unrivalled and desirable remains powerful, 
especially but not surprisingly in government documents like the NSS.   
56 ‘Newspeak’ is the official language of the fictional ideology of ‘Ingsoc’ or English Socialism in George 
Orwell’s novel 1984. ‘The purpose of Newspeak’, Orwell wrote, ‘was not only to provide a medium 
of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all 
other modes of thought impossible… Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact and often 
very subtle expression to every meaning that a Party member could properly wish to express, while 
excluding all other meanings and also the possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods’ (2009: 
1176). 
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3.5.2 Cyber space 
 
But there is something other than just the reiteration of liberal internationalism 
in the NSS’s identification of how openess can, at the same time as boosting the 
UK’s economy and ‘maximis[ing] welfare for all countries’, also challenge and 
undermine that same security. The most obvious elements of this challenge relate to 
the perception of how easily flows can be exploited to cause harm, amply illustrated 
by the materialisation of cyber technologies as a security issue - so much so that 
‘cyber security’ is a major theme of the NSS, as well as the subject of its own 
separate Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom (CSS).57 While cyber space is 
described by the NSS as the ‘most important new domain of national security of 
recent years’ (2009: 13, emphasis added), Miriam Dunn Cavelty (2010), writing in the 
American context, traces the emergence of so-called ‘cyber security’ back to the 
1980s. She cites the increasing take up of home computers during the decade, as 
well as the development of ‘cyber-counter-culture’ (the proverbial loner hacking into 
government computer systems), and rising incidents of cyber-crime, related, but not 
exclusive to, foreign espionage. All of which account for, she claims, the first links 
between cyber space and national security. 
The way in which cyber space has become such an important focus of UK 
national security – despite not being ‘new’ as such - can be explained, I would argue, 
by conceptualising it precisely as a reality natural to neoliberal discourses – and 
moreover the failure of its imaginaries. This is not to claim either that if there were 
no NSS, no CSS, no national security regime, that individuals (or organisations) 
would not use cyber technologies to inflict damage, but instead to argue that the 
materialisation of these cyber technologies as a threat which makes possible an 
entire range of security practices - including a new Office of Cyber Security58 - must 
be understood through regulatory discourses, including those of neoliberalism.  
It is also interesting and important to note that the most important early 
advances in cyber technologies – especially relating to personal computing and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Cabinet Office (2009) Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom [Online]. Available at 
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm76/7642/7642.pdf (Accessed 9 September 2011). 
58 The Office of Cyber Security was set up in 2009. It is based in Cheltenham but comes under the 
remit of the Cabinet Office. For further information see the Cabinet Office webpage, available at 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/office-cyber-security-and-information-assurance-ocsia 
(Accessed 10 September 2011). 
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electronic networking - were inspired by the ‘Californian Ideology’, whereby the 
openness and accessibility of cyber space was held to represent an ‘electronic direct 
democracy, in which everyone would be able to express their opinions without fear 
of censorship’ (Dunn Cavelty, 2010: 159). According to Dunn Cavelty, however, the 
end of the cold war and the loss of ‘biopolar balance’ raised the spectre that cyber 
space, despite its ability to give states an ‘information edge’ (including a Revolution in 
Military Affairs), would be used by ‘malicious actors’ to gain assymetric advantage. It 
was feared that ‘those likely to fail against the American war machine might instead 
plan to bring the USA to its knees by striking vital points at home: critical 
infrastructures’ (Dunn Cavelty, 2010: 159). In other words, the openness and 
accessibility that had been so attractive about the information revolution – its ability 
to exceed existing realities and governmentalities - had become a source of 
vulnerability and danger.  
The CSS and NSS give insights into the paradoxical advantages and disadvantages 
of cyber flows, which as I argue above characterise the materialisation of biopolitical 
norms. For example, ninety per cent of high street purchases are transacted using 
wired and wireless communication; global trade relies on the ‘real-time nature of 
cyber space’ to co-ordinate complex, round-the-clock supply chains across different 
time zones; and critical national infrastructures such as utilities, food distribution, 
transport, the health service, and the financial system all rely on the internet.59 But 
whilst ‘interdependent, open and networked societies benefit greatly from the 
strengths and resilience that arise from information sharing, co-operation and 
efficiency’ - hence the government’s support for and protection of cyber space - ‘it is 
also the case that such societies present unique opportunities for people to cause 
harm’ (NSS 2009: 77). Elsewhere the NSS claims that the new cyber security regime: 
 
… gives priority to ensuring that our people’s ability to do business, 
communicate, learn, and interact socially through the internet and other 
networked activities are secure, and that the risks inherent in our dependence 
on networks for the critical infrastructure that underpins all our lives are 
managed (2009: 30). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Cabinet Office (2009) Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom [Online]. Available at 
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm76/7642/7642.pdf (Accessed 9 September 2011). 
	   142	  
For example, ‘hostile states, terrorists, and criminals, can all potentially use cyber 
space to undermine our interests’ (NSS 2009: 3). This exploitation of cyber flows in 
order to undermine the UK’s interests and cause harm can happen at the national 
level, through attacks on critical national infrastructures, as well as at the level of 
businessnes and individuals (NSS 2009: 3). In this way, initiatives like the Office of 
Cyber Security, which provides ‘strategic direction’ and ‘coordinates action’ on 
cyber security on behalf of government, ‘international partners’ and ‘private sector 
partners’, must be understood precisely as a policy response licensed and made 
possible by broadening national security. 60   
 
 
3.5.3 Re-making the terrorist threat - Symbiosis and ‘Public opinion, culture and 
information’ as a threat domain 
 
As everyone in this House knows, to succeed, those [counter-terror] 
measures will require not just military and security resources but more 
policing and intelligence, and an enhanced effort to win hearts and minds – 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown, 2007.61 
Whilst the NSS can perhaps reasonably claim cyber space as a ‘new’ domain of 
national security, the same cannot be said of terrorism and insurgency. Yet a key 
part of the rematerialisation of terrorism within broadening national security takes 
place through performativities of interconnected open flows vis-à-vis the phenomena 
of violent insurgency. The NSS claims that ‘insurgencies in the last century were 
largely fought within the boundaries of single states (though not devoid of outside 
influence), and were rarely, if ever, linked to wider acts of terrorism’ (2009: 81). 
‘Today’, it continues, ‘globalisation and the increasing dependence of societies on 
international financial information and communication networks ensure that 
grievances and agendas can pay little heed to geographical boundaries’ (NSS 2009: 
81). As a result, terrorism and insurgency are ‘woven together’ through the 
‘networked migration of ideas’, and the ‘unprecedented’ transfer of ‘money, tactics, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See Cabinet Office webpage, available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/office-cyber-
security-and-information-assurance-ocsia (Accessed 10 September 2011). 
61 BBC News Online (2007) ‘In full: Brown anti-terror speech’, 14 November 2007. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7094620.stm (Accessed 10 September 2011).   
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and personnel’, so that ‘what began in Iraq as an insurgency’ (and not an invasion by 
coalition forces in 2003) ‘became a theatre in which Al Qa’ida sought to attack not 
only the Coalition but Iraqi forces and civilians too’ (NSS 2009: 81, emphasis added). 
What is therefore referred to as the ‘symbiotic nature’ of terrorism and 
insurgency through flows of money, tactics, personnel, and ideas, licenses the ‘design 
of mutually supporting counter insurgency and counter terrorism strategies’ (NSS 
2009: 81). The ‘core’ of these strategies aims ‘to resolve local issues and negate the 
grievances that feed terrorism’ (NSS 2009: 81). Gregory (2010) describes precisely 
such an approach being used by the US military strategy in Iraq. In 2007 David 
Kilcullen, Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to David Petraeus, then Commanding 
Officer of the multi-national force, argued that ‘insurgent violence was part of ‘an 
integrated politico-military strategy’ that could only be met by an integrated politico-
military counter-strategy’ (Gregory, 2010: 75). This ‘integrated politico-military 
strategy’ is an old one - better known as ‘winning hearts and minds’. It emerged in 
the 1950s and 1960s in the context of ‘colonial’ wars in Vietnam, Ireland, and what 
was then Malaya (now Malaysia) to name a few, as a specific response to the 
difficulties encountered by military forces in separating out the ‘insurgents’ from the 
presumably peaceful local population, in order to defeat the former ‘on the 
battlefield’ (Mumford, 2011). The NSS, however, resignifies hearts and minds for the 
‘information age’:  
 
Almost every aspect of national security has an important information 
dimension. In the information age, the world is increasingly interconnected and 
information is instantaneous. The sphere of public opinion, culture and 
information is therefore an important domain in its own right. This has long 
been recognised in both the military and diplomatic arenas [and] the 
Government is adapting and extending this approach (NSS 2009: 14, emphasis 
added).  
 
The policy responses licensed by winning hearts and minds for the ‘information 
age’ begin with the designation of ‘Public opinion, culture, and information’ (Poci) as 
a threat domain. The concept of the ‘threat domain’ is distinct both from ‘drivers of 
insecurity’ - which as I discussed in the previous chapter emerged as a performativity 
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of neoliberal geopolitics after the end of the cold war - and the more traditional 
category of ‘threat actors’ (human or natural, state or non-state) (NSS 2009: 8-15). 
In this way, broadening national security is also performed through what the NSS 
terms ‘a key development’ in national security policy: the designation of ‘domains in 
which threats can become apparent’, and ‘the environments in which threats may 
become manifest’ (2009: 12, 32, emphasis added). It is not immediately clear, then, 
what a threat domain is, beyond an umbrella term covering unknown threats about 
which the only thing known is that they will become apparent and manifest, and they 
must be dealt with. And this, I would argue is precisely the point: ‘in the modern age, 
these domains are evolving rapidly and so our response, as elsewhere, needs to be 
effective, fast, coordinated and adaptable’ (NSS 2009: 11, emphasis added). The 
concept of the ‘threat domain’ therefore reiterates both the habitual theme of ‘a 
changing world’, and the particular ‘pre-emptive’ policy response demonstrated by 
for example horizon scanning. 
The NSS describes three different types of threat domain, of which two are 
familiar. First, the ‘hostile and destructive capabilities’ of conventional weapons, 
including small arms and cluster munitions, and weapons of mass destruction known 
by the ‘CBRN’ label – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (NSS 
2009: 93). Second, ‘physical and technological domains’, including land and maritime 
environments, the air, and ‘emergent, technology driven domains like space and 
cyber space’ (NSS 2009: 93). The third threat domain, however, so-called ‘domains 
of influence’, are notably different because they are ‘areas of human activity which 
are of fundamental importance to global stability’ (NSS 2009: 104, emphasis added). 
In particular, the NSS identifies ‘Public opinion, culture and information’ (Poci) as a 
threat domain as a means of assessing how the ‘information dimension’ of 
globalisation relates to national security, how ‘debates around the globe… affect the 
attitudes of people’, and ‘what drives the behaviour of individuals, groups and nations’ 
(2009: 104-5, emphasis added). 
It is the case that the importance to national security of people’s attitudes and 
behaviour has ‘long been recognised in both the military and diplomatic arenas’ (NSS 
2009: 14). The NSS makes explicit these links in relation to the longstanding reliance 
of military campaigns on the ‘support of public opinion’ and the ‘support of the 
people amongst whom they are carried out’ (2009: 105). So, for example, in the 
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counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations that the UK Armed Forces are most 
likely to be involved in abroad, success ‘will depend less on battlefield success and 
more on shaping behaviours and gaining support for political change’ (NSS 2009: 42-3, 
emphasis added). In terms of international diplomacy, the NSS explains that ‘we 
continue to promote our values of freedom, tolerance, justice and human rights’ 
through international outreach programmes such as the British Council (2009: 14). 
Regarding terrorism, broadening national security ‘seeks to challenge the ideology 
that drives Al Qa’ida inspired violent extremism’ (NSS 2009: 78). ‘We can challenge’, 
it continues, ‘Al Qa’ida’s distorted interpretation of Islam, exposing its inaccuracies 
and shortcomings in order to reduce the support and motivation which Al Qa’ida 
and associated groups rely on’ (NSS 2009: 78). 
But because of the impossibility of separating the flows used by terrorists and 
insurgent groups from those used by the good, interdependent and networked 
societies, and the good interacting peoples of the world, violent ideology must be 
challenged ‘at home’ too. In this way, broadening national security easily segues into 
countering terrorism under the CONTEST rubric: preventing people from becoming 
terrorists or supporting violent extremism; challenging Al Qa’ida’s ideology; and 
addressing perceived grievances against western society (NSS 2009: 105). In this way, 
it should become clear that the CONTEST policies, including crowded places 
security, are part of the ‘military arena’, and that the reliance of military campaigns 
on public opinion includes that within the UK. ‘In our own communications we 
recognise the need to engage with the public on the counter-terrorism agenda; 
publishing the full CONTEST strategy this year was a key step in this direction (NSS 
2009: 105). 62 
Finally, the NSS also ‘recognises’ the importance to national security of ‘wider 
community cohesion’ vis-à-vis the information domain: or in other words, the 
cooption of British Muslims into the values of a supposedly homogenous British 
‘community’ (2009: 106). ‘Since some communities and individuals can be suspicious 
of governments as a source of information’, the NSS explains, ‘we are finding 
credible voices within communities... to enable us to quickly and effectively distribute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The NSS also explains that under CONTEST’s purview, the government established a Research, 
Information and Communications Unit (RICU), staffed and directed by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the FCO, and the Home Office. The purpose of RICU 
is to ‘communicate effectively to reduce the risk of terrorism’, primarily by ‘exposing the weaknesses 
of violent extremist ideologies and supporting credible alternatives’ (NSS 2009: 14). 
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the facts about our policies and rebut distortions’ (2009: 106). This is at the same 
time an empty invitation and a veiled threat: the NSS makes surprisingly little 
attempt to conceal the martial origins and rationale of the policy of securing public 
support, and ultimately offers no alternative to those who do not want to be 
‘rebutted’ in this way. Here, broadening national security and its attempts to bring 
‘public opinion, culture and information’ into line reflects what Gregory (2010) 
discussed as the ‘cultural turn’ inherent in biopolitical security. This is not only the 
performing of binary divisions between ‘we’, ‘our’, and ‘us’ versus ‘British Muslims’, 
but it is also made possible by performativities of an openness that is ultimately one 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
Broadening national security is materialised through a range of biopolitical 
performativities in addition to the geopolitical performativities of interconnection I 
discussed in chapter 2. Indeed, performativities of global interconnection are 
characterised by the maximisation of good flows and the minimisation of bad flows, 
which represent the materialisation of political-economic liberal norms. The concept 
of biopolitical security should not therefore be used to conceptualise attempts to 
secure or control flows and populations, for these are the already-secured realities 
of liberal norms. 
If biopolitical security mechanisms do not secure natural reality - because as the 
materialisation of liberal norms they are already ‘secured’ - they must have another 
function. In this chapter I argued that performativities of biopolitical security, 
including broadening national security, (attempt to) bring the excess of human life 
into line with liberal natural reality. If the ‘massifying’63 performativities of populations 
make it difficult to identify and individualise threat, such as who is the insurgent and 
who is the non-combatant, or who uses the internet for lawful personal banking and 
who uses it to illegally transfer funds for extremist activity, the excess must be 
brought into line in other ways. Specifically, this excess is imagined in terms of 
certain human and cultural characteristics, so that ‘hearts and minds’ or its global age 
equivalent ‘public opinion, culture and information’, becomes that which is at stake in 
the monopoly of violence exercised through national security. 
The point, then, is not that the threats which contemporary national security 
addresses are ‘new’ or ‘broadening’ as such – and this includes the terrorist threat. 
Rather that, understood as a set of biopolitical performativities, broadening national 
security materialises an ever-widening space of security. David Campbell (2007b: 
131) recognises this when he discusses the biopolitical security of American oil 
policy and SUV driving in terms of ‘contact zones’ with everyday life. The ‘translocal 
borderlands of automobility’, he writes, ‘connect cultures of individual consumption 
with practices of global security through multiple sites of materialization and 
territorialisation at ‘home’ and ‘abroad’’ (2007b: 131). In the following chapter I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 In SMBD, Foucault comments that bio-power is ‘not individualizing but, if you like, massifying, that is 
directed not at man-as-body but man-as-species’ (p. 243). 
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explore my case study of crowded places security in order to further interrogate the 
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Chapter 4 Crowded places security I - 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
We must be insistently aware of how space can be made to hide consequences 
from us, how relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the apparent 
innocent spatiality of social life – Edward W. Soja.64 
 
Architecture – the discipline often assumes – is innocent, and therefore not an 
activity like that of other pirates of both Empire and counter-Empire. Yet it is 
typically considered to be a conservative profession, involved in fortifying the 
very worlds under discussion here. It even seeks the same political immunity – 
Keller Easterling.65  
 
In the previous chapters I considered how broadening national security re-
materialises the terrorist threat through performativities of interconnection and 
open flows. In this chapter I turn my attention to a case study of one particular 
policy response licensed by these performativities: crowded places security in the 
BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead. What are the spatial 
knowledges and imaginaries which make it possible to fight the war on terror in the 
UK high street? In other words, how do practices of crowded places security cite 
and reinscribe broadening national security in the UK’s visitor attractions, 
businesses, and public services?  
Heeding Edward Soja’s warning, an engagement with these questions must once 
and for all depart from the ‘innocent spatiality’ that dominates analyses of the 
security practices of the war on terror in public space. But to question the innocent 
spatialities of crowded places also requires negotiating a shift from the broad-brush 
imaginative geographies I focused on in chapters 2 and 3, to the politicised 
imaginaries at work in specific crowded places like BALTIC. Thus, in the same way 
that taken-for-granted ‘global’ spatialities make possible the violence of broadening 
national security, so too Keller Easterling argues that politically conservative 
discourses – specifically those of neoliberalism - are cited and reinscribed by 
seemingly ‘innocent architecture’. The main questions I will address in this chapter, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 1989: 6. 
65 2005: 13. 
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then, are: what are these politically conservative discourses in BALTIC? How are 
they cited and reinscribed by security practices in BALTIC? And, what does this tell 
us about the discourses of crowded places security?  
I begin in section 4.2 by considering how Easterling’s (2005) concept of the 
‘spatial product’ is useful for identifying politically conservative discourses in 
otherwise ‘innocent’ public spaces – and how such a process is important when 
doing research on, and within, the latter. In this way, I argue that the BALTIC Centre 
for Contemporary Art is dominated by the ‘BALTIC story’: manufactured and inter-
locking narratives about the gallery’s origins and operations which are relentlessly 
churned out in a range of guidebooks and conceptual/intellectual texts, and 
performed throughout the architecture and organisation. Although these 
performativities, or in Easterling’s parlance ‘dispositions’, are very successful in 
dominating representations of BALTIC, they also provide many insights into the 
relations of power and discipline which, I will argue through the chapter, are cited 
and regenerated by security practices. 
Next I move on to look at these security practices in more detail.66 Since 
opening in July 2002, security at BALTIC has been dominated by and defined through 
the ‘security conditions’ of government indemnity (see chapter 5) and the ‘normal 
security’ practices of a public building. In addition, since 2007 BALTIC has been 
increasingly involved in the crowded places security being rolled out to the high 
street businesses of north and south Tyneside. In section 4.3, I begin my analysis of 
security practices at BALTIC by illustrating how they depend on the emptying of 
space and everything being in its place, and how the ‘unanticipated spaces’ created by 
different installation artworks can create disruptions (Crary, 2003: 7). Because 
performativities of biopolitical security attempt to bring that which is not known in 
advance into line with an already-secured natural reality, this notion of strangeness, 
dislocation and ‘un-anticipation’ – what JJ Charlesworth describes as the interruption 
of difference in the ‘open circuitry of things’ (2008: 22) – is a key site for 
contestation and ‘disidentification’ (Butler, 1993: 2).   
In section 4.4, I juxtapose the security emphasis on controlling space with the 
flexible spaces boasted about in the ‘BALTIC story’. The flexibility which is a key 
arrangement at BALTIC may appear to reiterate the interruptions made possible by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Drawing on interviews with BALTIC Crew and senior staff.	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installation art, but in this section I argue that it instead functions to reinscribe the 
authority of the modernist gallery - what artist and critic Brian O’Doherty (2000) 
critiqued as the ‘white cube’ gallery. In this way, and despite the potential of the 
artworks to disrupt security practices at BALTIC, the apparent tension between 
security practices of emptying out and the apparent freedom of art ‘to take on its 
own life’ in the modernist gallery is, in a very important sense, not a tension at all 
(McEvilley, 2000: 7). In section 4.5 I explore the ways in which performativities of 
space and security at BALTIC can both be considered as the materialisation of ‘zero 
space’: the construction of an empty, unchanging space as ‘sympathetic magic’ to 
‘promote unchanginess in the real world… to cast an appearance of eternality over 
the status quo’ (McEvilley, 2000: 9). In this way, my main argument of the chapter is 
that the drive to empty or ‘zero’ space at BALTIC in the name of security also 
functions – perhaps primarily functions - to reproduce dominant political-economic 
discourses.  
Finally, in section 4.6 I explore how zero space is reinscribed by practices of 
vigilance, or, in crowded places parlance, ‘security awareness’ (NaCTSO, 2007: 15). I 
also consider how the translation of visitors’ behaviour into ‘normal’ or ‘suspicious’ 
is made possible in relation to performativities of zero space. 
This chapter’s investigation of the spatial politics of crowded places security 
makes an important contribution to the critical geopolitics and security studies 
literatures in two main ways. First, it illustrates how important it is to move beyond 
analyses of security in public space in which security and space are wrongly 
positioned as separate, even conflicting, realities; or at least in which the reality of 
security may be constructed and contingent, but the reality of space is pre-existing 
and static – the proverbial blank slate. In contrast, my analysis argues that deeply 
politicised performativities of space make possible performativities of security, and the 
former must be taken into account when attempting to understand and contest the 
exclusions and violences of the war on terror in UK public space. Understanding this 
relationship is absolutely key, not only because it means that art galleries/visitor 
attractions make possible crowded places security, but also because the 
performativity of such spaces makes contestation not possible, or certainly more 
difficult. 
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Second, the chapter argues that crowded places security performs an ‘ideal 
space’ estranged from the demands of temporal and spatial situatedness: a ‘crowded’, 
busy, accessible space which is at the same time empty and bare of all potential 
security threats. In so doing, the space of crowded places security cites and 
regenerates the liberal status quo I discussed in chapters 2 and 3. This is a potent 
argument which goes a great distance, I think, towards an understanding of the 
spatial politics of contemporary security practices; not just those of crowded places, 
but also health and safety, civil contingencies, and valuable objects like artworks (see 
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4.2 BALTIC the spatial product 
 
We are taught that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news 
in the world – Deleuze.67 
 
In their conceptualisation of a Butler-esque performativity of space, Nicky 
Gregson and Gillian Rose (2000) advocate moving beyond a narrow focus on 
performing bodies to space understood as ‘brought into being through performances 
and as a performative articulation of power’ (p. 434, emphasis added). Nonetheless, 
they focus mainly on the performativity of space by people – car boot sales vendors 
and customers, community arts workers and clients – so that other types of 
performative agency are considered only as far as they are part of this relationship. 
In my view, however, performativity becomes even more useful as a spatial heuristic 
if it incorporates Butler’s much later comments on the multiple agencies involved in 
performativity. ‘It is not simply that a subject performs a speech act’, she writes, 
‘rather, a set of relations and practices are constantly renewed, and agency traverses 
human and non-human domains’ (2010: 150). 
If architecture is not politically innocent - and not just in terms of the agendas of 
architects, but also the politicised arrangement of buildings and organisations - then 
the theory of performativity must be able to conceptualise not only how discourses 
become materialities, but also how materialities reiterate and reproduce regulatory 
norms in turn. Remember that Butler was very clear that the body and sex are 
materialised - given boundary and fixity - by the citation of regulatory norms. But her 
insights have seldom been applied to the ‘non-human’ materialities which are a 
necessary part of performative politics.    
Second, Gregson and Rose’s argument that the performativity of space, like the 
performativity of identity is unstable, becomes somewhat problematic when applied 
to a largely static architecture and organisation like BALTIC, which celebrates its 
first decade in July 2012. It may indeed be possible for the community arts worker 
and car-boot sale vendor who are the subjects of Gregson and Rose’s research to 
perform space in ‘transitory and temporary’ ways (2000: 442). But this formula does 
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not fit so comfortably with the arrangements at BALTIC, which emphasise the legacy 
and endurance of the building - and from that to the gallery itself. 
The BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art is located in the former grain 
warehouse of Joseph Rank Ltd’s Baltic Flour Mills, which between 1950 and 1982 
was a dual-purpose factory for the production of flour and animal feed. ‘The brick 
building we now know as BALTIC’, Andrew Guest explains in his BALTIC 
guidebook,68 was ‘only part of a large flour mill… that extended along the river 
[Tyne] to the east of the present building and away from the river to the south’ 
(2008: 4). The Baltic Flour Mills were designed in the 1930s by architects Gelder and 
Kitchen based in Hull, Yorkshire, and completed and ready for use in 1950 – 
ironically when most other industries in the Gateshead quayside area were closing 
down (Guest, 2008: 4; also Histon, 2006). 
In 1982, four of the mill’s five buildings suffered the same fate by way of a 
serious fire in the complex. The fifth building, the distinctive yellow brick tower of 
the grain silo (and today’s BALTIC), only survived according to Guest because of its 
strength as a work of civil engineering. It could hold 22,000 tons of grain, and indeed 
for the next two years until 1984 it was used to store part of the European 
Economic Community’s (EEC) controversial grain mountain (Guest, 2008: 4-5). The 
stranded silo building was then the subject of plans for conversion into flats, but 
these fell through in the late 1980s. It is at this point that B.HERE, a BALTIC 
guidebook written by two staff members, takes up the story (Martin and Thomson, 
2002).69 In 1992 the building was purchased by Gateshead Council as the site for its 
proposed new contemporary art centre. Two years later Dominic Williams of Ellis 
Williams Architects, London, was announced as the winner of the design 
competition and the ‘enabling works’ began in December 1998 (B.HERE: 32). 
These works focused on clearing the 148 interior concrete silos, each measuring 
2.5m x 2.5m2, which fortified the already formidable exterior brick walls. Guest’s 
BALTIC guide provides a dramatic re-telling of how this ‘50-metre-high building 
designed to store grain’, was converted into a six-floor art centre (2008: 16). In 
particular, he recounts how the daring removal of the interior silos left the brick 
facades unsupported and vulnerable, so that a ‘special temporary 1,000-tonne steel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  Guest was the Director of Northern Architecture - the architecture centre for the north east of 
England - at the time he wrote this book.	  
69 The Assistant Curator and the Head of the Education and Public Programme. 
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frame was designed to wrap around and support the whole structure, its weight 
resting on the building’s original foundations’ (Guest, 2008: 16). Once this steel 
frame was in place, ‘all the new materials to create the new interior had to be 
craned in through the top of the building through this lattice frame’ (Guest, 2008: 
16). 
This discussion of the BALTIC building is intended to raise two important points 
that I will discuss in turn in this section. First, it introduces the ‘BALTIC story’: a 
number of manufactured and interweaving narratives which are continually 
reproduced in a range of guidebooks and conceptual/intellectual texts (including 
Guest’s book and B.HERE), and reproduced throughout the organisational structure. 
In this way, the conversion from the old industrial building to the new, modern, and 
technically sophisticated art gallery is important in establishing the authority of 
‘BALTIC art’ and the ‘BALTIC centre’, which I discuss further in section 4.4. 
Second, and following on, it highlights the need for an alternative account of the 
performativity of space beyond that offered by Gregson and Rose. This is not a 
simple case of the performativity of transitory versus static spaces, car-boot sales 
versus art galleries. Nor is it to claim that largely fixed architectures and 
organisations like BALTIC somehow ‘pre-exists’ their own performance; only that 
they do not, like car-boot sales, ‘depend for their very existence, for their bringing 
into being, on specific performances’ of promoters, marshals, vendors, and so on 
(Gregson and Rose, 2000: 442). Instead, the peculiar performativities of BALTIC that 
I have begun to allude to here - which bring together history, architecture, and, as I 
discuss below, retail business – demand, I think, a more canny awareness of what 
Easterling terms the collusive, persuasive, and aggressive constitution of space. 
 
 
4.2.1 Introducing the ‘BALTIC story’  
 
The ‘BALTIC story’ is a number of manufactured inter-locking narratives about 
the origins and operations of BALTIC, continually reproduced in a range of 
guidebooks and conceptual/intellectual texts and on sale in the BALTIC Shop or 
available for perusal in the well-stocked and open access Library & Archive. BALTIC 
has its own copyrighted typeface, which acts as a sophisticated and aesthetically 
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distinct form of branding on everything from the menus in the café to the floor guide 
on the interior wall of the visitor lifts. Alongside, and also through this typeface, the 
BALTIC story is reproduced throughout the building and organisational structure. 
You will notice BALTIC’s distinctive industrial aethestic as soon as you enter the 
building: the entrance hall is framed with Cor-Ten steel with its layer of authentic 
‘stabilised rust’, and you will read about it in the books (B.HERE: 39). Then you will 
see it everywhere: the steel-finished toilet doors, the iron girders used for the stairs.  
I re-appropriated the term ‘BALTIC story’ from one of these books: BALTIC: The 
Art Factory and its description of BALTIC’s ‘time line’ as ‘not one story but many’ 
(Martin and Thomas, 2002: 97). ‘The twenty-year progress of BALTIC from disused 
industrial building to centre for contemporary art’, the book explains, ‘is only one 
part of the ‘story’ of the art history of the North East, and indeed, could not have 
taken place at all without those chapters that both preceded and unfolded 
concurrently around it’ (Martin and Thomas, 2002: 97). BALTIC, it concludes, has 
‘not one story, but many’ (Martin and Thomas, 2002: 97). 
BALTIC: The Art Factory, like many of these purportedly neutral BALTIC story 
texts, was written by staff members and published by BALTIC itself. I write 
purportedly neutral, because none of them – at least not in my readings – spoke in 
anything other than a detached third person, as if neither BALTIC the organisation 
nor BALTIC staff members had to offer up an account of themselves: they simply 
‘were’. Indeed, this is flagrantlly admitted to in the The Art Factory. ‘Looking back at 
the development of the BALTIC project over the years’, it opines, ‘it is difficult to 
pinpoint the precise moment of its genesis: perhaps because such a moment never, 
in fact, existed’ (Martin and Thomas, 2002: 97). Rather, the genesis of BALTIC is lost 
in the many histories of its locale. But the BALTIC story is more than just an 
abstract narrative – it is an embodied discourse, so that ‘doing’ in BALTIC, including 
by security practices, ‘cites already established formations of knowledge’ (Gregson 
and Rose, 2000: 437). Therefore it is important, I think, to understand something of 
the politics of the BALTIC story, and in particular, the political conservatism which 
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4.2.2 The politics of the BALTIC story 
 
But BALTIC is not just about art. BALTIC will be a place where people can 
come simply to hang out in the café, in the Riverside Restaurant or in the 
Rooftop Restaurant, to browse through the bookshop, or simply to sit in Baltic 
Square enjoying one of the most amazing views in the world.70 As Chairman, I 
am extremely excited about the way in which it will be an exemplary Pan-
European demonstration of how people can connect at all sorts of levels with 
the visual arts – Alan J. Smith, BALTIC Chairman.71 
 
In the concept of the ‘spatial product’, Keller Easterling (2005) is no less 
committed to the performative politics of space than Gregson and Rose. Spatial 
products are the tourist resorts, information technology campuses, retail chains, golf 
courses, and global sea ports which although often treated as ‘banal or unresponsive’ 
by architects (and I would add many politics scholars), are nonetheless imbued with 
‘myths, desires, and symbolic capital’ which make them densely political (Easterling, 
2005: 1). ‘As lubricating agents of a market’, she writes, ‘spatial products are usually 
presumed to be innocent of involvement in the extreme spaces of war’ (2005: 3). 
‘Yet even the most banal space’, she continues, ‘has been a military target, acting as 
an apparatus or a provocation of aggression’ (Easterling, 2000: 3). The idea that 
space can be, and indeed in many ways is, militarized is not original, and it is pursued 
with more attention elsewhere (Coward, 2008; Graham, 2010). Yet, in Easterling’s 
formulation the violent properties of space are not confined to its use and abuse by 
a state’s military, or even to an unfortunate fate as a military target. Instead spatial 
products are violent because they are the ‘lubricating agents of a market’; they are 
the ‘Teflon formulas of neoliberal enterprises’ (Easterling, 2005: 1). 
As such, spatial products create ‘worlds’: domains of logic that naturalize certain 
narratives - particularly those which enable capital accumulation – and segregate 
others. They maintain their coherence Easterling writes, ‘by limiting and excluding 
information. Worlds aspire to be perfect utopias, singular domains attempting to 
coerce compliance and compatibility from anything foreign to them’ (2005: 5). Their 
borders ‘expand and exclude, extend and tighten’, thus ‘allowing the world to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Surely a gross exaggeration! 
71 Martin and Thomas, 2002: 12. 
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increase in size but not neccesarily in diversity or intelligence’ (Easterling, 2005: 5). I 
would argue then that although Easterling does not explictly use Butler’s 
performativity schema, her concept of the spatial product captures (or attempts to 
capture) the spatial performativities – the citation and reinscription – of neoliberal 
norms.  
So, how do spatial products cite and reinscribe global neoliberal discourses? 
Which are the telltale practices? Instead of, for example, negotiations between 
buyers and sellers at a car-boot sale, spatial products cite and reinscribe regulatory 
norms through what Easterling terms ‘dispositions’: ‘heavy information that becomes 
a nuanced, unexpressed subtext of action or practice’ (2005: 6). So while ‘spatial 
products perhaps resist semiotics’, they ‘offer other precise expressions of value and 
exchange stored in arrangement and presence’ (Easterling, 2005: 7). She gives two 
examples. 
First, the ‘data and logistics’ which simplify messy human geographies through 
any combination of commercial formulas, marketing protocols, and digital 
capitalisms, thus ‘avoiding the political inconveniences of location’ (Easterling, 2005: 
1). Spatial products ‘substitute spin, logistics, and management styles for 
considerations of location, geometry or enclosure’ (Easterling, 2005: 2). The agent of 
the spatial product, the ‘architect and salesman’, is the ‘orgman’, whose ‘tools are 
acronyms, stats, and datastreams’ (Easterling, 2005: 2). The orgman has a ‘frontier 
enthusiasm for this abstract territory. He derives a pioneering sense of creation 
from matching a labour cost, a time zone, and a desire to generate distinct forms of 
urban space’ (Easterling, 2005: 2, emphasis added). In this way, Guest’s description of 
the process of gutting out the old Baltic silo building and winching in the ‘new 
interior’, with its ground-breaking design solutions and ‘metres squared this’ and 
‘how many tonnes that’, has more than a whiff of the orgman and spatial product 
about it.  
I propose, then, two possible ways to interpret the BALTIC story as a source of 
empirical material for a research project. On the one hand, it is possible to dismiss 
its tone and bracket its claims as the PR patter of marketing materials – frustrating 
but unavoidable. I should qualify here that many, though not all, of these texts were 
written and published in the years immediately before and after BALTIC opened in 
July 2002, and their authors perhaps felt justified in proportion to the perceived 
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need to generate publicity for the new gallery. But on the other hand, if we are to 
take seriously the ways in which space makes security possible and contestation not 
possible, then it is crucial, I think, to pay close attention to how such spaces are 
performed and the discourses they cite and reinscribe. 
Second, Easterling is also concerned with how the dispositions of the spatial 
product are performed through ‘elaborate costumes and stylistic affectations’ – 
‘window dressing for a product that supposedly achieves neutrality by operating as a 
revenue envelope’ (2005: 1). In this way, the ‘innocent’ globally dispersed fairways of 
the Arnold Palmer Golf Management company are instead shown as greedy 
mouthpieces for an insincere form of (invariably western) ‘genteel family urbanism’, 
where ‘players walk the greens, merging with advertisements for banks and 
insurance companies’ (Easterling, 2005: 83). ‘The trappings of Arnold Palmer Golf’, 
Easterling continues, ‘are the rewards that the privileged give to themselves for 
bearing the responsibilities of leading a privileged life’: ‘air conditioners, tinkling ice, 
and grass being watered or mowed’; athletic gear with special peformance 
characteristics designed by Hugo Boss, Tommy Hilfiger, or Ralph Lauren, featuring 
endorsements by Nike or the Ford Motor Company (Easterling, 2005: 82-3).   
As a spatial product, then, we could point to BALTIC’s commercial attributes 
boasted about by the first chairman Alan Smith: the café, two restaurants, and 
bookshop. BALTIC Café Bar is positioned towards both the BALTIC visitor and the 
non-art viewing casual diner:  
 
Whether it is a lunch date or for refreshment during a visit, BALTIC Café Bar 
is on hand. There is an extensive list of hot and cold drinks plus sandwiches, 
pastries and an array of mouth watering cakes.72  
 
Or, for those who fancy something a little stronger, the Café Bar also targets the 
gastro pub market:   
 
… with its fully licensed bar, outside seating for hot summer days overlooking 
Baltic Square and beyond, the Café Bar is a great place to go to meet friends, 
chill out and watch the world go by.73 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See ‘BALTIC – Visit - Food & Drink’. Available at http://www.balticmill.com/visit/Eating.php 
(Accessed 22 July 2011). 
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The SIX restaurant on the uppermost sixth level (formerly the Rooftop Restaurant) 
claims to provide an even more enticing, upmarket location for lunch and dinner. 
According to BALTIC’s website it combines ‘breathtaking panoramic views’ with 
‘great food… British modern cuisine featuring the very best ingredients’, with ‘great 
service and a great experience’.74 Lastly, BALTIC Shop stocks a wide range of artist 
products, ‘BALTIC stuff’ (specially manufactured BALTIC memorabilia including 
stationery, tea towels, and key rings), books, fashion, jewellry, gifts, and 
homewares.75 BALTIC Shop also has an online purchasing facility and is heavily 
marketed in the main ‘From BALTIC with love’ email newsletter, and its own 
‘BALTIC Shop’ email newsletter.76 
The public is heavily encouraged to visit all of these facilities without the onus of 
venturing into the main art spaces – although in this sense BALTIC is typical rather 
than unique. The move towards the commercialisation of galleries separate from, or 
at least not mutually inclusive with, the viewing and appreciation of art has been 
much discussed and lamented (see for example Kuspit, 2004; Sylvester, 2008). But to 
infer that it is a particularly modern citation of neoliberal norms would be 
misleading. When the Tate Gallery at Millbank on the Thames (now Tate Britain) 
first opened in 1897, it explicitly offered a pleasant aesthetic environment alongside 
that of the art. Helen Searing (2004) in her Tate-commissioned book on Tate 
architecture, explains that visitors to the new Tate – the middle classes and, for the 
first time, the ‘proletariat’ – could choose from a range of pleasures (also Lorente, 
1998; Moore and Ryan, 2000). They could admire ‘popular narrative pictures’; visit 
the fountain in the central hall complete with goldfish, or the ‘bookshop of sorts’ 
squeezed into the vestibule; or simply people-watch from the rotunda balcony 
(Searing, 2004: 36, 60). 
Yet, the somewhat quaint features of Tate Britain in 1897, cannot compare with 
Tate the bona fide commercial powerhouse in 2011, which operates a franchise of 
four galleries (two in central London, and one each in Liverpool and St Ives, 
Cornwall); a catering company serving the four galleries’ many cafes, restaurants, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid. 
74 See ‘BALTIC – Visit - Food & Drink’. Available at http://www.balticmill.com/visit/Eating.php 
(Accessed 22 July 2011). 
75 See ‘BALTIC – Shop’. Available at https://www.balticmill.com/shop/index.php (Accessed 22 July 
2011). 
76 See ‘BALTIC Love’. Available at https://www.balticmill.com/love/ (Accessed 5 September 2011). 
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functions; a large and successful publishing company; and Tate Online which features 
the Tate’s own TV channel, a Learn Online facility, and Tate Online Shop.77 Nor is it 
simply the case, as Searing puts it, that the art gallery has changed from a space 
performed through one discourse - ‘the conservation, display and contemplation of 
art’ – to many (2004: 19). Art galleries, she writes, are now ‘arbiters of value, 
engines of education, revitalisers of community, generators of economic wealth, sites 
of corporate philanthropy and reward, purveyors of entertainment, refreshment and 
consumer goods’ (Searing, 2004: 19). 
But in my view, the relationship between art, galleries, and commercial and 
economic interests is more enduring, more difficult to untangle, and deserving of 
more nuanced analysis. To give just one example, the Victoria and Albert Museum in 
London opened in May 1852 with the original name of The Museum of Manufactures, 
and was explicitly positioned towards developing the relationship between the arts 
and the foremost obsession of Great Britain’s ruling classes: the international 
competitiveness of British industry (Searing, 2004: 17). Public art galleries have 
therefore always functioned as a form of ‘cultural capital’, and research into political 
phenomena at these organisations - including security – must pay attention to this 
enduring, albeit mutating, discourse (Searing, 2004: 36). 
Finally, if spatial products cite and reinscribe neoliberal discourses, then what 
kind of disruptions are possible? How can spatial products subvert the discourses 
they are both enabled by and regenerative of? To begin, unlike Gregson and Rose 
who discuss in depth the ways in which their research subjects can and do speak 
back to power, Easterlng does not explicitly engage with the issue of disrupting 
discourse. Instead, one of the most interesting, provocative, but perhaps 
disheartening, aspects of Easterling’s schema is her insistence that the performativity 
of spatial products embodies ‘a capacity for collusion, persuasion, and aggression’ 
(2005: 1). So whereas Gregson and Rose look to the ‘instability’ of performed spaces 
and the ‘creativity of everyday life’ (2000: 433), Easterling is deeply suspicious of 
what she terms ‘masquerades of openness’, at least when they are performed in 
conjunction with commercial organisations (2005: 115). 
Drawing on Deleuze and Guatarri’s ‘The Smooth and the Striated’, Easterling 
writes that ‘capital is smooth and elastic to avoid detection or perpetrate a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See the Tate website at www.tate.org.uk.	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confidence game’ (2005: 17). Analogously, ‘soft’ organisations purport to represent 
‘a new organisational paradigm - not the corporate hierarchy but an open, fluid, 
feminized, connected structure’ (Easterling, 2005: 17). Furthermore, ‘soft executives 
are enlightened team players. They speak of synergy and feedback’ (Easterling, 2005: 
17). Yet, she counters that the ‘illusion of an inclusive disposition masks an exclusive 
disposition… The goal of soft is to devour extrinsic information, remain intact, and 
avoid contradiction’ (Easterling, 2005: 17-18, emphasis in original). In this way, the 
spatial product and its dispositions of softness, openness, and flexibility is just as 
commercially driven and politically devious as the more easily recognisable ‘hard’ 
dispositions. 
In this discussion of the ‘soft’ organisation with ‘exclusive dispositions’ I 
recognise some of the contradictions of the BALTIC story which I discuss in the rest 
of the chapter. So if thus far I have seemed to conflate – or at least imply no 
difference between - BALTIC the centre for art and the essentially commercial, 
profit-making ventures which Easterling explictly positioned as spatial products, this 
is purposely done. My argument is that in order to understand crowded places 
security it is essential to take seriously the performativities of space where it occurs, 
and if performativities of space cite and reinscribe discourses, then we must also be 
sensitive to what these discourses could be. Hence my exploration and critique of 
the BALTIC story and BALTIC as a spatial product. It would however be misleading 
to suggest that neoliberal globalisation is the only, or even dominant, discourse at 
BALTIC. To begin to probe what these other discourses could be, I will turn to the 
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4.3 Empty space and everything in its place 
 
When artworks arrive at BALTIC and before they go on public display – 
sometimes only moments before - they are photographed by the programme team 
as part of what was described to me in an interview as ‘health and safety and the 
normal security of the building’. 78 Specifically, health and safety regulations require 
that, ‘so far as is reasonably practicable, every floor in a workplace and the surface of 
every traffic route shall be kept free from obstructions’ – that is, from ‘any article or 
substance which may cause a person to slip, trip or fall’.79 In this way, if a visitor or 
member of staff should trip and decide to take legal action, the photographs can be 
used as visual evidence that ‘reasonably practicable’ steps were taken to prevent 
obstructions. 
The crowded places security advice for visitor attractions (hereafter CPAVA) 
published by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) in 2007 and 
available on their website, reiterates the importance of abiding health and safety laws 
as a first step in ensuring adequate protective security. In its section on ‘Physical 
security’, CPAVA advises owners and managers that ‘you will need to ensure that all 
necessary regulations are met, such as local planning permission, building consents, 
health and safety and fire prevention requirements’ (p. 15). And to drive home the 
point that protective security against terrorism can in many cases dovetail with 
‘normal security’, CPAVA also warns that ‘criminal prosecution and heavy penalties 
under health and safety laws… are a real possibility in the wake of a terrorist 
incident, particularly if it emerges that core standards and statutory duties have not 
been met’ (p. 5). 
Crowded places security also reiterates the security discourse of health and 
safety through an emphasis on ‘good housekeeping’. For example, workplace fire 
regulations discuss the importance of good housekeeping to reduce specific ‘fire 
risks’ (materials which can go on fire), and to keep emergency exits unobstructed.80 
CPAVA foregrounds good housekeeping because it ‘improves the ambience of your 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 The programme team includes the curator, the technical manager, and the exhibition technicians. 
79 From Section 12 ‘Condition of floors and traffic routes’ of the Workplace (Health, Safety and 
Welfare) Regulations 1992 [Online]. Available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1992/3004/regulation/12/made (Accessed 18 July 2011).	  
80 See ‘Process Fire Risks’ on the Health and Safety Executive website. Available at 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/construction/safetytopics/processfire.htm (Accessed 26 July 2011).   
	   165	  
visitor attraction’, and ‘reduces the opportunity for placing suspicious items or bags’ 
(p. 9). Measures include using a clear bag for waste disposal (‘as it provides an easier 
opportunity for staff to conduct an initial examination for suspicious items’); 
‘avoid[ing] the use of litter bins around the attraction if possible’ (while ensuring 
there is ‘additional and prompt cleaning’); and keeping all public and communal areas 
clean and tidy, such as exits, entrances, reception areas, stairs, halls, lavatories, and 
washrooms, as well as back of house service corridors and yards (CPAVA: 19). 
Likewise, all vegetation and trees should be pruned back, especially at entrances, 
as this will ‘assist in surveillance and prevent concealment of any packages’ (CPAVA: 
19). In an intriguingly absurd passage, the Protecting Crowded Places: Design and 
Technical Issues (PCP) publication discusses the use of trees in counter-terrorism. 
Trees of ‘sufficient girth and rooting can be used as a vehicle security barrier’, PCP 
explains, as long as their ‘limbs do not provide an easy climbing aid close to a 
perimeter’, and foliage does not ‘obscure sight lines for guard force surveillance’ (p. 
27). Ultimately, however, they are not considered a reliable counter-terrorism 
practice, ‘due to the inability to grow sufficent trees close enough to each other to 
deny vehicle access between them’ (PCP: 27). 
Good housekeeping emphasises how crowded places security relies on a 
control of space facilitated by the provision of ‘sight lines’ for surveillance: seeing 
through materials, for example rubbish bags, around materials, for example vegetation 
and trees, and seeing no materials at all, for example removing litter bins. CPAVA 
also stresses the importance of ‘ensur[ing] that everything has a place and is returned 
to that place’ (p. 19, emphasis added). Crowded places security can therefore be 
conceptualised as a performativity of clearing out space which materialises a 
particular kind of secured ‘order’. 
Performativities of clearing out space are very much in evidence at BALTIC. 
What BALTIC staff term their ‘clear floor policy’ is maintained by banning bins in the 
building (except small slot bins in the toilets), and by not allowing visitors to bring 
large bags into the art spaces. Instead, BALTIC provides lockers in a small hallway to 
the left of the front reception desk, which are ‘checked and cleared every night’. As 
a result, BALTIC is ‘quite a big building, [but] quite an empty building if that makes 
sense… it is quite an easy building to clear each night’ (emphasis added).  
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Yet the materialisation of a secured order at BALTIC - unobstructed floors with 
everything in its place, prompt cleaning, cleared lockers and an ‘empty building’ - are 
undermined by the business of the gallery itself: the public display of artworks. Staff 
interviewees described an incident which seems to have become a sort of BALTIC 
legend, in which a ‘suspicious package’ appeared in The Hoerengracht (1983-88), a life-
size walk-through recreation of Amsterdam’s Red Light District which was part of an 
exhibition of works by artists Edward and Nancy Kienholz in summer 2005 (see 
figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1 Kienholz’s The Hoerengracht (1983-88), with bike rack in the bottom left 
corner.81 
 
This is what happened: 
 
… it had an Amsterdam street set-up so you could walk in between buildings 
and there was the actual bike racks, that very authentic look – I don’t know if 
they were the actual ones from Amsterdam – kind of all built into the scene, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Davison, C. (2005) Kienholz: The Hoerengracht [Online]. Available at 
http://archive.balticmill.com/index.php?itemid=37348&fromtermid=32981&position=28&numresults=4
3&start=20&tab=Image (Accessed 5 September 2011). 
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and there was just like this carrier bag tied up and shoved in one of the bike 
wheels, [in the] spokes. 
 
However, using the photographs taken by the programme team, staff were able to 
verify that the carrier bag (which contained a plastic box) was a legitimate part of the 
installation. 
In a much less dramatic example, American artist Sarah Sze’s Tilting Planet exhibit 
at BALTIC in April–August 2009, was a sculptural installation ‘cobbled together out 
of disposable items such as water bottles, drawing pins, paper, salt, string, lamps, 
matchsticks and wires’ (see figures 4.2 and 4.3). 82   
Figure 4.2 Sarah Sze’s Tilting Planet installation, taking up the whole of BALTIC’s Level 
4 art space.83 
 
So here, in contrast to the recursive performativities of a secured order based on 
emptiness, ‘Sze’s is an art of additions, of one thing being added to and playing off the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See ‘Exhibition-Past-Sarah Sze’ on BALTIC’s website. Available at 
http://www.balticmill.com/whatsOn/past/ExhibitionDetail.php?exhibID=124 (Accessed 18 July 2011). 
83 Davison, C. (2009) Sarah Sze: Tilting Planet: Exhibition Image (06) [Online]. Available at 
http://archive.balticmill.com/index.php?itemid=41530&fromsearch=sarah%20sze&position=5&numresu
lts=32&start=&tab=Image (Accessed 5 September 2011). 
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next’.84 In antithesis to the attempt to bend or curtail the organic life of vegetation 
and trees to security, figure 4.3 shows how Sze’s ‘syntax of stuff’ takes over the 
whole space of BALTIC’s Level 4, ‘moulding themselves into spaces’ and ‘spreading 
ivy-like through the gallery’.85  
Figure 4.3 Close-up of Tilting Planet.86 
 
Similarly problematic for performativities of secured order was Tomás 
Saraceno’s 14 Billions (Working Title) exhibit in July–October 2010. It was a large scale 
model of a black widow spider’s web made out of 8000 black strings and elastic 
cords, and 23,000 individually tied knots (see figure 4.4). 87 When I visited this 
installation only three visitors were allowed into the space at any one time so that 
the BALTIC Crew member on duty could closely monitor interaction between 
artwork and viewer. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See BALTIC (2009) Sarah Sze: Tilting Planet: Exhibition Guide [Online]. Available at 
http://archive.balticmill.com/index.php?itemid=41790&fromtermid=26636&position=0&numresults=22
&start=&tab= (Accessed 24 July 2011). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Davison, C. (2009) Sarah Sze: Tilting Planet: Exhibition Image (07) [Online]. Available at 
http://archive.balticmill.com/index.php?itemid=41525&fromsearch=sarah%20sze&position=6&numresu
lts=32&start=0&tab=Image (Accessed 5 September 2011). 
87 See BALTIC (2010) Tomás Saraceno: 14 Billions (Working Title): Exhibition Guide [Online]. Available at 
http://archive.balticmill.com/index.php?itemid=42983&fromtermid=43987&position=2&numresults=15
&start=&tab (Accessed 18 July 2011). 
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Figure 4.4 Tomás Saraceno’s 14 Billions (Working Title) installation, modelled on the 
web of a black widow spider.88 
 
According to the exhibit guide, ‘scientists have used spiders’ webs when describing 
the early origin and structure of the Universe’, and the title 14 Billions refers to the 
Universe’s approximate known age in years.89 By making these links between the 
universe, spiders’ webs, and the space of the contemporary gallery, and how each 
either spins out scale (from the spider’s web to the universe) or squeezes scale 
(from the universe to the gallery), Saraceno is commenting on the effort that goes 
into materialising space - what Edward Said referred to as ‘willed human work’ 
(2003: 7).  In the case of crowded places security, and as I discuss more below, this 
is a substantial effort to materialise cleared out and rationalised spaces, whilst at the 
same time the objective of these spaces is precisely to attract visitors to visitor 
attractions or to be busy for business. As an alternative to these kinds of onerous 
efforts, Saraceno’s work is purposely utopian: ‘he challenges our ideas about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Brau, C. (2010) Tomás Saraceno: 14 Billions (Working Title): Installation shot (02) [Online]. Available at 
http://archive.balticmill.com/index.php?itemid=42829&fromsearch=saraceno&position=1&numresults=
12&start=&tab=Image (Accessed 5 September 2011). 
89 Ibid. 
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stability of the built environment and the structure of urban environments’, in order 
to explore ‘possible visions of a better world’.90   
This drawing in of the viewer to the performativities of space carried out by 
Tilting Planet and 14 Billions, explains why floor staff in BALTIC – or the BALTIC 
Crew as they are known - are much more active than staff in other galleries, 
something remarked upon during an interview. BALTIC Crew are ‘not security 
guards’, I was told, ‘they’re there to interact with the public and communicate with 
them’, but:  
 
… quite a few galleries you go to, I’ve just recently been to one and its so 
different when you go round them, the one where I was in Paris, there they 
are sat in their chairs in the corners, sitting at Tate Modern, Tate Britain. Here, 
staff will approach you, talk to you, and go through and talk to you about the 
artworks, so they are very engaging with the public.   
 
But despite this engagement with the public, the BALTIC Crew perform a particular 
role in mediation between the subversive performativities of the artworks and the 
discourses of the status quo: health and safety and crowded places security. 
These insistent challenges to the materialisation of secured order through health 
and safety and crowded places security are perennial and unavoidable at BALTIC 
because of the particular art it showcases. Contemporary art, according to Jonathan 
Crary (2003), responds to the particular conditions of advanced capitalist 
industrialisation. In contrast to art after the Renaissance, in which artists tended to 
‘critically engage with the experience of human perception’, the ‘last 125 years have 
seen a dramatic transfer of human capabilities to machines, especially capabilities 
involving vision, thought and memory’ (Crary, 2003: 6). 
This emergence and embedding of technological culture has also led, Crary 
argues, to a dislocation from locale. ‘There is more and more disconnection of 
economic circulation from physical space’, he argues, ‘as abstract forms of wealth 
have a mobility and a fluidity unrelated to what we used to think of as location’ 
(Crary, 2003: 8). This chimes with my discussion in chapter 3 of the biopolitical 
security arguments that contemporary liberal discourses are materialised as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Ibid.	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contingent and complex – thus highly abstracted - ways of living, and Crary’s counter-
argument that in response we should engage with the ‘strange kind of dislocations 
and associations that now constitute subjective reality’ (2003: 8). Installation art like 
that of Sarah Sze and Tomás Saraceno takes up this injunction by, to put it crudely, 
re-materialising the ‘spaceless electronic worlds’ that Crary identifies (2003: 7). It 
provides a ‘theatrical’ and ‘immersive’ environment ‘into which the viewer physically 
enters’, and it therefore distinguishes itself from other artistic mediums such as 
painting, sculpture, photography, and video (although it can make use of them), 
because it ‘addresses the viewer directly as a literal presence in the space’ (Bishop, 
2005: 6). Rather than being a pair of disembodied eyes, the viewer becomes 
embodied (Bishop, 2005: 6) (also Serota, 1996). In this way, installation art provokes 
and demands a sensory and indeed sensual engagement between artwork and 
viewer, which directly challenges the empty, rationalised, secured order of health 
and safety and crowded places policy. It also speaks back to what Jenny Edkins 
identified as the empty abstractions of the biopolitical security literature, exemplified 
by Dillon’s claim that the ‘emergent eventual character of living things’ now 
characterises contemporary ways of living (2007a: 16). 
Yet tactility cannot be unquestioningly regarded as a form of liberation from 
power. William Bogard (2007), for example, describes the forms of ‘tactile control’ 
emerging as part of contemporary biopolitical societies. Like installation art, tactile 
control aims to simulate the sense of touch, but the ‘larger goal is to create 
‘immersive’ environments that synthesize visual, auditory, and olfactory messages 
with tactile or vibratory information, to create so-called ‘multi-media’ interfaces that 
produce ‘complete’ sensory experiences’ (Bogard, 2007: 4). He also notes Marshall 
McLuhan’s argument that ‘information media are tactile systems. They demand not 
just the eyes and ears of the viewer but the intensive involvement of the body’ 
(2007: 4). Inverting McLuhan’s famous aphorism ‘the medium is the message’, Bogard 
claims that the ‘medium is not just the message but the massage, a technology of the 
flesh’ (2007: 4, emphasis in original). 
Sometimes, however, installation artworks can be disconcertingly sparse, and 
can almost look like the empty secured order strived for by security practices. 
Turner Prize-winning artist Steve McQueen’s two installations at BALTIC in autumn 
2008, Running Thunder and Pursuit, are good examples of this. Running Thunder 
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consisted of a film of a decomposing horse projected onto the wall of a small and 
darkened room, with a bench for viewing the only other object in the space. Pursuit 
was a large and utterly pitch-black space, a ‘theatre of war’,91 with only the random 
projection of black and white images - ‘molecular particles’ – around the walls, and a 
discordant soundtrack of unidentified deep reverberating sounds. In performativity 
terms, McQueen’s works sought to subvert or disidentify with contemporary 
discourses around war and death, in particular indifference to war in other places and 
the death of others, by reciting and subverting their various moods and dynamics – 
darkness, fear, and decay. ‘In shadowing these associations’, the exhibit guide 
explained, ‘the catastrophe to which the works themselves seem to allude is… the 
dissociation of mediated images from the experience of daily life’.92 In important 
ways, all of these installations – Sarah Sze’s organic life-like sculptures, Tomás 
Saraceno’s modelling of the universe as a spider’s web, and McQueen’s references to 
hidden violences in inner and outer spaces - illustrate that performativities of space 
are not contiguous with the sense of enclosure within four walls. So although 
BALTIC may be a static architecture, at the same time it does not have the exclusive 
rights to the articulation of space within its four walls. As I discuss in the next 
section, this is a key factor in understanding the politics of security in the art gallery. 
To sum up, crowded places security can be conceptualised as a performativity of 
clearing out space which materialises a particular kind of emptied and rationalised, 
but most of all secured, order. The important implication arising from this 
materialisation of secured order is that it blurs the line between what was previously 
the ‘normal’ security of health and safety and public buildings, and the new counter-
terror regime of crowded places security. In this way, objects which were previously 
problematic in terms of the obstruction of floors, now also become potential 
terrorist bombs. In a more absurd example, trees become a security issue because 
they can conceal objects and can even be used as an ‘easy climbing aid’. As I discuss 
in section 4.6, this blurring becomes especially problematic when it is no longer 
objects but people which are rendered ‘suspicious’ by virtue of a very often valid 
presence within the meshes of counter-terror regimes. In contrast, the various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 See ‘Steve McQueen: Pursuit: Interpretation Guide’ [Online]. Available at 
http://archive.balticmill.com/index.php?itemid=39651&fromtermid=6817&position=4&numresults=11&
start=&tab=Archive (Accessed 21 July 2011). 
92 Ibid.	  
	   173	  
installation artworks posit the legitimacy of surprise, abundance, and sensuality 
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4.4 Flexible space – Establishing the authority of the ‘white cube’ 
gallery 
 
If the performativities of the installation artworks are important in speaking back 
to the emptied and rationalised order of crowded places security, it becomes 
important to understand the ways in which they are enabled by another dominant 
performativity at BALTIC: the flexible art gallery. Officially, BALTIC is neither a 
gallery nor a museum of art, but instead a ‘centre for contemporary art’. For those 
who produce and use these labels, like BALTIC’s founding Director Sune Nordgren 
(1998-2003), they have precise meanings and implications – in particular, as I discuss 
in this section, they reproduce particular authoritative types of space. 
The label of ‘centre’ rather than gallery or museum distinguishes between the 
contemporary art shown at BALTIC (including installation) and other, older genres: 
‘classical’ and ‘modern’ in that order. These genres in turn correspond to very 
different performativities of space. Classical art buildings appear imposing and static, 
to the contemporary eye at least. Helen Searing explains that they were typically 
built in an architectural language of ancient Greek and Roman, and Renaissance 
features, in order to communicate their status as ‘elevated sanctuaries of accepted 
masterpieces’ (2004: 18-19). Their interiors were organised as ‘symmetrical 
compositions with deliberated orchestrated circulation patterns’; the appropriate 
response, it was felt, to ‘exalted’ collections which rarely changed (Searing, 2004: 
18).  
At a BALTIC International Seminar held in April 2000 (hereafter B.READ), 
which functioned as a sort of art debate/ publicity before the official opening in July 
2002, Tuula Arkio, then Director of Kiasma Museum of Contemporary Art in 
Helsinki, Finland, noted that classical art buildings were ‘completely closed’, and had 
‘a huge staircase so that when you come in you feel that you are small, you do not 
know what is waiting for you when you go up into the galleries’ (Martin and 
Nordgren, 2001: 39). In contrast, Kiasma, which opened to the public four years 
before BALTIC in May 1998, was built in Steven Koll’s ‘phenomenological’ style of 
architecture which is about the ‘feeling that you get in the building, the movement and 
what you feel in your own body’ (B.READ: 38, emphasis added). So for example, 
Kiasma’s western façade is made entirely of glass, and is thus ‘very open’ (B.READ: 
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39). ‘It was important’, Arkio explained, ‘that people could see what is happening 
inside the building’ (B.READ: 39). Kiasma’s commitment to openness extends to the 
positioning of a ‘free zone’ on its ground floor: people can use the gallery café and 
shop without having to pay the €10 fee for the rest of the building. 93  In these ways, 
Arkio claimed that the aim of Kiasma was to ‘reshape the museum concept… we 
wanted to be active, vital and pluralistic in all our operation [sic] and we also wanted 
to emphasise the idea that the museum is not just a physical space, its also a 
conceptual space’ (B.READ: 39, emphasis added). 
The idea of the gallery as a space performed through art, rather than as an 
enclosure in which art was simply displayed, emerged after the second world war 
and in particular through the work of the German architect Ludwig Mies van der 
Rohe. Mies’ Neue Nationalgalerie, which opened in West Berlin in 1968, is held as 
the paradigmatic example of the conceptual gallery (see figure 4.5). 
Figure 4.5 Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s Neue Nationalgalerie (1962-8) in Berlin with 
its ‘undifferentiated universal space’.94 
 
The Neue Nationalgalerie was designed to materialise Mies’ ‘motto of ‘beinahe 
Nichts’’, which Searing translates as ‘almost nothing’ (2004: 20). It was a square glass 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 The €10 fee was correct as of 14 July 2011. Information available on the Kiasma homepage 
http://www.kiasma.fi/kiasma_en.   
94 Friedrich, F [Online]. Taken from the Neuenationalgalerie website. Available at 
http://www.smb.museum/smb/sammlungen/details.php?lang=en&objID=20&n=1&r=13&s=6 (Accessed 
5 September 2011).	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pavillion with two steel supports on each wall holding up a continuous plate roof 
(Searing, 2004: 20). There are no rooms, partitions or features inside to break up 
the open, continuous space. ‘At the time’, Searing continues, ‘many critics argued 
that such box-like volumes of undifferentiated ‘universal spaces’ best suited the 
museum programme’ (2004: 20, emphasis added). 
The notion of a ‘undifferentiated universal space’ for art in turn cites and 
reinscribes claims about the transcendent experience of art. For example, Searing’s 
almost breathless claim that the public art gallery became a substitute for the 
‘elements of awe and ritual’ previously fulfilled by religious worship, and that ‘just as 
the architecture of temples and cathedrals was integral to the liturgy, so the museum 
building makes an indispensable contribution to the experiences on offer’ (2004: 14) 
(also Lorente, 1998). Yet Frascina and Harris (1992) refer warily to art’s 
authoritative position as an ‘aesthetic experience’, which like religion is assumed to 
act as ‘a necessarily transcendent ‘other’ to everyday life’ (p. 11). To the authority of 
art’s transcendent and, moreover, consensual universal values, the contributions to 
Frascina and Harris’ anthology assert differences of class, gender, and race (also 
Bradley and Esche, 2007).  
The idea of the art gallery as a universal space was, however, found wanting. 
Searing explains how in the 1960s concerns grew about how its ‘amorphousness and 
lack of direction’ impacted upon the aesthetic and educational functions of the art 
gallery: ‘visitors were sometimes puzzled as to where and how to proceed, and 
traditional works of art often seemed swallowed up in the undefined space’ (2004: 
21). Consequently, architects and curators, influenced in particular by Louis Kahn’s 
reintroduction of symmetry and hierarchy into gallery and museum space – his 
concept of the ‘society of rooms’ – began to favour the return of ‘distinctive galleries 
while maintaining freedom of circulation and options for recurrent reconfiguration 
according to curatorial needs’ (Searing, 2004: 125, 21, emphasis added).  
Contemporary art spaces, then, heed the authority of a different kind of spatial 
organisation. ‘I deliberately do not say ‘museum’’, Sune Norgdren explained of 
BALTIC in 2000, ‘and I deliberately do not say ‘gallery’ for the art spaces, because I 
want these spaces to be flexible’ (B.READ: 28, emphasis added). So BALTIC does not 
have a permanent art collection, but instead, in the words of the BALTIC story, ‘a 
dynamic, innovative and experimental artistic programme made up of artists’ 
	   177	  
residencies’ (B.HERE: 14). This ‘dynamic, experimental’ programme depends in turn 
on the spatial flexibility that was ‘built in’ to the new gallery. After the gutting out of 
the old silo building described above, a new flexible interior was put in, beginning 
with four main floor plates which Guest describes once again in an orgman-like 
manner: 
 
The four new principal floors were formed from post-tensioned beams cast in 
situ, tied to the 300mm stubs left over at 2.5 metre centres from where the 
grain silos connected to the side walls. Additional support for the long floor 
spans was provided by rows of pillars set out 2.5 metres from the side walls 
(also following the original grid of silos), the two side aisles that they formed 
providing the logical route for the main services to the new spaces. The floor 
can support six-tonne point loadings (i.e. six tonnes at any one particular 
point) (2008: 16). 
 
In between these four principal floors, temporary ‘mezzanine’ levels were 
constructed: what Guest describes as ‘intermediary floors of lightweight, non-
structural and removeable steelwork’, rather like meccano (2008: 9). ‘The whole 
idea behind this’, the architect Dominic Williams explained at the BALTIC 
International Seminar, ‘is that between floors there is flexibility, so that you can build 
the mezzanines in steel frame in order to strip them down’ (B.READ: 14). Likewise 
with the interior walls and ceilings, which are constructed from panels that can be 
added or removed according to the different needs of the space. This is particularly 
the case with the smaller space at the front of Level 2. Installations are frequently 
shown here, but must be arranged in such a way as to allow access to the ‘Quay’ 
education and play area towards the rear. As Quay’s most typical users are children 
of school age, the exhibits in this area must also be ‘child friendly’.  
This performativity of flexible space extends even into BALTIC’s back of house 
physical plant, and it is flourishes like this – going the extra mile, as it were - which 
are given particular prominence in the BALTIC story. Guest describes how beyond 
the ground level art space, behind a (predictably flexible) removeable partition, are 
‘artists’ studios, workshops, [and] exhibition storage’, as well as the ‘loading area 
where full-size trucks can drive in and off-load directly into the building’ (2008: 26). 
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The idea is that trucks can off-load more or less into the two vast ‘arts lifts’. Five 
metres high with two metres squared volume and a load bearing capacity of ten 
tonnes, B.HERE informs readers the lifts can be used ‘to put a Sherman Tank on the 
4th Floor!’ (p. 37). Also behind the partition, though Guest does not mention it, is the 
security office where personnel watch the bank of screens hooked up to BALTIC’s 
44 closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras (see chapter 5).  
Alongside, then, the cleared out order of security practices and the ‘un-
anticipated’ spaces of the installations, BALTIC is also performed through the flexible 
arrangements of walls and floors, and, moreover, of imagination which are 
appropriate to a conceptual art gallery. The installations drive this flexiblity at the 
same time as they are made possible by it: BALTIC’s ‘dynamic, innovative, and 
experimental’ artworks require a correspondingly dynamic space. Yet, as a 
consequence of this mutually constitutive relationship, perhaps the artworks 
concede some of their potential for ‘disidentification’? (Butler, 1993). 
At this point, it may seem that security practices at BALTIC - which effect a 
control or locking-down of space through emptying and rationalisation - must be in 
tension with its multiple flexible dispositions as a conceptual art space. In my view, 
however, this is not the case. Certainly, the latter are significant; extending beyond 
the art spaces not only into the back of house plant and the very construction of the 
renovated building itself, but also into the books and narratives of the BALTIC story. 
Indeed, the ways in which the BALTIC story reiterates this notion of flexible 
dispositions is particularly telling; for if the installations’ themes illustrate that their 
performativities of space are not contiguous with enclosure within BALTIC’s four 
walls, then the BALTIC story illustrates that the four walls of BALTIC need not even 
be contiguous with its own ‘sense of self’. For BALTIC’s performativities of flexibility 
are neither as flexible nor as different from those of security as the BALTIC story 
would suggest, and as I now discuss. 
The consistent and insistent performativity of flexibility at BALTIC is far from 
accidental or indeed obvious. Instead, it points to the authority of the modernist 
gallery. In a set of three seminal essays published in the magazine Artforum in 1976 
and reprinted in 2000, artist and writer Brian O’Doherty unleashed a scathing 
critique of the postwar and predominantly western modernist art gallery which he 
referred to as the ‘white cube’. These essays confronted the ‘assumptions on which 
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the modern commercial and museum gallery were based’, in particular, the ‘complex 
and sophisticated relationship between economics, social context, and aesthetics as 
represented in the gallery space and system (O’Doherty, 2000: inside front cover, 
emphasis added).  
O’Doherty contrasts the modernist white cube with the nineteenth century 
Salon gallery, demonstrated by Samuel Morse’s painting Exhibition Gallery at the 
Louvre, 1832-33 (see figure 4.6). The Salon, O’Doherty explains, ‘implicitly defines  
Figure 4.6 Samuel Morse’s Exhibition Gallery at the Louvre painting, 1832-33.95 
Figure 4.7 Yoko Ono’s Between the Sky and My Head installation, December 2008 – March 
2009, in BALTIC’s Level 4 art space.96 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Taken from http://faculty.washington.edu/dillon/Morse_Gallery/ (Accessed 5 August 2011). 
96 Davison. C. (2009) Yoko Ono: Between the Sky and My Head: Exhibition Image (01) [Online]. Available 
at http://archive.balticmill.com/showmediaframe_nl.php?file=L40697.jpg (Accessed 5 September 2011). 	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what a gallery is, a definition appropriate for the esthetics of the period’: specifically, 
‘a gallery is a place with a wall, which is covered with a wall of pictures’ (2000: 15). In 
this sense, Morse’s painting depicts a scene which is ‘upsetting to the modern eye: 
masterpieces as wallpaper’ (O’Doherty, 2000: 16). The rationale for this 
arrangement was that ‘each picture was seen as a self-contained entity’, separated 
from each other by a heavy frame and the unified perspective contained within the 
painting (O’Doherty, 2000: 16). Space in the nineteenth century Salon was 
‘discontinuous and categorizable, just as the houses in which these pictures hung had 
different rooms for different functions’ (O’Doherty, 2000: 16). As Foucault has 
already argued in 1970’s The Order of Things, the nineteenth century mind was 
‘taxonomic’, and its eye ‘recognized hierarchies of genre and the authority of the 
frame’ (O’Doherty, 2000: 16). 
In contrast, in the postwar white cube, wall, floor, and ceiling melt into one, 
demonstrated by BALTIC’s Level 4 art space in figure 4.7. The gallery, O’Doherty 
explains, was ‘filled with consciousness. Its walls became ground, its floor a pedestal, 
its corners vortices, its ceiling a frozen sky’ (2000: 20). Rather than the heavy picture 
frame which indicated that ‘art’ was located within its parameters, the white cube 
itself became the signifier. According to Thomas McEvilley, who wrote the 
introduction to the reprinted essays, art ‘stepped once and for all outside the frame 
of the painting and made the gallery space itself the primary material to be altered by 
art’ (2000: 10). For this reason, in the white cube art was not only ‘what was 
deposited therein’, but also ‘all impediments except ‘art’’ had to be removed; so that 
‘once completed by the withdrawal of all apparent content’, the white cube becomes 
‘a zero space, infinitely mutable’ (O’Doherty, 2000: 87). ‘Is the empty gallery’, 
O’Doherty asks, ‘modernism’s greatest invention?’ (2000: 87, emphasis added).  
 In O’Doherty’s reading, performativities of space at the white cube gallery do 
not reiterate and materialise ‘infinitely mutable’ space as an innocent backdrop to 
new and emerging genres of art, such as collage and installation. Zero space is a 
discourse – in O’Doherty’s view, a specifically modernist discourse - by which 
through a process of ‘productive constraint’ certain practices, dispositions, and 
arrangements are made possible (Butler, 1993: x). It is in relation to this discourse of 
zero space, then, that I argue both performativities of space and performativities of 
security at BALTIC must be understood.  
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4.5 BALTIC the neo-white cube and the politics of ‘zero space’ 
 
… galleries are in the paradoxical position of editing the products that 
extend consciousness, and so contribute, in a liberal way, to the necessary 
anesthesia of the masses – which goes under the guise of entertainment, in 
turn the laissez-faire product of leisure – Brian O’Doherty.97  
 
Although in his guidebook, Guest (2008: 14-15) claims that BALTIC has made ‘a 
conscious attempt to avoid creating spaces that would be the classic, bland ‘white 
cubes’ so beloved of the contemporary art gallery’, it nonetheless apes them in many 
ways (see figure 4.8). 
Figure 4.8 BALTIC’s neo-white cube art space on Level 4.98 
 
For the white cube has its own ‘rigorous laws’ which reiterate modernism’s ‘laws of 
progress’, as O’Doherty explains:   
 
The outside world must not come in, so windows are usually sealed off. Walls 
are painted white. The ceiling becomes the source of light. The wooden floor 
is polished so that you click along clinically… The art is free, as the saying used 
to go, ‘to take on its own life’ (2000: 13,15). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 2000: 90. 
98 Riddy, J. (2002) BALTIC: Level 4 Art Space – empty (01) [Online]. Available at 
http://archive.balticmill.com/index.php?itemid=25611&fromsearch=level%204&position=10&numresult
s=103&start=&tab=Image (Accessed 5 September 2011). 
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In BALTIC’s art spaces, the walls are also painted white, the ceiling is the only source 
of natural light (for Level 4 – the other art spaces have no natural light source), and 
it has a wooden floor.99 BALTIC is, then, a neo-white cube. 
The white cube – or in BALTIC’s case, the neo-white cube - is a ‘highly 
controlled context’ (McEvilley, 2000: 7). Complying with certain ‘laws’ - white walls, 
no windows, wood floors – the white cube materialises a form of control which is 
spatial, but more importantly McEvilley and O’Doherty argue, is also a form of social 
control. The white cube, not unlike a religious building, is designed to eliminate 
awareness of time and place, wherein the artworks are ‘like religious verities… 
untouched by time and its vicissitudes’ (McEvilley, 2000: 7). This is the space of 
‘eternal display’: ‘a kind of non-space, ultra-space, or ideal space where the 
surrounding matrix of space-time is symbolically annulled’ (McEvilley, 2000: 8). But 
the space of ‘eternal display’ is at the same time a political manoeuvre: 
 
The eternity suggested in our exhibition spaces is ostensibly that of artistic 
posterity, of undying beauty, of the masterpiece. But in fact… by suggesting 
eternal ratification of a certain sensibility, the white cube suggests the eternal 
ratification of the claims of the caste or group sharing that sensibility. As a 
ritual place of meeting for members of that caste or group, it censors out the 
world of social variation, promoting a sense of the sole reality of its own point 
of view and, consequently, its endurance or eternal rightness (McEvilley, 2000: 
9).   
 
The form of control in the white cube is not just then a problem for curators to 
mediate and for artists to circumvent and subvert, for it reproduces and reaffirms 
the ‘political interests of a class or ruling group’ – specifically, O’Doherty claims, the 
‘liberal way’ - ‘attempting to consolidate its grip on power by seeking ratification 
from eternity’ (McEvilley, 2000: 8). The performativities of zero space which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 And not just any wood floor. They are made from 200-year old swedish pine trees grown north of 
the polar circle, and for every tree felled, another was planted (B.HERE: 39). The wooden flooring, 
Guest explains, gives ‘an appropriate natural and workshop feel’, and was untreated ‘so that the floors 
could wear honestly with age’ (2008: 19, emphasis added). At the time, Director Sune Nordgren 
claimed that the mantra for the building, inside and out, was ‘truth to materials… nothing is painted, 
nothing is covered’ (Guest, 2008: 19). This ‘truth to materials’, Nordgren wrote elsewhere, is the 
‘same attitude that I think should run through the whole experience of BALTIC’ (B.HERE: 39). 	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materialise this ‘grip on power’ through ritualized repetition are also what McEvilley 
terms ‘a kind of sympathetic magic’: ‘an attempt to obtain something by ritually 
presenting something else that is in some way like the thing that is desired’ 
(McEvilley, 2000: 9). ‘The construction of a supposedly unchanging space’ is 
therefore ‘sympathetic magic to promote unchanginess in the real or non-ritual 
world; it is an attempt to cast an appearance of eternality over the status quo in 
terms of social values’ (McEvilley, 2000: 9).  
Security practices at BALTIC, as performativities of zero space, attempt to 
remove all ambiguities within space. This process of emptying space is also a process 
of social censorship which is both made possible by and reaffirms liberal discourses, 
which promote the ‘sole reality’ of one particular point of view and its ‘eternal 
rightness’, rather than the desire to save lives. In this way, the space of crowded 
places security can also, I think, be considered as an ‘ideal space’. ‘Crowded places’, 
the Working Together to Protect Crowded Places document explains, ‘are locations 
frequented by the public, which are judged to be possible terrorist targets by virtue 
of their crowd density’ (WTP: 7, emphasis added). The design advice for crowded 
places in PCP details case studies of a ‘busy regional shopping centre’, a ‘large busy 
railway station’, and a sports stadium which, due to its success in protective security, 
becomes not more zero-ed but even busier as a ‘favoured venue for high profile 
business conferences’ (pp. 34-5, emphasis added). While the recipients of crowded 
places security practices are no doubt ‘real’ places, the space of crowded places 
security itself is an ideal space to the extent that it is only secure when it is cleared 
out and ordered, even though such a state of emptiness and stasis would undermine 
the claims to vulnerability to terrorist attack – accessibility, availability, and 
‘economic/ political impact’ - in the first place (Home Office, 2010a: 3).  
Returning to Sarah Sze’s Tilting Planet at BALTIC, the exhibition guide claims that 
its ‘impulsive… jumble of colourful components’ would ‘amount to nothing if its 
combination of architecture and objects did not attain a rhythmic order’ (emphasis 
added). 100 ‘This order’, the guide continues, ‘imbues the elements with an urgency of 
placement within her built environment’; it is a ‘fragile ecosystem’.101 One critic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 See BALTIC (2009) Sarah Sze: Tilting Planet: Exhibition Guide [Online]. Available at 
http://archive.balticmill.com/index.php?itemid=41790&fromtermid=26636&position=0&numresults=22
&start=&tab= (Accessed 24 July 2011). 
101 Ibid. 
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wrote of an earlier Sze installation, ‘Bees make honey, beavers made dams, and 
people make plastic’, so that Sze’s ‘obsession to create an expressive order from our 
synthetic surroundings feels somehow natural’ (emphasis added). 102 Approached in 
this way, it is quite clear how installation art can be understood as challenging zero 
space. Tilting Planet performs an order which is ‘rhythmic’, ‘urgent’, and ‘expressive’, 
plainly contrasting with the static order re-inscribed within the white cube. 
Furthermore, Sze’s art is built to break down. The guide describes the ‘inevitable 
destruction and implicit vulnerability of Sze’s art’: 
 
… the disposability of its components and the fragility of its construction 
encourage ‘an experience that feels as though it is limited by time’. You are not 
so much looking at her art as you are witnessing its entropic decay.103   
 
Thus presenting a clear opposition to the ‘enduring’ and ‘eternal’ presence strived 
for by the white cube. Indeed, like crowded places security, zero space in BALTIC is 
never, and can never, be complete because the art spaces, the artworks, and (as I 
illustrate in the next section) the visitors are always changing. 
However, it is important to remember that there are dissenting voices - those 
who believe that contemporary art no longer has the power to challenge or subvert 
the power of the status quo. Jean Baudrillard has argued that contemporary art, 
rather than challenging the ‘material environment’ of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries as Crary would have it, instead reproduces that materialism as rampant 
consumerism and banal politics. ‘My point of view’, he said, ‘is anthropological’:  
 
From this perspective, art no longer seems to have a vital function; it is 
afflicted by the same fate that extinguishes value, by the same loss of 
transcendence. Art has not escaped this tendency to effectuate everything, this 
drive to make everything totally visible to which the West has arrived. But 
hypervisibility is a way to extinguish sight (2005: 65, emphasis added). 
 
So, as art has lost its transcendent value (in Baudrillard’s opinion), it has come to 
privilege value in and of itself: in other words, art has become a market. Similarly, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid.	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art critic Donald Kuspit writes in his 2004 book The End of Art that, ‘art has been 
subtly poisoned by social appropriation, that is, the emphasis on its commercial value 
and its treatment as upscale entertainment, turning it into a species of social capital’ 
(p. 8). 
These counter-arguments that contemporary art can ‘no longer’ challenge 
political conservatism rely on the view that art did once hold a privileged position as 
social critique, and of the art gallery as, to a greater or less extent, indivisible from 
that status. In the same mode, in March 2002 Peter Hewitt, then Director of the 
Arts Council of England, argued that the arts were uniquely placed to help the public 
understand and even control feelings of terror and trauma after the September 11 
attacks. Music, poetry, and prose he said can ‘provide a common language to share 
deeply intimate feelings of grief and sorrow. Art provides a bridge to coax the 
private and intimate out into a shared, public setting’ (Hewitt, 2002: 5). In recent 
years the so-called ‘aesthetic turn’ has introduced these narratives formally into the 
social sciences (see for example Bleiker, 2009), to the extent that referencing a 
book, a film, or an artwork has become a sort of shorthand for critique, often to the 
point of banality. 
Certainly from my own experience at BALTIC it is difficult to challenge an 
interpretation like that of Kuspit’s, in light of the elephantine apparatus around, and 
the huge effort that goes into, ‘securing’ an artwork based on criteria set down by 
the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS) which underwrites the financial risk of 
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4.6 Security awareness in crowded places 
 
The crowded places security advice for visitor attractions emphasises the 
importance of ‘security awareness’, while at the same time acknowledging ‘there is a 
need to maintain a friendly and welcoming atmosphere within visitor attraction 
environments’ rather than a ‘fortress mentality’ (CPAVA: 5). Indeed, the vulnerability 
of crowded places to terrorist attack is based precisely on their busy-ness and 
business: accessible and available spaces offer the ‘prospect for an impact beyond the 
loss of life alone’, for example ‘serious disruption or a particular economical/ political 
impact’ (PCP: 3). It may even be possible to say (within discursive parameters) that 
crowded places become more vulnerable in direct proportion to their accessibility 
and availability. This only heightens awareness that the zero space materialised by 
crowded places security is an ‘ideal’ space, but it is no less problematic for that - 
reiterating and promoting as it does an ‘unchangingness in the real world’, specifically 
a liberal status quo.  
BALTIC appears to fit into this mould of the crowded place in terms of 
accessibility and availability. It does not have a bag search or, indeed, any kind of 
security screening process at its public entrance, preferring instead for visitors to 
enter and leave freely, and, if appropriate, to leave large bags in lockers off to the 
side of the reception desk. This process is certainly assumed to enhance the 
accessibility of BALTIC. The decision not to have a bag search was described to me 
in an interview as an ‘internal political decision’ made by the previous director Sune 
Nordgren: ‘the reasoning behind it was not wanting to put people off… it was a 
visitor numbers political game’.104 
This ‘political decision’ in favour of maintaining accessibility and the ‘welcoming 
atmosphere’ described in CPAVA raises, however, precisely the problem of the 
space of security: how to incorporate or bring into line with natural reality that 
which is not known in advance. In the absence of what Jon Coaffee (2009) might 
term ‘territorial interventions’, which would disrupt circulation - in other words 
interfere with the ability of a liberal natural reality to function in relation to itself - 
the excess of accessibility at BALTIC is brought into line – secured - in three main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 For accounts of a much more muscular and visible post-9/11 security regime in the Museum of 
Metropolitan Art, New York, see Danziger (2008).  
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ways. First, through zero-ing space: in addition to the emptying and clearing out 
practices described above, the lockers are also ‘checked daily that nothing is left in 
there… [we] try and secure them as best possible’. Second, through the closed 
circuit TV (CCTV) surveillance of BALTIC’s ‘level 4 control’ security system (see 
chapter 5). Third, through the particular interactions between the BALTIC Crew 
and visitors to BALTIC. 
 
 
4.6.1 Vigilant Crew 
 
In addition to avoiding a ‘fortress mentality’, the practice of security awareness 
in crowded places emphasises a broad-based vigilance which aims to make it easier 
to see ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ behaviour on either side of the public front (see 
Amoore, 2009). So staff should ‘know their own work areas or offices very well’, 
and ‘be alert to anything unusual’ in their colleagues’ ‘behaviour and attitudes’ 
(CPAVA: 15, 34). Once again emphasising that contemporary national security 
practices are just as concerned with prosaic ‘human’ realities as with complex, 
contingent, and emergent ways of life.105 This notion of being vigilant to colleagues’ 
unusual behaviour is represented within crowded places as ‘Personnel security’ 
(CPAVA: 33-36). For alongside the dominant narrative promoted by crowded places 
policy documents, and indeed by the NSS, of a terrorist exploiting the accessibility of 
a shopping centre or nightclub, personnel security addresses the issue of ‘some 
external threats, whether from criminals, terrorists, or competitors seeking a 
business advantage’ making use of the ‘co-operation of an ‘insider’’ (CPAVA: 33). In 
this way, crowded places are encouraged to make use of ‘good recruitment and 
employment practices’: collecting proofs of identity from staff, as well as their 
national insurance numbers and educational qualifications, and verifying that these 
documents are legitimate. ‘Good personnel security’, CPAVA continues, ‘is best 
achieved by creating a culture in which security is accepted’ (p. 35).106  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 So for example the NSS discusses the issue of ‘personnel security’, which necessarily brings in the 
‘expertise and knowledge held by citizens, industry and the third sector’ (2009: 79). 
106 CONTEST also discusses personnel security and the so-called ‘insider threat’ as part of the 
Protect workstream and the protective security of the UK’s assets, which includes crowded places. 
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) provides personnel security advice 
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Staff vigilance must also, of course, be trained on the public: staff should ‘look 
out’ for the now familiar ‘items out of place’ and ‘unusual behaviour’ (CPAVA: 15). 
They should have the ‘confidence to report any suspicions, knowing that reports – 
including false alarms – will be taken seriously’; no doubt part of an idealised 
crowded places ‘security culture’ (CPAVA: 15). In BALTIC, the Crew members – the 
staff who are in situ in the public areas and identified by their distinctive black and 
white t-shirts – were described to me as being ‘really vigilant’: ‘they’re vigilant 
because of the artworks being damaged but also they’re conscious of their own 
space’. In this way, if an item is ‘out of place’, like an object in a plastic bag in an 
artwork, ‘it would be noted straight away, there’s a reporting process to it, radio 
alarm, messages, and procedures in place for us to back up to that’. 
During the interviews, the importance and competence of the BALTIC Crew in 
security was continually emphasised. They are trained in security procedures when 
they commence employment: everything from how to use security radios to 
evacuation routes. They were described to me as being, alongside CCTV and 
intruder detection systems (see chapter 5), the ‘third prong’ of BALTIC’s security 
regime. But in an important sense, just as biopolitical performativities attempt to 
bring into line with a liberal natural reality that which cannot be known in advance, 
staff vigilance must exceed specific security practices and policies. As I was told, ‘you 
can’t write a policy for every single incident, as in what if it is there [a bomb], what if 
it is there, what if this happens’. In general, the ‘right people are there to make the 
decision in the situation they find themselves in’. In other words, in the space of 
security at BALTIC the staff play a key role in the knowledges and practices by which 
the unanticipated challenges of accessibility are governed. 
Furthermore, these knowledges and practices rely on what is portrayed as a 
unique relationship between BALTIC Crew and the public. BALTIC’s main priority is 
an ‘overall learning experience’ and ‘excellence in service’. Key to this is that the 
Crew are ‘active out there providing art information, engaging with visitors 
proactively’. To make this engagement possible, approximately 80 per cent of the 
Crew (I was told) have their own art practices, and many had completed arts 
degrees at nearby Newcastle and Northumbria universities. In addition to this arts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in order to ‘minimise and manage the risk of staff exploiting legitimate access to an organisation’s 
assets or premises for unauthorised, malicious purposes from theft to terrorism’ (CONTEST: 105-6). 
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experience, BALTIC also requires that the Crew have previous customer 
experience, through retail employment for example.  
Therefore ‘one of the skills BALTIC Crew learn is ‘should I approach that 
person, should I not?’… [it is not] something ‘taught’ as much as it is an intuitive 
thing the Crew members develop’. So the arrangement at other galleries whereby 
staff sit ‘in a corner on a chair with their head down reading an old book’, is 
dismissed at BALTIC. Rather, it is ‘quite proactive walking around the space, [and] it 
is a good deterrent to those who may be thinking along naughty lines’. 
At the time of the interviews, BALTIC staff in line with visits from the two 
Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) attached to Northumbria Police, were 
also preparing to further develop and enhance vigilance with updated procedures for 
reporting ‘unusual behaviour’. The new process identified three categories of unusual 
behaviour: banned; nuisance (‘drugs, teenagers running amok on a skateboard’); and 
suspicious – ‘people who haven’t done anything but just weren’t right’. Suspicious 
people: 
 
… can make staff feel uncomfortable, just with the conversations that they 
have or just the closeness that they get or just an action that seems to worry 
staff, it is that kind of suspicion, and that can often lead to being a nuisance or 
being a banned. 
 
With the updated procedures, ‘[every]thing gets reported in’, including ‘even a 
conversation with a slightly odd person’:107 
 
… in terms of ‘I’ve had a strange conversation and I want to log it with you’. 
As a duty manager then we log those instances, and you can then start to build 
up some visitors’ patterns of strange behaviour. 
 
As well as ‘strange conversations’, other logged visitor behaviours include 
‘whether someone’s a bit active with a camera’ or ‘they’re just actively strange 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 It was not made clear whether in practice all conversations with so-called ‘odd persons’ are 
recorded. Certainly my impression was that the interviewee was keen to emphasise that BALTIC 
took the issue of odd/strange/suspicious behaviour seriously, as it is a key part of crowded places and 
counter-terrorism security. 
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around the space… and if we have CCTV footage of them then that goes in the file 
as well’. The fact that being ‘a bit active with a camera’ counts as potentially 
suspicious behaviour at BALTIC is ironic in two ways. First, in relation to its 
intensively visual security regimes: staff vigilance of their colleagues and the general 
public, and the use of extensive use of CCTV (see chapter 5). Second, because 
alongside the emphasis placed by installation art upon materiality and sensory and 
immersive encounters between artwork and art viewer, BALTIC’s visitors are in an 
important sense still spectators – they are there to see the art. The way that 
divisions are effected between what Louise Amoore (2009) has termed legitimate 
‘lines of sight’ – of the art – and illegitimate ‘lines of sight’ – capturing views on 
camera - are therefore a key part in crowded places security, as they are in other 
security practices of the war on terror’s ‘homefront’.  
Finally, a large part of the Crew’s public vigilance role consists of preventing 
visitors from touching the artworks: 
 
… those conversations [between staff about suspicious behaviour] often start 
if someone was persistent in wanting to touch that work then it would become 
slightly abnormal behaviour once you’re told [not to] and you continue to do 
that. 
 
For BALTIC the immediate issue is that artworks are sensitive and valuable, and ‘can 
get damaged by thousands of people touching it every day’. William Bogard (2007), 
however, has another viewpoint on this regulation of touch in his essay on the role 
of haptic technologies – the electronic mimicking or simulation of the body’s sense 
of touch – which he conceptualises (after Deleuze) as a flexible form of control 
analogous to a serpent’s coil. Haptic or ‘tactile control’, he writes, ‘manage[s] and 
counter[s] the body’s most basic capacity to resist, its sensitivity to its own power’ 
(Bogard, 2007: 2, emphasis added). In this way, he argues that tactile control 
supplements the ‘optical control’ of surveillant technologies: 
 
… because they enclose the body at its surface, effectively reducing the 
interior to the body itself, coils form a kind of mobile confinement. 
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Surrounding you as you go out the door and into the open, they go where you 
go, or stay where you stay (Bogard, 2007: 3). 
 
However, it is important to add here that recent scholarship, and indeed the case of 
crowded places security, illustrates that ‘optical control’ is still very much a part of 
contemporary security regimes, be it through surveillance (Lyons, 2007, 2003) or 
more insidious forms of securitised ways of seeing (Amoore, 2007). 
In the same way, the primary reason for having the lockers to the side of the 
front entrance was to protect the art from physical contact with visitors: 
 
… to be honest, the reason we have lockers is for the protection of the 
artworks. Somebody going in with a great big rucksack – and I’m not trying to 
justify it, you have to say well it is only art what are we trying to protect? – but 
on Level 4 the pieces can be so fragile… a great big bloody Berghaus flying 
around isn’t going to help.108 
 
This is not to say that, for BALTIC staff, the lockers do not also serve an important 
security function, but I think that in important ways the performativities of security 
awareness and staff vigilance at BALTIC illustrate an unwillingness to cede the 
authority of art and the neo-white cube to that of security. 
The role of the lockers also indicates another dimension of the authority of the 
neo-white cube: the protection of the value of artworks, even to an extent which is 
contradictory to the aims of installation art to provide immersive, sensory 
environments. In an essay on the performativities of art spaces, published to 
accompany an exhibition of the Zabludowicz Collection titled When We Build Let Us 
Think That We Build Forever at BALTIC between September 2007–January 2008, JJ 
Charlesworth explains that ‘there is a way in which spaces and objects go together, 
which tells us what they are, what they are for, and what we should do with them’ 
(2007: 11). This is why, he continues, Marcel Duchamp’s upside-down urinal Fountain 
– ‘the founding myth of modern art’ - caused such controversy when it was 
submitted to an exhibition of the Society of Independent Artists in New York in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Berghaus is a popular manufacturer of rucksacks and outdoor equipment. 
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1917 (Charlesworth, 2007: 12). Not because Fountain demonstrated that ‘anything 
can be art’, but rather that ‘art is produced by a context of attention’: 
 
… when we walk into a supermarket and buy a box of soap powder, we don’t 
set it apart, contemplate it for a while, then leave. If we enter an art gallery, 
contemplating a urinal produces a sort of feedback loop, in which we notice that 
the thing we are looking at somehow rejects or rebuffs the way we anticipate 
looking at it (Charlesworth, 2007: 12). 
 
The context of attention in an art gallery, then, is determined by ‘effects of visual 
concentration’ that point to the presence of art: Duchamp’s Fountain was placed on a 
plinth to distinguish it (with intended irony, of course) from an everyday ‘non-art’ 
urinal. Effects of visual concentration are how ‘art commands authority in the space 
in which it is presented’, a performativity of space which is common to other forms 
of ‘privileged’ object: 
 
In commercial culture, the paradoxical dynamic is that the more valuable, desirable 
or expensive the item, the more space around it has to be evacuated of all other 
meaning… the visual paradox of the luxury object, when it is presented, is that it 
demands a zone of visual scarcity around it… It is clear that the technique of 
concentration on an object to be contemplated never was exclusive to the space of 
the gallery’ (Charlesworth, 2007: 14). 
The import of Charlesworth’s analysis is that performativities of ‘concentration’ 
are, like performativities of zero space, at the same time performativities of valuing 
and de-valuing. It is this process of commercial valuing which much contemporary art 
tries to subvert (even if Jean Baudrillard argued that it fails). If Duchamp had placed a 
diamond on the plinth instead of a urinal, would there have been the same 
controversy over whether it was art? Indeed, this is more or less what the artist 
Damien Hirst did nearly a century later with his For the Love of God sculpture: a 
diamond-encrusted skull which cost £14 million to make in 2007, and was sold in 
August that year for £50 million.109 In the next chapter I explore the question that if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 There are, however, rumours that Hirst was not able to find a buyer, and so ‘bought’ it himself for 
less than the £50 million asking price. 
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BALTIC did not have to protect valuable artworks – as opposed to valuable people - 





In this chapter I argued that crowded places security at BALTIC is not 
performed in an innocent space. Instead, its performativities of zero space, emptying 
out and putting everything in its place, cite and reproduce the authority of the 
modernist gallery. And, as Brian O’Doherty argued in Inside the White Cube, the 
authority of the modernist gallery is itself a kind of ‘sympathetic magic’ which cites 
and reinscribes ‘unchangingness in the real world’: specifically the unchangingness of 
a western liberal status quo. It is therefore crucial to disregard once and for all the 
assumption that public spaces are an apolitical backdrop to contemporary security 
practices like crowded places; an assumption aptly represented by the question put 
to me more than once, ‘what has an art gallery got to do with security?’ Security at 
BALTIC is a front in the war on terror – its inclusion in crowded places counter-
terrorism since 2007 demonstrates that. But more than this, security practices at 
BALTIC cite and reinscribe already deeply politicised performativities of space.  
Practices of emptying space and putting everything in its place may allow for the 
quicker identification of bombs or other potentially harmful objects, as with the 
discovery of a concealed plastic object in The Hoerengracht exhibit (which turned out 
to be a lunch box). But the result of counter-terrorism practices is different from, or 
at least not mutually inclusive with, the discourses they draw on and indeed depend 
on for their coherence. And the meaning of coherence here can include the reason 
that many people (not least the government and other officials who put together 
regimes like crowded places, and the individuals who carry them out) do not seem 
to think it curious, illogical, or question that ‘crowded’ places can only be truly 
secure when they are cleared out and ordered, even though such a state of 
emptiness and stasis would undermine the very claims to vulnerability to terrorist 
attack – accessibility, availability, and ‘economic/ political impact’ - in the first place. 
Perhaps this is because the people who devise counter-terrorism policy recognise 
that the aim of total security is unrealistic and, indeed, undesirable. Nonetheless this 
	   194	  
does not stop them rolling out crowded places security to high street businesses and 
public services across England.  
In this chapter, then, I have considered one discourse that crowded places 
security might be considered to cite: the authority of the modernist art gallery and 
the freedom of art. An important part of this citation is the paying of homage to 
what O’Doherty referred to as the ‘god of the empty gallery’: ‘once completed by 
the withdrawal of all apparent content’, he writes, ‘the gallery becomes a zero space, 
infinitely mutable’ (2000: 87). And I have looked at how, in this way, security 
practices at BALTIC perform a deeply politicised ‘zero space’. I have considered this 
performativity of space before. In chapter 2 I argued that the ‘broadened’ globalised 
spatialities of the NSS make possible a ‘broader range’ of coercive and violent 
responses. In chapter 3, I argued that the privileging of emergent circulating forms of 
life, while intended as critique, instead bleaches out the closures resulting from 
biopolitical performativities of space and identity. 
Therefore the performativity of zero space in the ‘white cube’ gallery – or, in 
BALTIC’s case, the ‘neo-white cube’ – is far from being only an issue for artists and 
curators. The construction of an empty, static space at BALTIC as a backdrop to 
everything that occurs within it – art, visitors, eating, drinking, and so on - is 
‘sympathetic magic’ to ‘promote unchangingness in the real world… to cast an 
appearance of eternality over the status quo’ (McEvilley, 2000: 9). In this way, my 
main argument of the chapter is that the objective of crowded places security to 
empty or ‘zero’ space at BALTIC functions – perhaps primarily functions - to 
reproduce dominant liberal discourses – the same discourses which Foucault argued 
are reproduced as biopolitical forms of control. In the next chapter I further explore 
biopolitical control through crowded places performativities of risk and control. Just 
as BALTIC does not have exclusive rights to the performativities of space within its 
four walls, these performativities illustrate the ways in which the control of space in 
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Chapter 5 Crowded places security II – Risk 
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5.1 Introduction 
  
In this chapter I explore how in addition to performativities of zero space, made 
possible by and reaffirming norms of what Brian O’Doherty terms the ‘liberal way’ 
and its ‘eternal rightness’, crowded places security is also materialised through 
performativities of risk and control. Since BALTIC opened in 2002, the Government 
Indemnity Scheme (GIS) and its particular performativities of risk around the 
exhibiting of valuable artworks in public buildings have dominated security practices. 
After 2007, however, these have increasingly taken place alongside performativities 
of ‘terrorism risk’ through the work of the Counter-Terrorism Security Adviser 
(CTSA) network. In addition, the GIS and CTSAs are also both responsible for the 
installation at BALTIC of a sophisticated security assemblage known as ‘level 4 
control’. 
I begin in section 5.2 by introducing the GIS and discussing how it performs 
specific forms of risk through the reproduction of artworks as ‘indemnified material’ 
- at the expense, it must be noted, of other inanimate objects as well as living 
persons. In the second part of the section I discuss competing conceptualisations of 
the relationship between risk, insurance, and security in the war on terror. On one 
side can be considered to be Ulrich Beck’s (1999) influential ‘world risk society’ 
thesis, which holds that terrorism represents an unknowable and thus uninsurable 
catastrophic risk. Ranged on the other side are a number of scholars from both 
security studies and political economy who argue that contemporary insurance 
technologies are characterised by their embracing of risk - what Aradau and van 
Munster describe in terms of ‘a permanent adjustment’ (2007: 89) - rather than its 
avoidance, including ‘catastrophic risks’ such as terrorism. Following on from this 
second group of arguments then, I argue that the GIS illustrates a number of key 
points about the use of insurance technologies in the security of public spaces.  
In section 5.3, I explore how crowded places security is also materialised by 
performativities of ‘terrorism risk’ through the work of the two CTSAs attached to 
Northumbria Police. In particular, I look at how the CTSAs perform the terrorism 
risk of high street businesses, including BALTIC and its neighbours, in two ways: first, 
through the so-called ‘crowded places risk assessment’; and second, through their 
organisation of the ‘Project Argus’ counter-terrorism event. My key argument in this 
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section is that the work of the CTSAs (re)produces so-called ‘business sectors’ not 
individuals as the privileged objects of crowded places security. In so doing, crowded 
places security is more usefully understood in terms of regulatory norms which first 
and foremost value the economic activity of the UK’s business places and, moreover, 
its continuity. In this way, whilst the GIS can be considered to materialise norms 
associated with the value of the artworks, crowded places risk is geared towards the 
‘value’ of business continuity. 
In section 5.4, I move on to consider how crowded places security is 
materialised through biopolitical performativities of control primarily through 
BALTIC’s ‘level 4 control’ security system. After setting out the different aspects of 
level 4 control – CCTV, intruder detection, and the networked ‘steel box’ - in the 
second part of the section I discuss different ways of conceptualising ‘biopolitical 
control’ (Lacy, 2008: 339) as that which brings the excess of liberal norms into line 
with so-called ‘natural reality’ (STP: 41). In the third part I argue that much of this 
scholarship with its emphasis on the repressive aspects of control, misses the point 
of Foucault’s original argument: that the norms of biopolitics make and exhort life to 
live. Recognising the distinction between on the one hand, living one’s life, and on 
the other, that which exhorts and makes possible the living of life in certain ways, 
may release the possibilities of a ‘counter-politics’ to biopolitics (Gordon, 1991). 
Finally, I consider how different practices in BALTIC speak back to control, thereby 
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5.2 The Government Indemnity Scheme – Risk and security 
 
As a technology for managing risk, insurance extends far beyond what might 
ordinarily be understood as the insurance field – Tom Baker and Jonathan 
Simon.110  
 
BALTIC’s head of security described his two main priorities thus: ‘first of all, 
we’ve got the art side, the security of the art work, obviously for their value, and 
[second] also anti-terrorism… as in the normal security, as in every day-to-day life’. 
The first priority, then, is the security of the art work ‘obviously for their value’; and in 
particular, this is the ‘quite strict conditions of government indemnity insurance’, 
without which ‘we couldn’t insure quite a few of our exhibitions, couldn’t afford it’. 
Government indemnity insurance is the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS), run 
by the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA) for the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport. The GIS guidelines (hereafter GISG) explain that the 
borrower, i.e. BALTIC, pays a notional premium of around 0.5 per cent of a 
commercial insurance premium, in order for the Government to ‘underwrite[s] the 
risk of loss of, or damage to, objects loaned for the public benefit to museums, 
galleries, libraries, the National Trust and other similar bodies’ (Museums, Libraries 
and Archives Council: 5). 111  BALTIC as the borrower accepts a minimum liability of 
£300 for each object, plus one per cent if the object is valued at £4000 or above 
(GISG: 32). 
The Government Indemnity Scheme comes under the MLA’s remit to ‘protect 
cultural property’, which includes other measures such as export controls112 and tax 
incentives (GISG: 4). 113 The specific purpose of the scheme is ‘to enhance and widen 
access to objects of a scientific, technological, artistic or historic nature’ for ‘the 
benefit of the public within the United Kingdom’ (GISG: 4, emphasis added). Because 
any money paid out under the terms of the scheme ‘falls on the UK public purse’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 2002: 8. 
111 On risk and disaster management specifically in libraries and archives see Matthews and Feather 
(2003). 
112 The MLA issues licences for the export from the UK of ‘cultural objects’ which are over 50 years 
of age and valued over specific thresholds. See ‘Export controls’ on the MLA website. Available at 
http://www.mla.gov.uk/what/cultural/export (Accessed 17 April 2011). 
113 For example, UK taxpayers can transfer a work of art into public ownership in lieu of paying 
Inheritance Tax. See ‘Tax Incentives’ on the MLA website. Available at 
http://www.mla.gov.uk/what/cultural/tax (Accessed 17 April 2011). 
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(GISG: 4), the guidelines are absolutely clear on two points. First, the valuation on 
which the indemnity is based ‘should represent a fair estimate of the value that the 
object might reach if sold on the open market at the time of loan’, and the MLA may 
seek ‘expert advice’ if borrowers, in consultation with the owner, present a 
valuation that is too high (GISG: 13) (for critical discussions of pricing in the 
international art market see Velthius, 2003 and Werner, 2005). Second, the loan 
must meet the stipulated security conditions: ‘indemnity will only be issued when the 
loan in question is made in accordance with MLA’s security… guidelines’ (GISG: 12). 
 
 
5.2.1 Indemnified material 
 
At BALTIC, the Government Indemnity Scheme can be considered to make 
possible the public display of art, and thus the accompanying business of an art 
gallery, only when the calculated risks of access have been met by the imposition of 
its security conditions. As a result, the GIS has a major role in performing security at 
BALTIC in two ways: first, through the ‘level 4 control’ security system which I 
discuss in section 5.4; and second, through the reproduction of ‘objects of a artistic 
nature’ as ‘indemnified material’ in need of extensive protection, which in turn 
(re)produces particular, and sometimes contradictory, ways of valuing and securing 
objects and people. 
To begin, in terms of architecture the GIS conditions state that the ‘indemnified 
material must be accommodated in a strong building which has physically well-
protected windows, doors and skylights’ (GISG: 54). In the previous chapter I 
discussed Keller Easterling’s arguments regarding the political uses of 
performativities of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ in architecture. The GIS reappropriates the 
‘strength’ of the BALTIC building – which itself went through several stages of 
softening and hardening during its conversion from a flour mill to an art gallery - as 
necessary to protect the valuable art works within. Furthermore, in the BALTIC 
story (and in other contemporary art galleries such as Kiasma Museum of 
Contemporary Art in Finland), windows and glass features are materials of openness 
and light – an important way in which gallery spaces perform the ‘transcendental’ 
experience of art. In the GIS security conditions, however, glass is a hard substance 
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which plays a crucial role in ‘well-protected windows’, and in the ‘anti-bandit 
laminated glazing’ which must be used for the display cases of ‘small portable’ 
indemnified material such as gold, silver, and jewellery (GISG: 54).   
Crowded places security effects yet another recombination of these qualities, 
whereby the hardness of glass is a source of both security and danger. NaCTSO’s 
counter-terrorism advice for visitor attractions (CPAVA) emphasises that ‘good 
quality doors and windows are essential to ensure building security’ (p. 16). But it 
continues with an important proviso: ‘many casualities in urban terrorist attacks are 
caused by flying glass, especially in modern buildings and glazing protection is an 
important casualty reduction measure’ (CPAVA: 16). This lethal combination of glass 
and bomb is a recurrent theme. In the typology of ‘explosive effects’ provided by 
Protecting crowded places. Design and Technical Issues (PCP),114 glass (and roof slates, 
timber, and metal) constitutes a ‘secondary fragment’ of a bomb (PCP: 6). After the 
‘direct weapon effects’, these secondary fragments cause the most fatalities and 
injuries (PCP: 6). As BALTIC’s east and west elevations are made of glass, another, 
largely insurmountable, security issue emerges in relation to evacuation: in the event 
of a terrorist attack, should evacuation routes lead outside – and potentially into the 
path of another bomb - or inside – at the mercy of shattering glass?  
As a result of the danger posed by glass, crowded places security appears to 
recommend minimising its use or avoiding it altogether. CPAVA focuses on the use 
of anti-shatter film, which, in the event of a bombing, holds glass fragments together, 
and is a ‘relatively cheap and rapid improvement to existing glass’ (p. 16). For new 
windows, it advises installing laminated glass (CPAVA: 16). PCP, which is after all the 
crowded places publication specifically addressing the ‘design and technical issues’ of 
counter-terrorism, is more unequivocal: in new buildings it advises consideration of 
‘whether large windows are essential’ and to ‘minimise the use of glazing’ (p. 21). 
Further on, however, when discussing ‘better oversight’ as a best practice example 
of crowded places security, PCP appears to do an about-turn, lauding the example of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 PCP identifies six ‘explosive effects’ deemed relevant to designing-in counter-terrorism protective 
security to new buildings: first, the blast wave, ‘a very fast moving high pressure wave created by the 
rapidly expanding gas of the explosion’; second, the fire ball, ‘created as part of the explosion 
process... local to the seat of the explosion... [and] generally associated with high explosives’; third, 
brisance, ‘the shattering effect’, which is also local to the explosion and associated with high 
explosives; fourth, primary fragments, which are parts of the bomb shattered by the brisance itself 
and secondary fragments; fifth, secondary fragments like ‘glass, roof slates, timber and metal’; and 
sixth, ground shock which is ‘produced by the brisance effect’ (p. 6).	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a major train station’s main hall which has ‘a large expanse of glazing across most of 
the roof area’ (p. 34). The glazing: 
 
... [permits] high levels of natural light and provides an excellent basis for 
natural surveillance. The comprehensive CCTV system has been integrated with 
internal lighting to provide a similar environment in low natural light 
conditions. This is further enhanced by the use of glazed panels in place of solid 
barriers to manage and separate pedestrian traffic and define security zones 
(PCP: 34, emphasis added). 
 
In this demonstration of crowded places security, the capacity of light to support 
‘natural surveillance’, to ‘manage’ pedestrian traffic, and to ‘define’ security zones, 
trumps the dangers of glass. Finally, the changing performativities of the benefits 
and/or dangers of glass within contemporary security programs also points to their 
spatial and historical contingencies; sometimes relying on the latest technological 
advances in blastproof toughened glass, or at other times returning to the 
surveillance qualities of natural light.  
In addition to measures regarding the built environment in the reproduction of 
art objects as indemnified material, there is also a prescribed role for staff. The staff 
in this case are BALTIC Crew, who can always be spotted in the art spaces in their 
black ‘CREW’ t-shirts. ‘We have staff on all floors’, I was told in an interview, ‘every 
floor that’s open to the public has a member of staff on’. This is because the GIS 
conditions demand that ‘all indemnified material must be displayed so that it is 
invigilated by trained personnel’; invigilation literally meaning ‘to watch over’ (GISG: 
54-55). Proper ‘relief arrangements’ must also be made for invigilating staff ‘for their 
relief for refreshment and other purposes’ (GISG: 55). Note, that this is not for the 
comfort of staff, but because ‘they must concentrate on the safety and security of 
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5.2.2 Risk, insurance and security in the war on terror  
 
The Government Indemnity Scheme therefore enjoys a privileged position in 
shaping security at BALTIC, and crowded places security reiterates and indeed 
‘piggybacks’ on the scheme’s performativities of risk. This stands in contrast then to 
Ulrich Beck’s (1999) classic account of the world risk society, which Claudia Aradau 
and Rens van Munster describe as ‘a society in which there are uncontrollable and 
unpredictable dangers against which insurance is impossible’, and whereby so-called 
‘international terrorism’ becomes another example of ‘a risk that goes beyond 
rational calculation into the realm of unpredictable turbulence’ (2007: 90; also 2008). 
However, in opposition to this claim, Aradau and van Munster argue that ‘although 
Beck presents risk society as riddled with risks of which we can have neither 
knowledge nor measure’, the war on terror instead ‘displays an insatiable quest for 
knowledge: profiling populations, surveillance, intelligence, knowledge about 
catastrophe management, prevention etc.’ (2007: 91). Note here that Aradau and 
van Munster’s account includes ‘classical’ disciplinary performativities of surveillance 
alongside the biopolitical profiling of populations. The mass of information gathered 
as part of the war on terror then feeds into the emergence of a ‘precautionary’ 
element in the governmentality of terrorism. ‘What is new’, Aradau and van Munster 
claim, ‘is not so much the advent of a risk society’ but instead ‘the emergence of a 
‘precautionary’ element that has given birth to new configurations of risk that the 
catastrophic prospects of the future be avoided at all costs’ (2007: 91). 
In his work on biopolitical security, Michael Dillon goes further than Aradau and 
van Munster in arguing that the war on terror has not ‘given birth to new 
configurations of risk’ but rather marks the highpoint of modernity’s constitution 
through risk. The ‘commodification of the contingent as risk’, Dillon argues, ‘is not an 
epiphenoma of the social that gives rise to something called risk society’ - rather 
contingency has been the ‘very principle of formation for the social and the political 
alike for some considerable historical time’ (2007a: 9). In Dillon’s reading, 
contingency is a mutation of liberal governance – or at least, it represents liberal 
governance turning back on itself. ‘The contingent that now governs western life’, he 
writes, ‘radically subverts what it first made possible as such – liberal biopolitics – 
widely circulating and intensifying its security neuroses’ (Dillon, 2007a: 9). 
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What both Aradau and van Munster and Dillon are describing, albeit to different 
extents, are the biopolitical performativities of risk associated with what Brian 
O’Doherty termed the ‘liberal way’. These are risks which recognise the challenges 
of the catastrophic – or, as Dillon argues, bring about those challenges by intensifying 
the ‘security neuroses’ of liberal biopolitics - but nonetheless embrace the 
opportunities it presents. In this way, such performativities are enrolled in 
materialising the biopolitical spaces I discussed in chapter 3: the reality natural to 
liberal norms which is paradoxical or even necessarily unstable because it 
simultaneously makes possible both good circulations – which it effects to maximise 
in open seria and ever-wider circuits - and bad circulations – which it effects to 
minimise. 
Insurance is therefore key in materialising biopolitical spaces through its role as 
a contemporary technology – perhaps the dominant contemporary technology – of 
risk. François Ewald (1991: 1999) explains that insurance materialises ‘a certain type 
of objectivity, giving certain familiar events a kind of reality which alters their nature’ 
– specifically, I would argue, a reality which is natural to liberal norms. By 
‘objectivizing certain events as risks’, Ewald claims, ‘insurers can invert their 
meanings: it can make what was previously an obstacle into a possibility. Insurance 
assigns a new mode of existence to previously dreaded events; it creates value’ 
(Ewald, 1999: 199-200, emphasis added). In this way, Richard Ericson and Aaron 
Doyle (2004) argue that American insurance companies were far from rendered 
immobilised by the September 11 attacks and subsequent imaginaries of catastrophic 
terrorism risks, and that the latter can in fact mobilize multiple actions and practices 
(also Bougen, 2003). In the United States, after the attacks the ‘insurance industry, 
along with government… imaginatively reconfigured markets to continue terrorism 
insurance coverage’ (Ericson and Doyle, 2004: 135). This is what Baker and Simon 
refer to as the ‘endurance of the risk-spreading infrastructure’ (2002: 6-7), especially 
with government as the ‘ultimate risk manager’ (Ericson and Doyle, 2004: 135). 
The GIS fits into these arguments because, first, it contradicts assertions about 
the limits to insurability in the ‘world risk society’. The GIS, to borrow from Baker 
and Simon (2002), ‘embraces risk’: for example, it is prepared ‘in exceptional 
circumstances’ to remove the so-called ‘war exclusion’ clause, if the owners of 
artworks are ‘concerned about the risk of terrorism, especially in England or 
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Northern Ireland’ (GISG: 14). Through the GIS, the UK government as the ‘ultimate 
risk manager’ operates security programs which allow cultural-economic activity to 
take place. 
Second, the GIS supports both Baker and Simon and Ewald’s claim that 
insurance is a technology rather than a product or genre of products. The UK 
government does not make profit from the scheme – rather, as the indemnifier of 
art objects it functions as an arbiter of value. Biopolitical security analyses have 
claimed that the ‘value of lives, goods, ideas and services depends on their 
continuous capacity to connect and circulate’ (Lobo-Guerrero, 2010: 3). I disagree 
with this assessment, and instead I would argue that circulation is a biopolitical 
performativity of value, in the sense that it brings forward a reality natural to 






















	   205	  
5.3 The crowded places risk assessment  
 
At the time of the interviews, as I discussed in chapter 1, BALTIC staff had 
neither heard of ‘crowded places’ security nor read any of its publications. 
Nonetheless, they were involved in implementing counter-terror protective security 
– the updating of reporting procedures I discussed in chapter 4, for example – in 
consultation with ‘officers from Project Argus’. These officers are the two CTSAs, 
who, although they are attached to Northumbria Police, are nonetheless managed by 
the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO). In this way the CTSAs 
form a ‘nationwide network’ of (self-styled) ‘local physical security experts’ (WTP: 
12). And their counter-terror work is defined by two main tasks (or at least two 
that are made public): first, to assess the ‘vulnerability’ of crowded places using an 
agreed ‘crowded places risk assessment matrix’ and to advise on protective security 
improvements; and second, to deliver Project Argus events up and down the UK 
(WTP: 18). 115 
The crowded places risk assessment matrix was created by a consortium of 
government security agencies as a result of Lord West’s review of crowded places 
security in summer 2007.116 According to Working Together to Protect Crowded Places, 
West recommended that despite substantial progress having been made in the 
protective security of crowded places, more was needed to turn advice into ‘action 
on the ground’ – in particular through engagement with local authorities and local 
businesses (WTP: 7). The matrix was therefore developed as ‘a standard way of 
assessing vulnerability’, with the CTSA acting as a ‘liaison’ figure (WTP: 18, emphasis 
added). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 It is worth noting that in addition to the crowded places risk assessment there is also a ‘National 
Risk Register’ (NRR), first published by the Labour government in 2008 as part of a commitment 
made in the NSS, and updated and published by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government in 
2010. The NRR contains the government’s ‘most current assessment of the likelihood and potential 
impact of a range of different risks’, and is designed to ‘encourage individuals and organisations to 
think about their own preparedness’ for civil emergencies. See ‘National Risk Register’ on the Cabinet 
Office’s website. Available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/national-risk-register 
(Accessed 10 August 2011). 
116 The consortium was led by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home 
Office, in conjunction with the Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters); 
NaCTSO; the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure; and the Joint Terrorism Analysis 
Centre (JTAC) (WTP: 18).	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The CTSAs exercise their performative agency early and throughout the risk 
assessment process. They begin by ‘drawing up a list of crowded places which may 
be at a relatively high risk of a terrorist attack’ (WTP: 25). This judgment is based on 
an idiosyncratic combination of four types of information: the CTSA’s own 
knowledge of the local area; information about the ‘generic threat crowded places 
face’; the ‘threat profile at particular local sites’ (drawing on crime figures, details of 
licensed premises, and reports from Special Branch and other police offices); and 
lastly, the views of local authorities on the ‘crowded places business sectors that 
feature most prominently in their local area’ (WTP: 18, 25, emphasis added). The 
CTSAs then carry out the risk assessment process in four stages. 
In the first stage, the CTSA ‘filters out’ supposedly ‘low risk’ sites based on ‘an 
assessment of the attractiveness of a site to terrorists and the potential impact of a 
terrorist attack’ (WTP: 25, emphasis added).117 ‘Attractiveness’ is graded on a five-
point scale from ‘Very High’ attractiveness to ‘Very Low’ attractiveness. In the 
second stage, the CTSA produces a judgement about the ‘vulnerability’ of a site, 
once again using the five-point scale. Bringing together a site’s attractiveness and 
vulnerability is assumed to provide the CTSA with ‘an assessment of the relative 
likelihood of a terrorist attack’ (WTP: 25, emphasis added). The third stage, then, is 
the ‘risk assessment of a site’, which seems as if it is the point at which the CTSA 
investigates the site ‘on the ground’ and advises on specific improvements (WTP: 
25).  WTP, however, describes it as the bringing together of the ‘relative likelihood 
and impact of a terrorist attack to provide a measure of the overall relative risk of a 
terrorist attack’ (p. 25, emphasis added). 
BALTIC would perhaps score highly in terms of the likelihood of attack because 
of its attractiveness as a high profile target, in the northeast of England at any rate, 
but at the same time score low in terms of impact. That is to say, with BALTIC’s 
‘level 4 control’ security system, an attempted terrorist attack would be less 
successful than on a similar target with a less sophisticated security system. 
However, it is one of the key points of crowded places security that it is not 
necessarily reducible to individual buildings. So fourth and finally, the CTSA groups 
the ‘risk assessments of individual sites by crowded places sector for each local 
authority area’: for example, ‘a town centre with a group of pubs and nightclubs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 For these ‘low-risk’ sites, NaCTSO developed in 2008 a ‘vulnerability self-assessment tool’ (VSAT) 
which is available through its website	  http://www.nactso.gov.uk/OurServices/VSAT.aspx.  	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adjacent to each other’ (WTP: 25). This is what was described above in terms of 
‘crowded places business sectors’. 
There are three important points to make about the crowded places risk 
assessment. First, although it obviously relies on the accumulation of information 
which Aradau and van Munster (2007) argued is characteristic of the war on terror, 
it must be emphasised that any claims about the veracity and validity of this 
information are themselves performed within narrow discursive parameters. This 
point is crucial, lest, as Louise Amoore has argued, ‘when we advance a critique of 
biopolitical systems in the war on terror, we inadvertently reproduce the certainties 
and assurances of the technical matrix that has become the mainstay of… homeland 
security programmes’ (2006: 338). She continues that the ‘authority of risk profiling 
in the war on terror precisely relies upon the representation of a world that would 
be safer if only ambiguity, ambivalence and uncertainty could be controlled’ 
(Amoore, 2006: 338). 
Second, then, this notion of authority and some form of control over the 
vulnerability attributed to crowded places is precisely what the risk assessment is 
aiming for. Yet in my view, it falls rather short of the mark. The way the assessment 
process is set out in WTP makes the actions taken by the CTSA, and in particular 
how they make their decisions, opaque and almost purposely cryptic, rather than clear 
and straightforward, and for that reason just a shade farcical. For example, at the 
start of the assessment they choose which businesses are at high or low risk to begin 
with, and although they may make use of information from local authorities, police 
colleagues, and the businesses themselves, ultimately the decision is theirs. Also the 
decision process seems to be based on some kind of bizarre quasi-numeric system. 
But instead of 1 + 1= 2, 2 + 1= 3, and 3 + 1= 4, the CTSA adds together the 
attractiveness of a site to terrorists and the potential impact to capture the 
‘attractiveness of site/threat’. To this they add the vulnerability of a site, to come up 
with the ‘relative likelihood of a terrorist attack’; and to relative likelihood is added 
potential impact, to ‘provide a measure of the overall relative risk of a terrorist 
attack’ (WTP: 25). Furthermore, WTP includes the proviso that crowded places risk 
assessments ‘do not reflect a view of the chances of one particular site or area being 
targeted by terrorists’ - rather, the assessments generate ‘the relative risk of a 
crowded place to terrorist attack compared to others’, for the purposes of 
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‘prioritising counter-terrorism protective security activity’ (WTP: 18, emphasis 
added). 
To some extent what appears as a highly artificial process for assessing the 
terrorism risk of crowded places could be done on purpose – or rather, it could 
serve a purpose. The conduct of counter-terrorism remains secretive at the best of 
times, and although BALTIC staff were very generous with information during my 
interviews and participant observation, the two CTSAs at Northumbria Police 
declined to be interviewed on more than one occasion. The results of the crowded 
places risk assessments are not published, being subject to confidentiality 
arrangements under the Government Protective Marking Scheme. Indeed, the 
‘survey’ which is given to individual sites like BALTIC is marked at the ‘Protect - 
Commercial’ level; and the ‘aggregated site information’, referring to for example 
Gateshead quayside where BALTIC is situated, can be marked up to ‘Confidential’ or 
‘Secret’ level (the highest is ‘Top Secret’).118 
What mitigates somewhat against this interpretation of deliberate opacity, 
however, is the fact that the publications provide a great deal of information about 
the specific objectives and dimensions of crowded places security. PCP, for example, 
goes into substantial detail about how the built environment can be planned and 
designed using protective security measures such as bollards to control traffic; 
CCTV; access control; visitor searches; and crowd management. WTP discusses 
how crowded places work is funded and ‘owned’ by lead local partnerships. ‘Options 
include’, it explains, ‘Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and the Resilience 
Network’ (WTP: 5). In the case of BALTIC on Gateshead quayside, the lead local 
partner is Gateshead Council within the Northumbria Local Resilience Forum (LRF). 
WTP’s discussion about responsibilities for crowded places at the local level – 
clarification of which was one of the key aspects of Lord West’s review - also brings 
into view the ‘leadership role’ of police Basic Command Units (BCUs) (WTP: 5). 
BCUs are tasked with briefing the lead local partner and ‘private/third sector 
owners’ of crowded places on risk and vulnerability assessments, ‘so that they are in 
a position to respond’ and vice versa: ‘local businesses’ who are the owners of 
crowded places have ‘key contributions to make’ (WTP: 19, 5). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 For more information on the Government Protective Marking Scheme see the Cabinet Office 
Security Policy Framework [Online]. Available at 
http://interim.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/207318/hmg_security_policy.pdf (Accessed 28 March 2011).	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I think it is more likely, then, that the crowded places risk assessment matrix is 
standardised within England only to the extent that it flows down from policy 
formulation at central government level – in particular, the Home Office. 119  
Likewise, crowded places policy is monitored and evaluated through the centralised 
measures of the Public Service Agreement (PSA) 26, which sets targets for national 
and local government specifically in relation to counter-terrorism, and by the Office 
for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office vis-à-vis the 
‘NaCTSO secure data information channel’ (WTP: 26). But in other important ways 
the risk assessment process is highly idiosyncratic, by which I mean it relies heavily 
on distributed performative agencies. Most notably these are of the CTSAs, who 
decide which businesses are to be fed into the risk assessment and liaise with those 
businesses on a person-to-person level, and of business owners and local authorities 
who have to undertake to do the work to improve their protective security when 
certain vulnerabilities have been ‘identified’. 
As a result of BALTIC’s own risk assessment, staff have begun to develop in 
consultation with the two CTSAs from Northumbria Police a security ‘briefing 
document’ for staff: ‘we’ve met them [the CTSAs] three or four times now to go 
through the paperwork’. This document is what WTP refers to as a ‘crowded places 
action plan’, which should ‘detail the actions that will reduce the vulnerabilities 
highlighted in the risk assessment’; be ‘proportionate to the level of risk’; and ‘set 
out clear and tangible milestones in tracking progress’ (p. 19). As I discussed in 
chapter 4 in relation to staff vigilance, BALTIC’s new security action plan does not 
address individual threats such as terrorism, flooding, or some other emergency. It is 
not possible or certainly not desirable, I was told, to have a security plan addressing 
only one type of incident: ‘[that’s] too tunnelled’. It is, after all, part of the 
materialisation of a biopolitical space of security whereby ever-wider circuits 
precisely mean that everything cannot be known in advance. The plan therefore aims 
to match the ever-wider and unknown rostrum of dangers with a broad, almost ‘one 
size fits all’ approach: ‘you have to look at the ‘what ifs’, it has to be more open to 
cover everything, a more general area… putting all your eggs in one basket is a 
dangerous thing’. The final plan will be ‘a good concise briefing’ for all staff on ‘what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 There are significant variations in crowded places policy in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.	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to expect, because you can never say well, you go to there and you do this, you 
can’t be so specific’.  
The third and final important point about the crowded places risk assessment is 
the use of the concept of ‘attractiveness’ to measure and convey in turn the 
likelihood, potential impact, and overall relative risk of a terrorist attack on a 
crowded place. The three main 2010 crowded places publications all begin by stating 
that ‘crowded places remain an attractive target for international terrorists’ (see 
WTP: 5, PCP: 3, and CPPS: 3). Constructing levels of attractiveness as a way of 
measuring threat and justifying the imposition of added security in public space is, I 
think, a very important development deserving of further investigation, because it 
seems to me to be precisely a way of performing the ever-wider circuits of 
biopolitical security. How is it possible to know in advance what may become 
‘attractive’? Just as the viewer in the art gallery is moved by the art work isolated on 
the plinth, and the consumer desires the luxury object brightly lit on the shop shelf, 
so too terrorists are ‘attracted’ to crowded places. Crowded places are constructed 
as separate from the surrounding urban context because of the values they 
represent – the ability of people to ‘go about their lives freely and with confidence’ – 
and, therefore, the unique ‘economic/political impact’ they offer to terrorists (Home 
Office, 2010a: 4). 120 
 
 
5.3.1 Project Argus and business places 
 
As a result of their increasing involvement in crowded places security, BALTIC 
staff attended a ‘Project Argus’ event delivered by CTSAs on behalf of NaCTSO in 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne city centre. According to NaCTSO’s website, Project Argus 
‘tak[es] businesses through a simulated terrorist attack’, in which participants work 
on their own and with ‘other local business representatives’.121 The event provides ‘a 
unique opportunity’ to learn both ‘valuable lessons helping to protect you, your 
business and your community, whether you are a small chain or a national business’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 As I discussed in section 2.3.2, this aim of ‘going about life freely and with confidence’ is the main 
objective which directly links the NSS, CONTEST and the crowded places policy.	  
121 See ‘Project Argus’ on NaCTSO’s website. Available at 
http://www.nactso.gov.uk/OurServices/Argus.aspx (Accessed 17 March 2011).	  
	   211	  
and the ‘importance of being prepared and having the necessary plans in place to 
help safeguard your staff, customers and your company assets’ (emphasis added). 122 In 
my view, the most important point about Project Argus is how it (re)produces 
crowded places as business places. 
Project Argus is ‘specifically aimed at the various sectors of the business 
community such as retail, leisure, and commercial centres’ (WTP: 23). These sectors 
are reflected in the participants who attended the event in Newcastle alongside 
BALTIC: ‘[we were] with all the public houses, publicans, the big... shopping centres, 
Eldon Square [and] the Gate were in attendance… We went, the Sage went, and did 
this table top exercise’. Eldon Square is a large indoor shopping centre, and the Gate 
is an entertainment complex with an Odeon cinema, a range of restaurants, bars, and 
clubs, and an Aspers casino – both are in central Newcastle. The Sage is a concert 
hall and ‘centre for music education’, and is located on Gateshead quayside adjacent 
to BALTIC. 123 In addition to this Project Argus for ‘retail, leisure, and commercial 
centres’, there is one for night-time economy businesses;124 ‘Argus Professional’ for 
architects and property developers; 125  and ‘Argus Planners’ for, obviously, 
planners. 126  Furthermore, PCP claims that ‘Project Argus will continue to be 
developed as required’ – in other words, as the crowded places security agenda 
identifies more spaces which are ‘attractive’ to terrorists (PCP: 43).   
Like the crowded places security plan, Project Argus focused on the ‘what if?’ of 
a terrorist attack in Newcastle city centre: 
 
…people automatically assume if an incident happens… let’s take for example 
there’s a terrorist attack… everybody thinks that the police and ambulances 
would be here within minutes, well no they’re not, it may be an hour and a half 
before they even attempt to come anywhere near secondary IEDs127 and so on 
and so forth. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Ibid.	  
123 See ‘About the Sage Gateshead – Introduction’ on the Sage’s website. Available at 
http://www.thesagegateshead.org/about/index.aspx (Accessed 23 September 2010).	  
124 See WTP: 12.	  
125 See PCP: 42.	  
126 Ibid.	  
127 IEDs are improvised explosive devices. It was this procedural delay in the arrival of the emergency 
services after the 7/7 bombings that led to so much criticism from the families of victims, and was a 
particular focus of the recent public inquiry, which reported its findings in May 2011. In her final 
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But it is revealing, I think, that in relation to this question of ‘what if?’ BALTIC staff 
did not find Project Argus as useful as another event organised by Gateshead 
Council:  
  
We did another table-top exercise on Gateshead Quay [for] major incidents 
[which was run] by Gateshead Council, which I thought was far more 
productive as it actually talked about site-specific, you know, there’s an 
incident there or this has happened, what would happen then? 
 
Gateshead Quay is styled as an attractive target because of the ‘amount of events 
and high profile buildings’. The high profile buildings include BALTIC of course, and 
the Sage, but also Baltic Square, which hosts open air events like the Evolution 
Weekender music festival, and the Millennium Bridge (or the ‘iconic Gateshead 
Millennium Bridge’). 128  There is also HMS Calliope, headquarters of the Tyne 
Division of the Royal Naval Reserve Unit, which is ‘slap bang in between... us and the 
Sage’.  
So if Project Argus focused on Newcastle city centre, why then were 
Gateshead’s top leisure venues in attendance? Not because a terrorist attack would 
affect any of them through the six ‘explosive effects’ identified in crowded places 
policy: the blast wave; the fire ball; brisance; primary or secondary fragments; or 
ground shock (PCP: 6). Indeed, BALTIC and Newcastle city centre are almost 1km 
apart (as the crow flies), not to mention being separated by the River Tyne. Perhaps 
it was because BALTIC is in the jurisdiction of the Northumbria Police, and it was 
simply more convenient to include them rather than run another event in 
Gateshead?  
Principally, I would argue that BALTIC and the retail, leisure, and commercial 
centres of Newcastle-upon-Tyne are connected to each other in a way which is 
essential to understanding the regulatory norms by which crowded places security is 
materialised. They are the jewels of the ‘NewcastleGateshead’ brand developed by 
the Newcastle and Gateshead Councils to promote the area ‘nationally and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ruling, Lady Justice Hallett concluded that ‘on the balance of probabilities’ the delay of the emergency 
services did not cause or contribute to any of the 52 deaths.	  
128 See ‘About the area – NewcastleGateshead’ on NewcastleGateshead website. Available at 
http://www.newcastlegateshead.com/site/about-the-area/newcastlegateshead (Accessed 17 March 
2011). 
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internationally as a place at the forefront of innovative culture-led regeneration’ ( for 
logo see figure 5.1). 129  In this case, as a consequence of the NewcastleGateshead 
brand and the CTSA’s ‘local knowledge’ of that brand, it may ‘make sense’ for these 
sites to be grouped together as a crowded places business sector (WTP: 25). 
 
Figure 5.1 The logo of the NewcastleGateshead tourist brand.130 
 
Project Argus therefore produces ‘business sectors’ as privileged objects of 
crowded places security, and in so doing situates this genre of counter-terrorism in a 
security discourse quite different to that of the National Security Strategy: business 
continuity. NaCTSO advises that attendance at Project Argus workshops should be 
supplemented with two business continuity publications available on their website: 
Expecting the Unexpected and Secure in the Knowledge. Expecting the Unexpected was 
published by NaCTSO in 2003 in conjunction with London First,131 an organisation of 
the city’s top businesses, and the Business Continuity Institute.132 Secure in the 
Knowledge provides business continuity advice specifically for small and medium-sized 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 See ‘NewcastleGateshead – About Us’ on the NewcastleGateshead website. Available at 
http://www.newcastlegateshead.com/site/about-us (Accessed 3 April 2011). 
130 Taken from the website, available at http://www.newcastlegateshead.com/site/about-us (Accessed 3 
April 2011). 
131See http://www.london-first.co.uk/.	  
132 See http://www.thebci.org/.	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5.4 ‘Level 4 control’ 
 
Finally, in the same way as crowded places security at BALTIC reiterates and 
‘piggybacks’ on the Government Indemnity Scheme’s performativities of risk, it can 
also be conceptualised through performativities of biopolitical control. In accordance 
with the GIS security conditions, indemnified artworks must be displayed at BALTIC 
in ‘level 4’ secure spaces:  
 
... in the insurance industry level 5 is a bank - basically, we have to go to level 4 
on parts of the building, and that involves links to the police, very tight control 
of keys, [and] lock down procedures followed to a tee. 
 
The ‘parts of the building’ is more specifically the third floor, which is described as ‘a 
closed control floor’. ‘Closed control’ has two applications in this context. First, it 
provides environmental control for ‘any artworks that would be sensitive… and 
have to be kept in climate conditions, which is set temperatures, humidity, obviously 
to stop them receiving damage through the environment they’re in’. As the GIS 
guidelines state, the Secretary of State for Culture, as nominal head of the scheme, 
must be satisfied that there is a ‘level of environmental monitoring and control 
necessary for the appropriate and effective care of the object loaned’ (GISG: 13). 
Second, closed control provides protection for the artworks by which the third 
floor can be converted into a so-called ‘steel box’: 
 
... [with] huge steel doors... an alarm separate from the building – neither 
security nor any of our staff have access to that floor, and it is directly linked 
to the police through an alarm which is password and code word protected. 
 
CCTV and intruder detection systems (IDS) are also key elements of ‘level 4 
control’, and they operate both within and beyond the steel box. When BALTIC 
opened in 2002 there were only eight CCTV cameras, and many of the back of 
house areas were not connected to the IDS. Since then, however, BALTIC has 
undergone two major security upgrades: one through ‘working with government 
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indemnity’, and the other, ‘our security review of the whole building’. As a result, 
there are now 44 CCTV cameras: 
 
... and the system that we have, we can put a camera anywhere in the building, 
just using a web browser, for our quiet little corners or areas that we’re 
worried about, whether it is a piece of artwork or... it is cheaper to put a 
camera than it is a person.  
 
Likewise, most of the back of house windows and doors have now been added to 
the IDS – ‘we control back of house areas a lot more now’ - and the system itself 
has been ‘linked up with the [Northumbria] police’.  
Although it is the financial considerations of government indemnity that are the 
most immediate and pressing motivation for BALTIC’s installation of level 4 control, 
at the same time it is difficult to distinguish its usage in terms of individual perceived 
security issues: 
 
… if someone can get into an area to steal, graffiti or vandalise, or leave 
something, [security systems] cover an area that we can’t cover for a multitude 
of reasons. [The upgrades] weren’t specifically done, ‘oh, anti-terrorism, we 
need a camera here’, they were done for ‘we need to control this area’. 
 
In other words, level 4 control is understood in BALTIC as a means to ‘control 
space’ rather than address a specific security threat. 
But what is the ‘control’ of controlling space? Level 4 control obviously fits into 
my earlier discussion about insuring against catastrophic risk. Indeed, insurance 
technologies like that of the GIS materialise a paradox in a way that fits with the 
paradoxical performativities of the biopolitical space of security, which make possible 
economic activity in ever-wider circuits whilst effecting to minimise the resulting 
vulnerabilities. So at the same time as the GIS embraces risk making possible the 
cultural and economic activity of the art gallery, Baker and Simon also discuss how 
insurance technologies increasingly take a ‘zero risk’ approach: ‘taking risks’, they 
write, ‘is only one part of a complex emerging configuration that also includes new 
demands for precaution and even abstinence’ (2002: 7). Likewise, Ericson and Doyle 
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point to insurance’s ‘key but often hidden role in establishing preventive security and 
loss prevention infrastructures, whether based on environmental design, electronic 
surveillance technologies, or private security operatives’ (2004: 139). These risk 
prevention infrastructures: 
 
… are increasingly within the precautionary principle, which emphasises that 
low frequency but high severity risks must be addressed through extraordinary 
control measures that reflect ‘zero tolerance’ and aspire to ‘zero risk’ (Ericson 
and Doyle, 2004: 139, emphasis added). 
 
The GIS with its ‘security condition’ of level 4 control therefore demonstrates how 
the ever-wider circuits of cultural and economic activity also draw forth 
‘extraordinary control measures’. 
Mark Lacy (2008) extends this argument by situating advances in environmental 
design and so-called techniques of ‘geo-engineering’ precisely in terms of intensifying 
control mechanisms. ‘Obsessed with controlling the future, control societies’, he 
writes, ‘seek to find techniques for ‘geo-engineering’ a safe future or developing 
financial techniques to profit from ‘catastrophic risk’’ (Lacy, 2008: 334). Indeed, when 
allied with advances in science and information technology, Lacy suggests that 
precautionary environmental engineering is being ‘supplemented with the adaptation 
principle’: the ‘most extreme plans suggest that responses to global warming/ climate 
change will involve ‘bioengineering ourselves and our environment to survive and 
thrive on an increasingly hot and potentially less hospitable planet’’ (2008: 334). Level 
4 control at BALTIC therefore points towards a development in which 
performativities of risk – mutable and contingent in line with the ever-wider space of 
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5.4.1 Biopolitical control 
 
… control societies simulate disciplinary societies – they have all their ‘feel’ 
without their walls – Bogard.133 
 
The kind of co-presence of enclosed spaces and networked systems represented 
by level 4 control has been theorised in a number of ways. Gilles Deleuze, in a short 
but highly influential essay originally published in L’Autre Journal in 1990 and re-
published in English in 1992 as ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, outlined his theory 
that: 
 
… we are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of 
enclosure – prison, hospital, factory, school, family… It is only a matter of 
administering their last rites and of keeping people employed until the 
installation of the new forces knocking at the door. These are the societies of 
control, which are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies (pp. 3-4, 
emphasis added).  
 
In Deleuze’s formulation, disciplinary societies (located in the eighteenth, nineteenth, 
and early twentieth centuries) were made possible by the production of what he 
variously termed ‘environments of enclosure’, ‘internments’, ‘interiors’, and ‘closed 
systems’ (1992: 3-4). The ‘ideal project’ of environments of enclosure, he wrote, is 
‘to concentrate; to distribute in space; to order in time’ (Deleuze, 1992: 3). As 
Foucault himself put it in the Security, Territory, Population lectures: the ‘first action of 
discipline is… to circumscribe a space in which its power and the mechanisms of its 
power will function fully and without limit’ (STP: 44). 
In contrast, the ‘new monster’ of the control society is made possible by highly 
flexible and adaptable ‘forms of free-floating control’ (Deleuze, 1992: 4). The 
corporation – ‘a spirit, a gas’ - replaces the factory; perpetual training replaces the 
school; and continuous control replaces the examination (Deleuze, 1992: 5). ‘Even 
art’, Deleuze writes, ‘has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open 
circuits of the bank’ (1992: 5). Therefore if enclosures are ‘molds, distinct castings’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 2007: 3.	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controls are ‘a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change 
from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from 
point to point’ (Deleuze, 1992: 4, emphasis in original). As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, William Bogard conceptualises one such expression of this new modulating 
control in terms of haptic or ‘tactile control’. Modulating controls, Bogard writes, 
‘adjust to the body as it moves and wherever it moves… they contract and release in 
waves, substituting for control of the body’s optical environment the regulation of its 
tactile milieu’ (2007: 3, emphasis in original).  
Key to modulating control are the codes and passwords which ‘mark access to 
information, or reject it’; so that the computer, or more precisely the networked 
computer becomes the primary machine of the control society (Deleuze, 1992: 5). 
‘Not that machines are determining’, Deleuze writes, ‘but because they express 
those social forms capable of generating them and using them’ (1992: 6). Bogard 
writes that ‘codes are flexible systems of capture in ways that fixed enclosures are 
not’ (2007: 3). ‘Embedded today in technologies like barcoded ID cards’, he 
continues, ‘and tomorrow in your genetically modified cells, codes eventually aim to 
control capitalist accumulation at the haptic or tactile level’ (Bogard, 2007: 3). 
The way in which BALTIC’s third floor is secured through passwords and code 
words without the intervention of BALTIC’s own staff, in a networked computer 
system coterminous with the police force area of the Northumbria Police,134 most 
obviously equates with Deleuze’s notion of control mechanisms which ‘giv[e] the 
position of any element within an open environment at any given instant (whether 
animal in a reserve or human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar)’ (1992: 
7). Or, as Bogard, puts it: the ‘new [control] mechanisms can position and fix the 
body independently of its location. They expand its territory but more tightly 
control the information parameters within which it functions’ (2007: 2). Ultimately 
what is most important, then, ‘is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each 
person’s position – licit or illicit – and effects a universal modulation’ (Deleuze, 1992: 
7). 
At this point, it is important to emphasise that level 4 control makes use of both 
the barrier - the steel box and the ‘strong’ BALTIC building itself - and the universal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Northumbria Police cover the metropolitan areas of Newcastle, Gateshead, and Sunderland, as 
well as South and North Tyneside boroughs, and county Northumberland. See the website 
http://www.northumbria.police.uk/.	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modulation (aspired to) by networked CCTV and IDS. Going by this evidence, then, 
arguments about the replacement of disciplinary societies by control are somewhat 
premature. Level 4 control could therefore perhaps be better conceptualised using 
Stephen Collier’s ‘topological analysis’ of biopower: which ‘examines how existing 
techniques and technologies of power are re-deployed and recombined in diverse 
assemblies of biopolitical government’ (2009: 79). For Collier, Foucault’s discussion 
of security in STP is as a ‘configurational principle’ that ‘determines how 
heterogeneous elements – techniques, institutional arrangements, material forms and 
other technologies of power – are taken up and recombined’ (2009: 89, emphasis 
added). 
The co-presence or ‘recombination’ in BALTIC of environments of enclosure 
like the steel box, and modulations of control spanning CCTV, intruder detection 
systems, and Northumbria Police’s security system, could therefore suggest a 
contemporary form of biopolitical government which, as Bogard puts it, allows 
‘Capital… to keep its grip on bodies, in fact, to extend and tighten that grip’ (2007: 
2). But of course, Collier’s ‘topological’ analysis of biopolitics must be subject to the 
same critique as that of the biopolitical security literature in chapter 3: namely, that 
there cannot be a ‘configurational principle’ of biopower which determines how pre-
existing ‘institutional arrangements’ and ‘material forms’ are recombined, any more 
than there can be pre-existing ‘analytical categories’ of circulating, emergent life 
which biopower exclusively addresses. Indeed Marieke de Goede (2011) puts 
precisely this critique to the concept of the modulating network set out by Deleuze. 
The ‘network has no outside’, she claims, ‘neither spatially nor discursively’; and for 
this reason, ‘there is no external point from which to critique the network; the 
binary language of being ‘with us’ or ‘against us’ seems obsolete’ (de Goede, 2011). 
Ultimately, she advises that ‘new avenues of critique have to be entertained, that 
include critical reflection on our own discourses of networked danger, including the 
language of hubs, nodes, links and associations’ (de Goede, 2011).   
In my view, Deleuze’s account of the modulating principle of the control society 
puts too much emphasis on ‘metastability’ and ‘continuous variation’ to be entirely 
convincing as a framework for understanding BALTIC’s level 4 control (1992: 5). 
After all, level 4 control both results from, and relies on, a number of juridical and 
sovereign institutions; what de Goede terms ‘indispensable authoritative bases’ 
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(2005: xx). To what extent would the kind of control mechanisms represented by 
level 4 control even be in place at BALTIC if they were not required by the 
government as a condition for the indemnifying of valuable artworks? To what 
extent could BALTIC go about its business of the public display of artworks if the 
GIS did not exist and it had to pay for prohibitive commercial insurance policies? 
And what would level 4 control even be worth if videotape from CCTV systems 
could not be used to prosecute individuals in the courts?135 
Bogard extends Deleuze’s short exposition of the control society by explicitly 
framing its emergence through the ‘telos of the disciplines’ (though complex and 
incomplete) as ‘a problem of capitalist governance, involving the limits of enclosure 
as a tool of capitalist accumulation’ (2007: 1-2). Specifically, he writes, capitalism 
began to encounter the ‘resistance of bodies to concentrated containment and 
regimentation’ (Bogard, 2007: 2) - but this was only part of the reason. After the 
second world war, the development of information technologies ‘make it possible to 
release populations more into the open’: 
 
… rather than pack them into closed spaces, capital begins a new strategy to 
disperse them. Network controls, like remote surveillance and electronic 
passwords, allow it to keep its grip on bodies, in fact, to extend and tighten 
that grip… The forces of accumulation, exploiting the capacities of openness 
and accessibility in networks, begin to follow you on the road and… turn ‘on 
the road’ into work, home into work, play into work, the whole planet into a 
flexible, controlled space of work (Bogard, 2007: 2). 
 
The way in which the control society can be considered to blend the road, the 
home, and play into work is precisely the movement going on with the provision of 
internet and wireless internet ‘Wi-Fi’ services in airports and coffee shops, for 
example. Lacy, also staying close to Deleuze’s formulation, conceptualises 
‘biopolitical control’ as an iterative ‘breaking down [of] the interior and exterior 
spaces of control and confinement in the name of new freedoms and security’ (2008: 
339). In other words, being ‘released into the open’ as Bogard put it cannot be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 PCP explains that ‘CCTV can help clarify whether a security threat is real and identify suspect 
activity… It can also be vital in post-incident investigations, but only if the images are good enough to 
identify what happened over the timeframe and can be used evidentially in court’ (p. 17).	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considered as a ‘freedom’ as such, but instead must be scrutinised for the ways in 
which it leads to and manifests biopolitical control. 
To demonstrate this ‘breaking down’, Lacy gives the example of the airport in 
the war on terror. He writes that biometric technologies ‘are presented as a major 
leap forward in how we can move through an airport’ – ‘a new freedom’, with ‘no 
more waiting in queues’ and ‘more time to hook up to a wireless network and check 
e-mails from your networks’ (Lacy, 2008: 339; also Amoore, 2006). In this way, he 
continues, the ‘space of the airport becomes less exceptional, designed to be more 
like home/ work or a hotel/ shopping mall, with all manner of services for work or 
relaxation’ (Lacy, 2008: 339). But, crucially, at the same time it moves closer to the 
control society which will ‘depend less on sites of confinement, because everywhere 
will become part of systems of control’ (Lacy, 2008: 339). Here I would have to 
challenge to a certain extent Bogard’s claim – echoed by Lacy – that control 
societies feel like disciplinary societies, but without the walls. Does it ring true that 
the home feels like work, or it is necessary to have a more nuanced understanding of 
the control society which does not rely simply on more-or-less binary opposites to 
the disciplines? 
To put it another way: it is possible to view the aim of art galleries, including 
that of BALTIC, to break down the distinction between art and commerce, home 
and away, leisure and education within the regulatory parameters of control, and if 
so what are the implications? Alan Smith, BALTIC’s first chairman, promoted the 
concept of the ‘third place’ art gallery in his foreword to The Art Factory (Martin and 
Thomas, 2002). ‘At the start of the 21st century’, he writes: 
 
… there is a recognised need for a ‘third place’, a place which is neither work 
nor home, where people can engage in a stimulating intellectual environment 
and where the edges between learning and leisure, education and entertainment are 
blurred (Martin and Thomas, 2002: 12, emphasis added). 
 
And if this concept of the third place is juxtaposed with BALTIC’s decision not to 
have a bag search in order to appear more inviting to customers, or the way in 
which BALTIC facilitates visitors’ enjoyment and education whilst at the same time 
rigorously governing their movement and behaviour through a broad range of 
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control practices, then links emerge between leisure, culture, control and commerce 
that cannot simply be represented in negative terms. What Lacy, vis-à-vis Paul Virilio, 




5.4.2 Optimising life and counter-politics 
 
Thus far it is possible to discern how the extant literatures on biopolitical 
control make two main movements. First, they concentrate on the import and 
meaning of the different ‘strategic shift[s] in power relations’; pursuing the question 
of whether, how, and to what extent biopolitics and/or control and/or biopolitical 
control have replaced the disciplines (Bogard, 2007: 1-2). Second, they seek to 
expose the ‘mechanics’ of biopolitical control; whether as a ‘modulating principle’ as 
Deleuze would have it (1992: 5), or the ‘topological recombination’ Collier 
describes. In my view, however, such wrangling must not be allowed to – but 
invariably does - obscure what is fundamentally at stake in these debates, and what 
was the key point of Foucault’s biopolitics. That is, when life, first, and that which is 
natural reality, second, can no longer be regarded as neutral with regard to power, 
this relationship and its performativities must be viewed in terms of optimisation. 
From this perspective, the biopolitical security literature appears doubly limited. 
First, as I argued in chapter 3, it fails to appreciate that the ‘key analytical categories’ 
(Dillon, 2007a: 8) of biopolitics cannot ‘explain’ the relationship between politics and 
life because they themselves are materialised within biopolitical discourses. But now, 
second, it also misses the bull’s eye by substituting a focus on the ways in which life 
is optimised for what is ultimately just another rendering of the ‘bare life of 
emergence’ (Edkins, 2008).  
To put the argument another way, if as Foucault claimed in the Society Must Be 
Defended lectures, ‘sovereign power’s effect on life is exercised only when the 
sovereign can kill’ (SMBD: 240), then biopower is exercised whenever life is lived. 
Admittedly, this may seem like a fairly appalling statement, foreclosing – or, as one of 
Foucault’s interviewers put it, ‘anaesthetising’ – the possibility of resistance. 136 To 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Foucault, 2002: 234. 
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the contrary, I would argue that it has the potential to breathe new life (pardon the 
pun) into resistance, by foregrounding the absolutely central distinction between the 
living of life and the ways in which that living is made possible or exhorted. 
In chapter 2 I discussed the unfavourable responses of political geographers to 
Thomas Barnett’s The Pentagon’s New Map and the various geopolitical rationales for 
interconnection, which rely precisely on this notion that connectivity into the global 
economy results in ‘a substantial degree of freedom to follow one’s own course in 
life’ (Dalby, 2007: 297). Whilst in no way wanting to dismiss the many, many 
privileges afforded to westerners including a large degree of choice in personal 
expression – especially in relation to life experiences outside the west - this is still 
not the same as living one’s own life. The ways of living which are bestowed ‘a 
substantial degree of freedom’ within the global economy are made possible by and 
materialise neoliberal norms. And of equal importance to these constrained and 
normative ways of living, are the ways of living which are made impossible or 
certainly much more difficult: for example, ways of living in the neoliberal 
borderlands of the oil industry discussed by David Campbell (2007b). This 
recognition opens up, then, possibilities for contestation which are specifically 
purposed to engage with the many ways in which the living of one’s life is made 
possible, enhanced, and optimised, as Colin Gordon explains: 
 
… modern biopolitics generates a new kind of counter-politics. As 
governmental practices have addressed themselves in an increasingly 
immediate way to ‘life’… individuals have begun to formulate the needs and 
imperatives of that same life as the basis for political counter-demands (1991: 
5). 
 
Lacy recognises this absolutely key distinction between the living of life and the 
ways in which that living is made possible when he points out that, ‘far from the 
dystopias depicted in many popular visions of the future’, societies of control are 
instead shaped by ‘ecologies of control’ which ‘can become ‘benignly’ woven into our 
lives’ (2008: 333). Design, he argues, is one such benign ecology of control; and he 
returns many times to the means by which control mechanisms effortlessly mingle 
with the beautiful objects and ‘smart products’ of everyday life, such as biometric 
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MP3 players, and email - the ‘most successful aspects of contemporary wired 
economies’ (Lacy, 2008: 336-7; also Weber and Lacy, 2011). As I have illustrated in 
the discussion about the role of the Government Indemnity Scheme at BALTIC, I 
would add that insurance technologies are another. 
Yet although the GIS demands a long-term level 4 control infrastructure of 
architectural modifications, staff invigilation procedures, and electronic security 
systems, paradoxically few exhibitions at BALTIC require full government indemnity 
because the contemporary art it shows tends not to count as ‘valuable’: 
 
... [with] contemporary art, that chair [the office chair that I was sitting on] 
could be worth £50 million, you know, it is not necessarily the Mona Lisa sat 
there... if you’ve got a Picasso in here, well yeah, that’s well expensive, but the 
normal person walking in the building wouldn’t necessarily know the value 
behind what something actually is... it is not that kind of art.  
 
This, then, opens up interstitial spaces and opportunities between different security 
programs and competing performativities of value at which it becomes possible to 
unwork level 4 control as a counter-politics to biopolitical control. 
In chapter 4 I described the incident at BALTIC when an unidentified object in 
the Kienholz installation The Hoerengracht – a life-size walk-through recreation of 
Amsterdam’s Red Light District – set off a security alarm, but then turned out to be 
a lunchbox in a plastic bag which was indeed part of the artwork. But security 
threats at BALTIC are not limited to unexpected objects being ‘discovered’ in the 
artworks. ‘Over the last few years’, I was told, an ‘artistic’ inattentiveness to certain 
religious and moral values has coincided with a growing awareness of the 
vulnerability of public spaces: 
... terrorists used to be on their home ground, but not any longer. But also I 
think it is not just the international terrorism part of it, you know - we can and 
have, albeit not in a terrorist way, highlighted aggravation in a certain sector of 
the population, if sector’s the right way [to put it].  
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This ‘non-terrorist’ threat was illustrated in reference to the installation Gone, 
Yet Still by Terence Koh, shown at BALTIC in September 2007–January 2008 as part 
of the Zabludowicz Collection, which stimulated ‘aggravation’ as well as a law suit. 
Koh’s installation featured 74 small figurative statues, which were: 
 
... all the things that he would want to be in a room with when he died; there 
was ET, and they were all just made of plaster of paris, with no real features on 
them; Mickey Mouse, ET, lots of things, but they all had kind of phalluses on 
them, and he’s a gay artist, he’s kind of very controversial, his work generally 
anyway.  
 
The controversy specifically focused on a figurative statue of Jesus Christ with an 
erection which ‘upset a lot of deeply religious people’, and was the subject of a 
private prosecution for outraging public decency and causing harassment, alarm and 
distress to the public, brought by a British christian woman and funded by the 
Christian Legal Centre.137 In the end, the case was thrown out by the Crown 
Prosecution Service in November 2008, and in a statement BALTIC stated: 
  
We are particularly pleased that… the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] has 
recognised and fully taken into account the importance and influence of the 
right of freedom of expression. This was the critical issue for BALTIC and we 
take the CPS’s decision as supportive of the role that galleries have in 
promoting such freedoms. Yesterday’s decision will be welcomed by galleries 
across the UK.138  
 
Although BALTIC staff are aware that ‘some of our art can be quite political’, at 
the same time they are insistent that ‘we’re not trying to control our artwork, because 
that’s not what it is about’. In stark contrast, then, to the substantial effort, financial 
resources, and attention that goes into installing and maintaining level 4 control in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Pidd, H. (2008) ‘Christian sues gallery over ‘blasphemous’ erection’, The Guardian, 3 September 
[Online]. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/03/religion.art (Accessed 9 
November 2010).	  
138 BALTIC statement, 11 November 2008. Available at 
http://www.balticmill.com/images/pdf/pressRelease/STATEMENT_11%20November%20200858.pdf 
(Accessed 9 November 2010).	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BALTIC, in anticipation of artworks that may not even require indemnification and in 
turn this advanced level of security, staff are wholly averse to any effort to ‘control’ 
the artworks themselves. For example, the name of an exhibiting artist may be 
known for some time but the content of the show is confirmed much later – 
sometimes only when the boxes containing the artworks are opened for the first 
time. And then: ‘if we think it might provoke reaction then we look at ways to deal 
with that rather than thinking ‘we can’t have that work here because it would 
provoke a reaction’’. Working in such a process, with tight deadlines and where 
control over the content resides with the artist, it is difficult to deal with the 
security challenges posed either by the challenge to religious and/or moral values, or 
by the artworks themselves: 
 
… to be honest you could have a room like this as an exhibition and right up 
to the last minute you’ll find nothing that would hurt anybody, and the next 
thing you come in ten minutes before the opening and there are 55,000 razor 
blades put on the table… or the artist just feels ‘I wanna put a nail through the 
middle of that chair’, so that’s why it is run to the last minute. 
 
Of course, I am not suggesting that BALTIC should control the artworks they 
exhibit, either in relation to the values they may challenge or any other bloated 
construction of risk, but I think that the contrast between level 4 control and the 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
What emerges at BALTIC then is a much more complex account of security 
practices in the war on terror than that offered either by the crowded places 
publications or by the National Security Strategy. Indeed, despite BALTIC’s 
increasing involvement in crowded places security through the relationship between 
staff and the two Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers from Northumbria Police, it 
is my conclusion that security at BALTIC is still very much dominated by the ‘level 4 
control’ required by the Government Indemnity Scheme.  
By emphasising the importance of the GIS and level 4 control in this way, 
however, I would not wish to imply that the other security practices at BALTIC have 
little or no performative agency. Crowded places security is made possible at 
BALTIC precisely because it builds on the level 4 control infrastructure of CCTV 
cameras, alarmed card-access doors and staff vigilance, as well as the ‘zero-ing’ or 
emptying out and rationalisation of space associated with health and safety and the 
forms of control exercised by the white cube gallery. But more to the point, all of 
these practices are made possible by the regulatory norms of the ‘liberal way’. It 
therefore becomes vital not to confuse the materialisation of the norms – the 
different security practices - with the norms themselves, or, to put it another way, 
to reduce the norms simply to the practices.  
The work of the Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers in performing terrorism 
risk through the crowded places risk assessment and Project Argus confirms this 
argument. These performativities of terrorism risk materialise the (in)security of the 
UK’s business places, and the need to maintain business continuity. In other words, 
neither crowds, individuals, nor any national security imaginary of ‘our people’ or 
‘our citizens’ (NSS 2009: 3, 5) are the objective of crowded places security – 
although their wellbeing is certainly most welcome, as BALTIC staff demonstrated in 
what I felt was a genuinely solicitous attitude towards their visitors. Indeed, it may 
not even be correct to claim that security practices are directed towards ‘objects’ – 
people or business – in the sense of means directed towards ends, although this 
does not of course mean that people cannot suffer at the end of security practices, 
as much scholarship over the last ten years has been, rightly, at pains to point out. 
Rather, it may be better to address the question ‘what is crowded places security?’ 
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by focusing on the norms that make it possible and the performativities which give 
boundary and fixity to certain security practices and secured spaces – and these are 
the particular liberal values of art, business and business continuity. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that all of the security practices at BALTIC are 
characterised by an obsession with the ‘what ifs?’ - exemplified by the attempt of 
staff to write a new security plan in line with crowded places policy that addresses all 
potential security threats: 
 
… [the aim is] one document which would cover hopefully any kind of major 
incident because if you try to take the specifics of an incident, you can’t write 
that, it is too tunnelled, you have to look at the ‘what ifs’… it has to be open 
enough to cover everything. 
 
The ‘what ifs?’ represent, I think, what David Campbell (1998) has argued are the 
aporia, gaps, and rifts that are always present in security discourses. Rather than 
achieve an all-embracing control of space, performativities of crowded places 
security are continually and agonisingly confronted by the sheer density and volume 
of the alternatives that cannot be controlled. If crowded places were empty and ‘zero-
ed’ they would no longer offer up the ‘political economic impact’ which makes them 
an ‘attractive target’ for terrorists (PCP: 3). Thus, the fact that crowded places exist 
as an object of contemporary security practice in the UK demonstrates that they are 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
In this concluding chapter rather than repeat the arguments of the individual 
chapters, I present an overview of the research project as a whole. In the next 
section 6.2, I discuss the value of the methodological and conceptual strategy used in 
the thesis in relation to the challenges of researching the politics of security as an 
empirical phenomenon. Then in section 6.3, I outline and summarise the three main 
themes that have emerged in the thesis, and discuss directions for future research. 
These themes relate to terrorism in a global age, the biopolitics of national security, 
and the meaning of crowded places security. 
 
 
6.2 Value of the methodological and conceptual strategy 
 
The thesis critically interrogated the UK’s on-going war on terror between 
2007-2010 through the performativities of two ‘fronts’ of broadening national 
security and crowded places security. At the same time, however, the experience of 
both carrying out the research project and writing it up in the form of a PhD thesis, 
carved out a deep awareness that the closer I tried to get to the politics of security 
as an empirical phenomenon to serve as the ‘object’ of my research, the more it 
slipped away. I want to clarify this claim on two points. 
First, I am not suggesting that attempts to research, and thereby understand, the 
politics of security are in any way futile. Indeed, it is one of the main implications 
emerging from my use of critical geopolitics and biopolitical security frameworks that 
both – but particularly the latter - would be improved by a closer engagement with 
security practices ‘on the ground’, as Foucault put it in his 1978 interview ‘Questions 
of Method’ (2002: 235). Nonetheless, it is worth considering that the limitations of 
these frameworks may be less a result of theoretical nuances – geo-politics versus 
bio-politics for example – than a certain failure of scholarly imagination. I am aware 
of the irony of having critiqued the power effects of different geographical 
imaginations throughout this thesis, and now to be advocating it as a research 
strategy. However, the problem remains that the politics of security cannot be relied 
upon by researchers to materialise as phenomena easily identifiable as ‘politics’ 
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and/or ‘security’. When they do, such as the national security practices which were 
the focus of chapters 2 and 3, by all means they should be rigorously identified and 
critiqued. In terms of the prosaic practices of crowded places security, however, far 
away from the familiar intelligibilities of state politics which governments and some 
academics have grown so comfortable using (even if, as is the case with critical 
geopolitics and security studies literatures, the aim is critique and refusal), this is not 
in my view the case. Performativities of crowded places security melt into, weave 
through, and burst from a range of unexpected phenomena and domains, which 
might nominally – but only nominally - be called ‘culture’, ‘the economy’, ‘insurance’, 
and so on.  
In such circumstances, my objective of developing Judith Butler’s theory of 
performativity as a conceptual tool for critiquing contemporary security practices 
met with both successes and limitations. Performativity, I argue, can bridge what is 
assumed to be a problematic – even irreconcilable - gap between the abstract power 
relationships of discourse and the ‘real world’ of empirical phenomena. As I explain 
in greater detail below, performativity allows me to position a greater range of 
everyday security practices within their discursive context, and, conversely, to 
identify security discourses in their everyday empirical form. Performativities of 
broadening national security may be intuitively recognisable as power relationships, 
although their role in the current re-materialisation of neoliberal discourses as the 
‘international terrorist’ threat and as counter-terrorism regimes is poorly 
understood – a gap which this thesis began to address. But the same cannot be said 
for chapter 4’s highlighting of how performativities of ‘zero space’ in contemporary 
white cube galleries do not simply co-exist alongside the emptying out and 
rationalising of space carried out by security practices, but rather make such 
practices possible. In other words, ‘zero-ing’ space can be considered to materialise 
liberal norms rather than being an objective of crowded places security in its own 
right. Such an argument adds considerable depth and insight into contemporary 
security practices in public space. 
But on the other hand, there is an inherent challenge in all this because 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of discourse was necessarily of a centrifugal 
epistemological domain of ever-increasing links, ties, and relations. In ‘Questions of 
Method’, Foucault described his approach as ‘rediscovering the connections, 
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encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given 
moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and 
necessary’ (2002: 227). It is, he continued, ‘a sort of multiplication or pluralization of 
causes’ (Foucault, 2002: 227). The problem, of course, is that such a ‘pluralization of 
causes’ is difficult to reconcile with and represent within academic discourse: either 
in the conduct of research, or even less so when ‘writing up’. This thesis developed 
performativity as a tool for matching this ‘pluralization of causes’ – in other words, 
for approaching discourse empirically – and thus shed light on the possible direction 
– and limitations – of a ‘Foucauldian methodology’. 
Foucault’s genealogical method is not about creating a history of social 
phenomena, but rather an analysis of historical practices as ‘programs of conduct’, 
with ‘effects regarding what is to be done… [and] what is to be known’ (Foucault, 
2002: 225). The importance of these ‘effects’ of discourse is precisely that they are 
‘effects in the real’: ‘they crystallize into institutions, they inform individual behaviour, 
they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things’ (Foucault, 2002: 232). 
Butler (1993: 22, 20) acknowledges Foucault’s arguments on regulatory power as the 
‘point of departure’ for her theory of performativity: whilst he writes of effects in 
the real, she investigates ‘the power of discourse to produce effects through 
reiteration’. This notion of reiteration is absolutely key. Foucault was hard to pin 
down on how discursive effects crystallized into institutions, informed behaviour, and 
so on. Central to performativity, however, is the argument that discourse becomes 
real through ‘citational practices’: the ‘ritualized repetition’ of discursive norms 
which ‘produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter’ (Butler, 1993: 2, 
x, 9, emphasis in original). 
Using performativity I was thus able in chapters 2 and 3 to investigate how 
contemporary UK national security discourses materialise as particular spatial (and 
political) configurations. The reiteration of ‘broadening national security’ by a wide 
range of policies and practices including the National Security Strategy and crowded 
places security, gives fixity to the imaginary of an interconnected globe. Whilst 
dramatic advances in communication technologies have undoubtedly produced new 
spatialities and relations of global reach, I argued that performativities of an 
interconnected globe primarily function to reproduce and legitimise a neoliberal 
geopolitical order. 
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But Butler also went beyond Foucault’s conception of discourse: ‘it is not 
enough to claim that human subjects are constructed’, she wrote, without 
recognising that this process is a ‘differential operation’ which produces the human 
as well as ‘the more and the less ‘human’’ (1993: 8). These are the abject subjects and 
domains which are produced within regulatory power as its ‘constitutive outside’, 
and which ‘haunt’ discursive norms with ‘the persistent possibility of their disruption 
and rearticulation’ (Butler, 1993: 8). In this way, when performativities of an 
interconnected globe fail, and fixity is not achieved or is disrupted, violence under 
the remit of national security is used to re-enforce the norms and maintain the 
status quo. As the NSS claims that the alternative to global economic and social 
uniformity is an ever-broadening landscape of interconnected threats and risks, it is 
those who reject or are ‘disconnected’ from such British and western norms (or can 
be portrayed thus) such as diasporic communities who get written into this domain 
of danger. 
Finally, performativity has been used more recently to account for the 
materialisation of discourses beyond the citational practices of subjects alone. This 
attention to material agency – the constitutive power of objects in political 
assemblages – was also largely absent from Foucault’s work.139 Nicky Gregson and 
Gillian Rose (2000: 434) argue that space is not only ‘brought into being’ through 
performativity but is also ‘a performative articulation of power’. This understanding 
of space as reiterating and reproducing discourse allowed me to make visible a range 
of security practices that would not be visible with other critical security or 
performativity approaches that focus solely on the ‘sayings’ and ‘doings’ of people. In 
chapter 4 I explored the role of buildings, documents, installation artworks, and even 
trees in materialising the emptied and rationalised ‘zero space’ of crowded places 
security, which in turn reproduces a (neo)liberal status quo. At the same time, 
however, this material culture – unidentified objects in artworks for example - 
confronts crowded places security with the reality of that which cannot be 
controlled.           
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Although he did not discount the importance of ‘more than human’ agency in discourse. For 
example, in STP he counselled that ‘a field of forces… cannot be created by a speaking subject alone 
and on the basis of his words, because it is a field of forces that cannot in any way be controlled or 
asserted within this kind of imperative [human-willed] discourse” (p. 3). 
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I also attempted to match this pluralization of causes in the politics of security 
by using a range of literatures which engaged with the performativities at hand, 
rather than forcing the performativities to fit the literature – which in the case of 
crowded places security would have been impossible as the literature is negligible. So 
as chapter 2 testifies, when I encountered the ways in which broadening national 
security depends on geographical knowledges, specifically of global interconnection, I 
turned to the work of Edward Said and others on the concept of the imaginative 
geography. As Chapter 4 illustrates, during my fieldwork at BALTIC I encountered 
not only a range of security practices - health and safety, ‘normal’ building security, 
and crowded places security – which to a large extent reflected and reiterated each 
other, but also a revolving cast of tensions between such practices and the daily 
‘business’ of the gallery itself: the showing of art. In attempting, then, to understand 
the particular performativities of space involved in the daily business of art I looked 
to visual culture and Brian O’Doherty’s work on the ‘white cube’. There I found a 
scathing critique of the political conservatism of the modernist gallery through 
performativities of zero space – a fitting conceptualisation, it seemed to me, of what 
allowed the different security practices in BALTIC to speak with one voice or read 
from the same hymn sheet, as it were. 
But advocating the use of a wider range of literatures and conceptual 
frameworks to approach the politics of security is not as good as admitting that 
security is everywhere or everything is (or can potentially be) security. Such claims 
would only repeat the unhelpful logics of abstracted ways of knowing and 
prescribing. Indeed, this is one of my main criticisms of the biopolitical security 
literature, as I discussed in chapters 3 and 5. By claiming that biopolitics secures ‘by 
instantiating a general economy of the contingent throughout all the processes of re-
productive circulation that impinge upon species existence as such’ (Dillon, 2007a: 
9), the literature not only fails the test of intuition (when one thinks to oneself ‘that 
does not ring true’ or ‘that does not describe my experience’), but it also does not 
stand up to investigation. In its designation of ‘Public opinion, culture and 
information’ as a threat domain, broadening national security demonstrates it is still 
very concerned not with ‘species existence’ but with the human capacity to think, 
behave, emote, and enjoy. And my case study of crowded places security at BALTIC 
illustrated how contemporary forms of biopolitical control are navigating, if anything, 
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an even closer intimacy with the human capacities made possible by contemporary 
technologies such as the internet. The human desire to interact with others, for 
example, is not being repressed and diminished to a bare biological life – it is being 
exploited, it is being opened up to new vistas of contact with forms of control. 
Perhaps, then, this exploitation and opening up is the most important implication of 
the biopolitical making life live. My research strategy therefore illuminates the first 
steps in the direction of a more responsive and receptive attitude (for want of better 
words) in researching the politics of security.  
As I discussed in chapter 1, qualitative methodologies respond to the 
specificities and unpredictability of social phenomena, and this objective was 
reflected in my research strategy. By employing a ‘micro-ethnographic’ approach 
combining interviews, participant observation, and textual analysis of documents to 
investigate and critique crowded places security at BALTIC, I was able to circumvent 
the criticism (e.g., Megoran, 2006) that research in political geography tends towards 
discourse analysis at the expense of everyday experience. 
Furthermore, conceptualising the empirical material on security that I gathered 
at BALTIC through the theoretical lens of performativity consolidated this strategy 
in two ways. First, by focusing on citational practices, and, moreover, the possibility 
of their failure, performativity foregrounds precisely the contingent and incomplete 
process through which imaginaries of ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’ space are rendered 
fixed and bounded over and over again every day. For example, zero space may be 
the objective of crowded places security at BALTIC, but my research illustrated how 
easily a range of objects – from rubbish on the floors to bits of the artworks 
themselves – can undermine the possibility of securing a crowded place. Second, 
then, by attending to the performative role of material culture and space alongside 
citational practices, recent developments in performativity theory - such as that of 
Gregson and Rose (2000) - are more receptive to the broader range of agencies that 
go into materialising security discourses on a daily basis. This is particularly 
important with ‘new’ security policies such as crowded places which it would be easy 
to slot into existing frameworks, with the result that the implications of these 
distinct policies could be missed. Indeed, the role of the Government Indemnity 
Scheme and its associated objects – e.g., glass cases - and practices – e.g., staff 
invigilation - sheds light on the extent to which crowded places security is concerned 
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to protect business and commercial interests. In these ways, research into security 
that uses performativity adds an important ‘everyday’ counter-narrative to official 
security discourses. 
My second point about the challenge of researching the politics of security is 
that, despite the fact that it is only ever partially and fleetingly captured within the 
meshes of academic research, this is in no way reflected by a downgrading or 
lessening of security’s violent effects in the real. For whilst academics struggle to 
conceptualise the politics of security manifested or intensified by the war on terror, 
the security politics of the war on terror go blithely on – mostly unaware of, and 
untroubled by, the many frustrated attempts to understand what they are. But this is 
not about hopelessness – after all, achieving success or suffering failure both depend 
on the goals that were set out to begin with. 
Indeed, Foucault was pressed to reflect precisely on how and why the effects of 
critique fail in regard to effects in the real. It was put to him that his critique of 
prisons in Discipline and Punish had ‘an absolutely sterilizing or, rather, anesthetizing 
effect’ on social workers and other social reformers, because they felt that rather 
than create instabilities in the real life of prisons and their prisoners, he instead 
offered up only ‘an implacable logic that left them no possible room for initiative’ 
(Foucault, 2002: 236). Whilst in Bodies That Matter, Butler is if not optimistic then 
certainly determined that that which has been ‘foreclosed or banished from the 
proper domain of ‘sex’’ might be ‘produced as a troubling return… a radical 
rearticulation of the symbolic horizon’ (1993: 23), Foucault replied to his 
interlocutor somewhat drolly that he didn’t feel capable of ‘subverting all codes’, 
‘dislocating all orders of knowledge’, and ‘overturning all contemporary culture’ 
(2002: 234). Instead, his objective was ‘to give some assistance in wearing away 
certain self-evidences and commonplaces’ (2002: 234) – a very modest claim for a 
man whose work is still hugely influential as a form of critique almost thirty years 
after his death. For Foucault then, critique: 
 
… doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, ‘this, then, is 
what needs to be done’. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those 
who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and 
confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law. 
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It isn’t a stage in programming. It is a challenge directed to what is (Foucault, 
2002: 236, emphasis added).  
 
With these sentiments in place, in the next section I discuss three key challenges 
emerging from the thesis and directions for future ‘essays in refusal’. 
 
 
6.3 Summary of main research themes 
 
 
6.3.1 Terrorism in a global age 
 
Chapter 2 argues that broadening national security, of which the new UK 
National Security Strategies of 2008 and 2009 are both a description and 
reinscription, materialises the norms of neoliberal globalisation – what then Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown referred to in classic Orwellian newspeak as the 
‘opportunities of the global age’ (NSS 2009: 3). But as Wendy Larner (2008) has 
pointed out, citations of neoliberal discourses are neither monolithic nor 
homogeneous – they take a number of forms. Chapter 2 highlights performativities 
of interconnection, and argues that broadening national security reiterates 
interconnection as a broadening register of coercive practices. For example, ‘horizon 
scanning’ – the dubious art of materialising threats which do not yet exist – and the 
building and strengthening of broader partnerships between national security, the 
public and private sectors, and citizens. These practices materialise or ‘bring to life’ a 
world in which the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence – which is at present what 
national security remains – is increasingly woven into everyday spaces. 
Although broadening national security did not begin with the war on terror, it 
has and continues to enable the re-imagining both of the terrorist threat and the 
objectives and conduct of counter-terrorism which have been such distinctive 
features of the conflict, and which have legitimated many of its violences. Diasporic 
communities in particular have become trapped in the ‘abject domains’ materialised 
by performativities of terror and counter-terror. Chapter 2 illustrates how in an 
‘interconnected globe’ the UK is materialised as ‘a stage where international 
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events can be played out domestically’ (NSS 2009: 38, emphasis in original). In 
other words, and to paraphrase Edward Said, interconnection – particularly through 
the internet and ease of travel - means that ‘they’ bring outside dangers into ‘our 
land’. Chapter 3 highlights how broadening national security performs the terrorist 
threat as an issue of ‘Public opinion, culture and information’. This has a number of 
implications ranging from the use of international diplomacy to promote the UK’s 
so-called ‘core values’ abroad, to challenging the ideology of international terrorism 
within the UK, whereby diasporic communities are, once again, disproportionately 
targeted. When the NSS discusses ‘wider community cohesion’ as an element of 
national security, it means the more or less coercive cooption of British Muslims 
into a supposedly homogeneous British community, an excellent example of what 
Brian O’Doherty referred to as the ‘eternal rightness’ of the liberal way, and how it 
censors the world of social variation.     
This on-going re-imagining of the terrorist threat illustrates, then, that just 
because broadening national security materialises norms of neoliberal globalisation 
does not mean that its practices are confined to the global level - this would be to 
mistake the materialisation of the norms for the norms themselves. Instead, 
performativities of interconnection and broadening national security precisely herald 
the disregard of neoliberal discourses for traditional spatialisations of 
national/international and inside/outside. In this sense the war on terror is not simply 
a war that happens on domestic and international fronts simultaneously; it is a singular 
conflict in which the notion of domestic and international with which scholars are 
used to working are outdated. Counter-intuitively perhaps, the UK government 
demonstrates a much better grasp of these new meanings than the academy – which 
is what makes the security policies I have used in this research project such 
compelling case studies. 
So if scholars aim to understand and critique contemporary counter-terror 
regimes they must likewise address themselves to the ways in which its objectives 
and conduct are changing as national security shifts focus from sovereign interests to 
protecting the global economy. And just as broadening national security is not solely 
a New Labour story (emerging as a set of practices key to the western-led re-
ordering of global geopolitics after the end of the cold war), it has been retained by 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government which succeeded New 
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Labour in May 2010. Not the least in the form of third versions of the National 
Security Strategy and the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, published in 
October 2010 and July 2011 respectively.140 Broadening national security and its re-
imagining of the terrorist threat is therefore very much a clear and present, and 
future, challenge for critical security scholarship.  
My case study of crowded places security in the BALTIC Centre for 
Contemporary Art, Gateshead, was designed precisely as an in-depth exploration of 
the new policy responses being licensed by broadening national security, and it threw 
up some interesting and important points about terrorism in a global age. On the 
one hand, ‘elite’ representations of broadening national security in the National 
Security Strategy are performed through what Simon Dalby termed a ‘global war 
script’ of interconnection. But on the other hand, crowded places security in 
BALTIC is materialised through ostensibly quite different performativities of 
emptying out or ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive 'zero tolerance' risk imaginaries, and 
extensive electronic surveillance. In conceptualising these performativities - which 
are still after all national security - as well as the step-change itself, I found critical 
geopolitics frameworks of limited value. This is because despite claims like those of 
Campbell and Power (2010: 244) that critical geopolitics has displaced state-centric 
readings and ‘opened up the range of sites/ texts/ practices where ‘geopolitics’ is 
seen to take place’, in my view its frameworks nonetheless remain indebted to the 
legacy of inter-state/ international/ global relations – albeit in a relation of negative 
repudiation. Therefore they are in many ways not up to the task of conceptualising, 
for example, the insurance technologies and performativities of business continuity 
by which national security is materialised in the UK’s businesses and public services. 
The failure may also be, as I discussed above, one of ‘academic imagination’: 
particularly in terms of confusing the materialisation of norms with the norms 
themselves. In my view, it is less an issue of understanding how the war on terror is 
fought simultaneously through domestic practices (counter-terrorism in crowded 
places) and foreign practices (military interventions) – in other words, of categorising 
and clarifying these practices in terms of national and international, inside and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 It is also interesting to note that the coalition government has produced Arabic and Urdu (and 
Welsh) translations of CONTEST, which were not available under the Labour government. See 
‘Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST)’ on the Home Office website. Available at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/counter-terrorism-strategy/ (Accessed 
15 September 2011). 
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outside, and so on. It is rather an imperative for scholars to recognise that neoliberal 
norms are materialised as a range of security practices where national and 
international no longer have the same meaning. Whereby, for example, the global 
market determines the value of artworks on public display in the UK, and the value 
in turn determines the level of control to which both the artworks and the visitors 
and users of public space are subjected. In seeking to advance such an understanding 
of national security which moves beyond the spatialisations of a bygone ‘inter-state’ 




6.3.2 The biopolitics of national security 
 
Chapter 3 develops the concept of biopolitical security using Butler’s theory of 
performativity; shifting the emphasis from how biopolitics work to how they perform 
liberal norms. It is argued that biopolitical performativities – such as multiplicity, 
population, the milieu, circulation and the uncertain - materialise realities natural to 
liberal norms. Specifically, these natural realities are spaces of security: realities 
which are open, uncertain, and broadening. Going against the grain of the extant 
security studies literatures, I conclude that biopolitics neither regulate nor secure 
populations and circulations; instead, they materialise spaces of security, and in this 
sense populations and circulations are already secured. This is not to claim that ways 
of living imagined in terms of circulation and population – migrating populations or 
‘globalisation’ itself - do not or cannot exist without biopolitics. Rather, they cannot 
be given the effect of boundary, fixity, and matter outside regulatory discourse. 
The implication of this argument is that what are commonly posited as 
biopolitical security mechanisms in the security studies literatures – biometrics, 
etcetera – are instead the attempt to bring the excess of human life into line with 
these already-secured realities. Here I do not mean excess as any tangible or even 
intangible object – rather, excess is that which operates beyond liberal imaginaries. It 
is something like the constitutive outside, the abject domain, of contemporary 
biopolitics. Essentially, these are not mechanisms situated within the ordinary 
workings of biopolitical discourses, they are practices at the very edge of political 
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possibility, made necessary when biopolitics fails or goes wrong. Though it may be 
little consolation, the biopolitics of the war on terror, which have galvanised an 
entire counter-discourse in the academy, the media, and the general public, 
demonstrate not the apogee of power over life but its glitches – the failure of its 
founding imaginaries. The ghost that haunts national security, therefore, is how best 
to bring excess into line with political-economic realities. 
This return to Foucault’s work in his late-1970s lecture seria on biopolitics, and 
the recovery of his emphasis on its ‘political-economic program’ (STP: 41), is crucial 
in adapting the concept of biopolitical security to deal with the contemporary 
challenges of broadening national security. I would not want to dismiss the concerns 
of the extant biopolitical security literature: the ways in which biopolitical norms are 
materialised as complex ways of life, aided and abetted by advances in information 
technology and genetic engineering – or what Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero describe as 
‘species life understood as emergent being is radically contingent being’ (2009: 14). 
But nonetheless, if the terms of the debate are shifted from species life to ‘natural 
reality’ (STP: 41), from ‘biological and biosociological processes’ to liberal political 
economy (SMBD: 250), it becomes much easier to understand the ways in which 
counter-terrorism and crowded places security are made possible by the neoliberal 
discourses which are increasingly the condition of possibility for national security. 
Indeed, chapter 5 argues that crowded places security is the biopolitical government 
of ways of life too. But the literature as it stands simply offers no framework to 
adequately conceptualise its control practices with their mêlée of people, objects, 
legal frameworks, and so on.  
What emerges, then, is a need for a recognition of the biopolitical 
performativities of broadening national security that does not just substitute 
‘population’ or ‘circulation’ for ‘state’; thereby reiterating the limitations of the 
critical geopolitics literature’s indebtedness to the increasingly less useful 
frameworks of inter-state relations. Rather, the biopolitical performativities of 
broadening national security would more appropriately signal a geopolitics of 
everyday spaces. By ‘everyday spaces’ I do not mean in any micro- or intra-state 
sense, but in terms of a spatial politics of the optimisation of life. This is no doubt a 
clumsy phrase, but I want to capture the sense of a spatial biopolitics which do not 
return in the end to traditional geographies of national/international and 
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inside/outside - although, as Foucault always took care to point out in this lectures, 
there may be many points of overlap and indistinction. One example from the thesis 
is the Government Indemnity Scheme, which is primarily responsible for introducing 
multiple forms of biopolitical control at BALTIC, but which is still after all a state-led, 
sovereign practice. The state is therefore still a major producer of violence, both in 
its traditional sovereign form as demonstrated by national security, and as a 
mediator within performativities of biopolitical control, as demonstrated by the role 
of the GIS at BALTIC. The point then, is not to dismiss the importance of 
governments and the state, but to appreciate the ways in which they may be 
involved in biopolitical as well as geopolitical security practices, including in counter-
terror regimes.  
 The thesis therefore takes the first steps towards a conceptualisation of the 
spatial politics of the optimisation of life, which can be summed up in three ways. 
First, it responds to the limitations of the nation-state imaginary resulting from 
processes of neoliberal globalisation: in particular, the breaking down of traditional 
sovereign borders between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and the increasing importance 
within national security policy of protecting the global economy. Such limitations 
have only been further exacerbated by trends and events in global politics under the 
rubric of the war on terror: practices of so-called ‘homeland security’ such as 
national ID cards which deeply unsettle the traditional notion of the rights-bearing 
citizen through their focus on the body as political signifier; and of course the focus 
of the thesis crowded places security, which rematerialises the UK’s high streets and 
public services as sites of national security. 
So second, there is an important sense in which notions of biopolitics and 
control are better able to conceptualise more ‘prosaic’ and diffuse forms of 
governance beyond the geopolitical state imaginary. This has been argued extensively 
by scholars across the social sciences, and some of whom I discussed in chapter 5. 
However, I also suggested an important way in which this literature could be 
developed to be even more receptive to prosaic forms of governance through 
security. Specifically, I argued that there needs to be a deeper working through by 
scholars of Foucault’s emphasis on biopolitics as the optimisation and control, rather 
than repression and control, of contemporary ways of living. Foucault had already 
made this argument in 1975’s Discipline and Punish: ‘we must cease once and for all’, 
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he wrote, ‘to describe the effects of power in negative terms’ (1991: 194). Instead, 
‘power produces; it produces reality’ (Foucault, 1991: 194).   
Third then, I want to argue that biopolitics should be conceptualised as the 
politics of the bad days, when one does feel oppressed and powerless, and of the 
good days, for example when one is spending time at an art gallery, enjoying art, 
tasty food, and luxury shopping, while all the while those sensations are being made 
possible through an extensive range of spatial control practices and regulatory 
norms. To do so is not to surrender all hope and optimism to a dystopian reality in 
which the innermost and sacrosanct human qualities are being ‘securitised’. I do not 
believe this to be the case, nor is it the intended implication of my argument. But to 
remain blind to the ways in which life is the object of politics – that is, the ways in 
which the natural realities of contemporary life are already the materialisation of 
regulatory norms - are already secured in certain ways towards certain ends - would 
be naïve. The importance of developing the concept of biopolitical security in the 
ways I have argued, and in particular of learning to recognise the distinction between 
living one’s own ‘natural reality’, and the norms and control practices which make 
certain realities natural, is that, as chapter 5 argues, it creates the possibility of 
capitalising on those moments and sites of excess at which biopolitical norms are 
most vulnerable. 
 
6.3.3 Crowded places security 
 
Chapter 1 discusses the importance of paying attention to what makes social 
phenomena singular. Crowded places security is an insight into the results when 
national counter-terrorism policy arrives in a contemporary art gallery where 
security is primarily understood as that of the artworks on display. Chapters 4 and 5 
illustrate, however, that the practices of crowded places security were not so 
unfamiliar at BALTIC as might at first be assumed (and as at first I did assume). 
Indeed, crowded places security ‘piggy backs’ on existing security practices at 
BALTIC put in place by the GIS: the use of glass for example, and, of course, level 4 
control. Furthermore, conceptualised through a performativity framework, it is not 
so much that crowded places security reiterates existing performativities of security 
at BALTIC. Rather, it would be a more accurate assessment that performativities of 
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security – be they health and safety, crowded places and so on – coalesce around 
the ‘zero-ing’ of space, and in this way materialise liberal norms. In other words, it is 
not a question of what crowded places security does to space at BALTIC, but what 
space can do for crowded places security – specifically, crowded places security 
reiterates the forms of spatial and social control associated with the ‘liberal way’. 
Chapter 5 develops this argument by considering the role of risk imaginaries and 
biopolitical security at BALTIC. The logic of crowded places security is that they are 
particularly vulnerable because they are particularly accessible and available, and in 
this way they seem to illustrate precisely the biopolitical space of security I discussed 
in chapter 3: the ever-wider circuits materialising liberal norms of ‘not interfering, 
allowing free movement, letting things follow their course; laisser-faire, passer et 
aller…’ (Foucault, 2007: 20). Therefore biopolitical performativities should be 
considered not in terms of securing life in the manner of a directly repressive 
expression of power, but as bringing the excess of these norms into line with so-
called ‘natural reality’ (STP: 41). And this is precisely the point: that there is a 
difference between one’s own ‘natural reality’ and that of liberal norms, and 
biopolitical performativities attempt to reconcile – more or less coercively – the 
former to the latter.  
Recognising this distinction becomes crucially important when attempting to 
understand the biopolitical performativities of crowded places security, where the 
key terms of the biopolitical security literature, such as circulation, are much less 
‘obvious’ than they would be in airports or train stations. The latter are spaces 
purposed for rapid and transient mobilities; thus they intuitively ‘fit’ with the 
narratives of speed and movement which overlay the extant biopolitical security 
literature. Indeed, it is for this reason that this literature must be considered as 
reiterating and thus materialising the very phenomena they seek to critique. 
Instead, my interpretation of biopolitical security draws on William Bogard’s 
eloquent appraisal that the control materialised by biopolitics has all the ‘feel’ of 
discipline without its walls (although as contemporary examples in the Middle East 
demonstrate, walls are still important in the materialisation of regulatory norms). 
What is most interesting and important about my case study of the biopolitical space 
of security at BALTIC, then, is the closer access it affords to what contemporary 
forms of control ‘feel’ like. Biopolitical control does not prevent movement or 
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enclose bodies in the manner of disciplinary mechanisms – this much has been 
argued in the literature. Rather, it makes possible, exhorts and optimises ways of 
living within certain regulatory norms, and makes other ways of living more difficult – 
particularly through what Bogard describes as ‘direct adjustments of the sensitivity of 
the body, its capacities to affect and be affected’ (2007: 3). An example would be 
how BALTIC facilitates visitors’ enjoyment, education and appreciation whilst at the 
same time rigorously controlling those experiences by a zero-ing of space, regulation 
of touch and optical control. 
The problem arises, of course, precisely when these forms of control do not 
work. When the excess represented by that which cannot be known in advance is 
too challenging, too overwhelming to be brought into line. Here, then, ever-wider 
forms of control must match ever-increasing possibilities. The ‘complex, diverse and 
unpredictable challenges’ arising in an interconnected global age must be matched by 
‘a broader range’ of coercive responses (NSS 2009: 19, 14). The unknown dangers in 
the art gallery must be matched with an all-encompassing ‘control of space’, 
sacrificing much of the human detail. In other words, the response to an ever-wider 
biopolitical space of security is an ever-broadening range of coercive security 
practices. 
In terms of future work on crowded places security, I want to make three 
points. First, BALTIC does not represent a definitive case study of crowded places 
security. After all, it is a key characteristic of the kind of qualitative research carried 
out in this thesis not to make generalisations as in ‘traditional science’, but rather to 
provide results that are ‘dependable and trustworthy’ within specific contexts (Gray, 
2009: 165). How, then, might my argument about crowded places security 
reiterating the ‘liberal way’ through performativities of zero space, risk, and 
biopolitical control work in other crowded places such as shopping centres, sports 
stadia, and so on? Alongside this consideration of other crowded places, it will be 
important to monitor the development of the policy itself as it moves further away 
from its immediate post-review phase and into, literally, everyday life. As Working 
Together to Protect Crowded Places warns, crowded places security is continually being 
developed. 
Second, it is also my view that it is important not to focus on crowded places 
security at all. By this paradoxical statement I want to emphasise that crowded 
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places security reiterates discourses which are not mutually inclusive with its 
practices – once again the materialisation of the norms must not be confused with 
the norms themselves. Indeed, one of the most important implications of developing 
performativity as a conceptual framework for contemporary spaces of security is, as 
I signalled in chapter 1, that it draws out or at least draws attention to the multiple 
performativities which materialise the ‘iterable structure’ of security in public space 
(Butler, 2010: 149). I have referred to some of these in the thesis: civil contingency, 
resilience, and the protection of critical national infrastructure. There is still work to 
be done in understanding these emerging performativities of security.  
Thus at the same time, third, scholars must be able to locate and challenge the 
sometimes violent but always exclusionary norms enabling the war on terror, 
without getting distracted or even terminally lead off course by whatever new policy 
the government produces.141 Policy-oriented critique is dangerous for two reasons. 
First, policies and governments change, but the exclusions remain. During the course 
of this research project there was a change in government – indeed, a rather 
fundamental change from majority to coalition government – the publication of two 
new CONTEST strategies (March 2009 and July 2011), and the review and 
publication of two specific security policies: the Prevent strategy in June 2011, and of 
course crowded places in March 2010. For this reason, it is important to provide 
genealogies of security policies – as chapter 2 provided for the National Security 
Strategy and CONTEST – alongside contemporary analysis. Second, the way in which 
the new security policies are presented in glossy portable document format (‘pdf’) 
publicly available on the internet, and in particular the use of management jargon, go 
a long way to banalising and depolicitising security policy. Indeed, I am suspicious that 
even if this is not the objective of these presentational tricks, they may still be 
implicitly acknowledged as a useful side effect. In my view, maintaining a balance 
between an empirical focus on policy and practices ‘on the ground’, and a 
genealogical approach can yield important ‘essays of refusal’ to the UK’s on-going 
war on terror.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster (2011: 4) make exactly this point in relation to the political 
management, the securing, of so-called ‘catastrophic’ events. ‘If we are to understand the 
governmental regime that emerges in our encounter with an unknown and unexpected future’, they 
write, ‘it is equally important to move beyond discursive differences’. For, ‘even when naming an 
event as ‘catastrophe’ is carefully avoided, unknown, unpredictable and worst case scenario events 
are added to the knowledge of disaster, risks, crises, emergencies and dangers’ (Aradau and van 
Munster, 2011: 4). 
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